{"id":"CVE-2026-34603","aliases":["EUVD-2026-17964","GHSA-g87c-r2jp-293w"],"status":"published","title":"@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions","description":"Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to version 2.2.2, @tinacms/cli recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets. If a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like pivot/written-from-media.txt as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-06","score":0.00424,"percentile":0.36865,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"published":"2026-04-01T00:23:02Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:43Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@tinacms/graphql","fixed_in":["2.2.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@tinacms/graphql","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.2.1"},{"fixed":"2.2.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@tinacms/graphql","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.2.2"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"ssw","product":"tinacms\\/cli"},{"vendor":"tinacms","product":"tinacms"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-g87c-r2jp-293w","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/f124eabaca10dac9a4d765c9e4135813c4830955","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34603","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g87c-r2jp-293w"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/34xxx/CVE-2026-34603.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34603","title":"@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions","description":"Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to version 2.2.2, @tinacms/cli recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets. If a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like pivot/written-from-media.txt as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T16:08:44.366Z","modified":"2026-04-01T17:54:25.006Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:14.665567Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-17964","description":"Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to version 2.2.2, @tinacms/cli recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets. If a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like pivot/written-from-media.txt as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T16:08:44Z","modified":"2026-04-01T17:54:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:24.09733Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-g87c-r2jp-293w","title":"@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions","description":"## Summary\n\n`@tinacms/cli` recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets.\n\nIf a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like `pivot/written-from-media.txt` as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete.\n\n## Details\n\nThe dev media handlers validate user-controlled paths with:\n\n```ts\nfunction resolveWithinBase(userPath: string, baseDir: string): string {\n  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir);\n  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(baseDir, userPath));\n  if (resolved === resolvedBase) {\n    return resolvedBase;\n  }\n  if (resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase + path.sep)) {\n    return resolved;\n  }\n  throw new PathTraversalError(userPath);\n}\n\nfunction resolveStrictlyWithinBase(userPath: string, baseDir: string): string {\n  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir) + path.sep;\n  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(baseDir, userPath));\n  if (!resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase)) {\n    throw new PathTraversalError(userPath);\n  }\n  return resolved;\n}\n```\n\nBut the validated path is then used directly for real filesystem access:\n\n```ts\nfilesStr = await fs.readdir(validatedPath);\n...\nawait fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));\nfile.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));\n...\nawait fs.remove(file);\n```\n\nThis does not account for symlinks/junctions already present below the media root. A path such as `pivot/secret.txt` can be lexically inside the media directory while the filesystem target is outside it.\n\n## Local Reproduction\n\nI verified this locally with a real junction on Windows.\n\nTest layout:\n\n- media root: `D:\\bugcrowd\\tinacms\\temp\\junction-repro4\\public\\uploads`\n- junction under media root: `public\\uploads\\pivot -\u003e D:\\bugcrowd\\tinacms\\temp\\junction-repro4\\outside`\n- file outside the media root: `outside\\secret.txt`\n\nTina's current media-path validation logic was applied and used to perform the same list/write operations the route handlers use.\n\nObserved result:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"media\": {\n    \"base\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\",\n    \"resolvedListPath\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\\\\pivot\",\n    \"listedEntries\": [\n      \"secret.txt\"\n    ],\n    \"resolvedWritePath\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\\\\pivot\\\\written-from-media.txt\",\n    \"outsideWriteExists\": true,\n    \"outsideWriteContents\": \"MEDIA_ESCAPE\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis shows the problem clearly:\n\n- the path validator accepted `pivot`\n- listing revealed a file from outside the media root\n- writing to `pivot/written-from-media.txt` created `outside\\written-from-media.txt`\n\nThe delete path uses the same flawed containment model and should be hardened at the same time.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Out-of-root file listing** via `/media/list/...`\n- **Out-of-root file write** via `/media/upload/...`\n- **Likely out-of-root file delete** via `/media/...` `DELETE`, using the same path-validation gap\n- **Bypass of the recent path traversal hardening** for any deployment whose media tree contains a link to another location\n\nThis is especially relevant in development and self-hosted workflows where the media directory may contain symlinks or junctions intentionally or via repository content.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nHarden media path validation with canonical filesystem checks:\n\n1. resolve the real base path with `fs.realpath()`\n2. resolve the real target path, or for writes the nearest existing parent\n3. compare canonical paths rather than lexical strings\n4. reject any operation that traverses through a symlink/junction to leave the real media root\n\n`path.resolve(...).startsWith(...)