{"id":"CVE-2026-34067","aliases":["EUVD-2026-25084","GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm"],"status":"published","title":"nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch","description":"nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00318,"percentile":0.24966,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-617"],"published":"2026-04-22T19:20:50Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:36Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nimiq-transaction","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.2.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nimiq-transaction","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.2.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"nimiq-transaction"},{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"nimiq_proof-of-stake"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Patch","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3659","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/6ff0800e8e031363e787c827d8d033e5694e4e6a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34067","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/34xxx/CVE-2026-34067.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34067","title":"nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch","description":"nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T19:52:43.916Z","modified":"2026-04-23T14:17:59.735Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-617"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:13.962274Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-25084","description":"nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T19:52:43Z","modified":"2026-04-23T14:17:59Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:19.171803Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm","title":"nimiq-transaction: Panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch","description":"### Impact\n`HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. \n\nThe proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.\n\n### Patches\n[The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/6ff0800e8e031363e787c827d8d033e5694e4e6a) is included as part of [v1.3.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0).\n\n### Workarounds\nNo known workarounds know.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T19:20:50Z","modified":"2026-04-27T16:22:44Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-617"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:58.897998Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34067","description":"nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T21:17:07.76Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-617"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:15.867234Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34067","title":"nimiq-transaction vulnerable to panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch","description":"nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T19:52:43.916Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:36.532478346Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-617"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:02.247031Z"},{"id":"GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm","title":"nimiq-transaction: Panic via `HistoryTreeProof` length mismatch","description":"### Impact\n`HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. \n\nThe proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.\n\n### Patches\n[The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/6ff0800e8e031363e787c827d8d033e5694e4e6a) is included as part of [v1.3.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0).\n\n### Workarounds\nNo known workarounds know.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T19:20:50Z","modified":"2026-05-05T15:59:34.42408Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-617"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.956911Z"}]}}