{"id":"CVE-2026-29112","aliases":["EUVD-2026-12743","GHSA-v3r3-4qgc-vw66"],"status":"published","title":"@dicebear/converter vulnerable to ncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions","description":"DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.0036,"percentile":0.30011,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-770"],"published":"2026-03-16T16:15:33Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@dicebear/converter","fixed_in":["9.4.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@dicebear/converter","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"9.4.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@dicebear/converter","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"9.4.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"dicebear","product":"dicebear"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/security/advisories/GHSA-v3r3-4qgc-vw66","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/commit/42a59eac46a3c68598859e608ec45e578b27614a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear/releases/tag/v9.4.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Product","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29112","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v3r3-4qgc-vw66"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/29xxx/CVE-2026-29112.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-29112","title":"@dicebear/converter vulnerable to ncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions","description":"DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-18T02:19:56.503Z","modified":"2026-03-18T20:03:09.619Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:56.284359Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-12743","description":"DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-18T02:19:56Z","modified":"2026-03-18T20:03:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:32.813864Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-v3r3-4qgc-vw66","title":"Uncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions in @dicebear/converter","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` (versions \u003c 9.4.0) read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service.\n\nThis primarily affects server-side applications that pass **untrusted or user-supplied SVGs** to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in version **9.4.0**. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-16T16:15:33Z","modified":"2026-03-19T21:00:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:38.524712Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-29112","description":"DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-18T04:17:16.037Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:29:37.18Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:09.735529Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-29112","title":"@dicebear/converter vulnerable to ncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions","description":"DiceBear is an avatar library for designers and developers. Prior to version 9.4.0, the `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service. This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade. This is fixed in version 9.4.0. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default. If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-18T02:19:56.503Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03.857271948Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:00.530889Z"},{"id":"GHSA-v3r3-4qgc-vw66","title":"Uncontrolled memory allocation via crafted SVG dimensions in @dicebear/converter","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `ensureSize()` function in `@dicebear/converter` (versions \u003c 9.4.0) read the `width` and `height` attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. `width=\"999999999\"`) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service.\n\nThis primarily affects server-side applications that pass **untrusted or user-supplied SVGs** to the converter's `toPng()`, `toJpeg()`, `toWebp()`, or `toAvif()` functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in version **9.4.0**. The `ensureSize()` function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new `size` option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the `width` and `height` attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-16T16:15:33Z","modified":"2026-03-19T21:17:23.205733Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:56.639206Z"}]}}