` is not sufficient for filesystem security on linked paths.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts`\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/models/media.ts`\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/utils/path.ts`","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T00:23:02Z","modified":"2026-04-06T16:44:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:47.945242Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34603","description":"Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to version 2.2.2, @tinacms/cli recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets. If a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like pivot/written-from-media.txt as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T17:28:41.12Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:39:18.427Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:12.73929Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34603","title":"@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions","description":"Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to version 2.2.2, @tinacms/cli recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets. If a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like pivot/written-from-media.txt as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T16:08:44.366Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:43.452099199Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:02.247031Z"},{"id":"GHSA-g87c-r2jp-293w","title":"@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions","description":"## Summary\n\n`@tinacms/cli` recently added lexical path-traversal checks to the dev media routes, but the implementation still validates only the path string and does not resolve symlink or junction targets.\n\nIf a link already exists under the media root, Tina accepts a path like `pivot/written-from-media.txt` as \"inside\" the media directory and then performs real filesystem operations through that link target. This allows out-of-root media listing and write access, and the same root cause also affects delete.\n\n## Details\n\nThe dev media handlers validate user-controlled paths with:\n\n```ts\nfunction resolveWithinBase(userPath: string, baseDir: string): string {\n  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir);\n  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(baseDir, userPath));\n  if (resolved === resolvedBase) {\n    return resolvedBase;\n  }\n  if (resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase + path.sep)) {\n    return resolved;\n  }\n  throw new PathTraversalError(userPath);\n}\n\nfunction resolveStrictlyWithinBase(userPath: string, baseDir: string): string {\n  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(baseDir) + path.sep;\n  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(baseDir, userPath));\n  if (!resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase)) {\n    throw new PathTraversalError(userPath);\n  }\n  return resolved;\n}\n```\n\nBut the validated path is then used directly for real filesystem access:\n\n```ts\nfilesStr = await fs.readdir(validatedPath);\n...\nawait fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));\nfile.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));\n...\nawait fs.remove(file);\n```\n\nThis does not account for symlinks/junctions already present below the media root. A path such as `pivot/secret.txt` can be lexically inside the media directory while the filesystem target is outside it.\n\n## Local Reproduction\n\nI verified this locally with a real junction on Windows.\n\nTest layout:\n\n- media root: `D:\\bugcrowd\\tinacms\\temp\\junction-repro4\\public\\uploads`\n- junction under media root: `public\\uploads\\pivot -\u003e D:\\bugcrowd\\tinacms\\temp\\junction-repro4\\outside`\n- file outside the media root: `outside\\secret.txt`\n\nTina's current media-path validation logic was applied and used to perform the same list/write operations the route handlers use.\n\nObserved result:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"media\": {\n    \"base\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\",\n    \"resolvedListPath\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\\\\pivot\",\n    \"listedEntries\": [\n      \"secret.txt\"\n    ],\n    \"resolvedWritePath\": \"D:\\\\bugcrowd\\\\tinacms\\\\temp\\\\junction-repro4\\\\public\\\\uploads\\\\pivot\\\\written-from-media.txt\",\n    \"outsideWriteExists\": true,\n    \"outsideWriteContents\": \"MEDIA_ESCAPE\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis shows the problem clearly:\n\n- the path validator accepted `pivot`\n- listing revealed a file from outside the media root\n- writing to `pivot/written-from-media.txt` created `outside\\written-from-media.txt`\n\nThe delete path uses the same flawed containment model and should be hardened at the same time.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Out-of-root file listing** via `/media/list/...`\n- **Out-of-root file write** via `/media/upload/...`\n- **Likely out-of-root file delete** via `/media/...` `DELETE`, using the same path-validation gap\n- **Bypass of the recent path traversal hardening** for any deployment whose media tree contains a link to another location\n\nThis is especially relevant in development and self-hosted workflows where the media directory may contain symlinks or junctions intentionally or via repository content.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nHarden media path validation with canonical filesystem checks:\n\n1. resolve the real base path with `fs.realpath()`\n2. resolve the real target path, or for writes the nearest existing parent\n3. compare canonical paths rather than lexical strings\n4. reject any operation that traverses through a symlink/junction to leave the real media root\n\n`path.resolve(...).startsWith(...)` is not sufficient for filesystem security on linked paths.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts`\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/models/media.ts`\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/utils/path.ts`","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T00:23:02Z","modified":"2026-04-06T17:02:54.547895Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-59"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:47.472172Z"}]}}