{"id":"CVE-2026-33184","aliases":["EUVD-2026-18891","GHSA-5rm9-893q-vmhm"],"status":"published","title":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross: Discovery handshake limit could underflow and later provoke a deterministic overflow panic","description":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00479,"percentile":0.41814,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-191"],"published":"2026-04-03T22:09:01Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48Z","products":[{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"core-rs-albatross"},{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"nimiq_proof-of-stake"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-5rm9-893q-vmhm","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3664","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/8f60a2d75b74b55764ecf34bd4435f4961630595","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33184.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33184","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33184","title":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross: Discovery handshake limit could underflow and later provoke a deterministic overflow panic","description":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-03T22:09:01.43Z","modified":"2026-04-06T13:19:33.717Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-191"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:07.609948Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-18891","description":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-03T22:09:01Z","modified":"2026-04-06T13:19:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:16.17729Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33184","description":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-03T23:17:03.6Z","modified":"2026-07-24T22:10:00.14Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-191"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:13.1424Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33184","title":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross: Discovery handshake limit could underflow and later provoke a deterministic overflow panic","description":"nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-03T22:09:01.43Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48.673034393Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-191"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.548715Z"}]}}