{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","aliases":["EUVD-2026-21434","GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"],"status":"published","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.24 - Privilege Escalation via chat.send to Allowlist Persistence","description":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00275,"percentile":0.20078,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-862"],"published":"2026-03-30T18:52:38Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","fixed_in":["2026.3.24"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2026.3.23"},{"fixed":"2026.3.24"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"openclaw","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2026.3.24"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"openclaw","product":"openclaw"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9","tags":["vendor-advisory","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-chat-send-to-allowlist-persistence","tags":["third-party-advisory","Third Party Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/35xxx/CVE-2026-35621.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35621","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.24 - Privilege Escalation via chat.send to Allowlist Persistence","description":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-10T16:03:09.856Z","modified":"2026-06-23T16:15:47.418Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:05.15083Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-21434","description":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-10T16:03:09Z","modified":"2026-06-23T16:15:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:32.273921Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9","title":"OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send","description":"\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.\n\nThis is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.\n\n## Details\n\nThe gateway's documented scope split is clear:\n\n- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action.\n- direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.\n\nThe vulnerable path is:\n\n1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`.\n2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.\n3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline.\n4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured.\n5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.\n6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)`, validates the result, and persists it with `writeConfigFile(validated.config)`.\n7. No sink-side check requires `operator.admin` before the persistent write occurs.\n\nThat creates a direct control-plane mismatch:\n\n- `config.patch` rejects the same caller with `missing scope: operator.admin`.\n- `/allowlist add dm ...` or `/allowlist add group ...` reached through `chat.send` can still rewrite channel authorization state.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A gateway client intentionally limited to `operator.write` can persist first-party channel authorization policy.\n- The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared `/allowlist` plumbing.\n- This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### 1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to `/allowlist`\n\nMirror the existing hardened pattern from `/config` and `/plugins`.\n\nBefore any config-backed `/allowlist add|remove` write, require:\n\n- `operator.admin` for internal gateway channels\n\nThis should happen before `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)` and before `writeConfigFile(...)`.\n\n### 2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement\n\n`configWrites` policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between `operator.write` and `operator.admin`.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-30T18:52:38Z","modified":"2026-04-10T17:20:20Z","cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:52.102227Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","description":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-10T17:17:04.52Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:40:52.893Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:13.902911Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-35621","title":"OpenClaw \u003c 2026.3.24 - Privilege Escalation via chat.send to Allowlist Persistence","description":"OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-10T16:03:09.856Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23.192518914Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:02.673625Z"},{"id":"GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9","title":"OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send","description":"\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.\n\nThis is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.\n\n## Details\n\nThe gateway's documented scope split is clear:\n\n- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action.\n- direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.\n\nThe vulnerable path is:\n\n1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`.\n2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.\n3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline.\n4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured.\n5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.\n6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)`, validates the result, and persists it with `writeConfigFile(validated.config)`.\n7. No sink-side check requires `operator.admin` before the persistent write occurs.\n\nThat creates a direct control-plane mismatch:\n\n- `config.patch` rejects the same caller with `missing scope: operator.admin`.\n- `/allowlist add dm ...` or `/allowlist add group ...` reached through `chat.send` can still rewrite channel authorization state.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A gateway client intentionally limited to `operator.write` can persist first-party channel authorization policy.\n- The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared `/allowlist` plumbing.\n- This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### 1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to `/allowlist`\n\nMirror the existing hardened pattern from `/config` and `/plugins`.\n\nBefore any config-backed `/allowlist add|remove` write, require:\n\n- `operator.admin` for internal gateway channels\n\nThis should happen before `plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...)` and before `writeConfigFile(...)`.\n\n### 2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement\n\n`configWrites` policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between `operator.write` and `operator.admin`.","status":"published","published":"2026-03-30T18:52:38Z","modified":"2026-04-10T17:42:22.367572Z","cwes":["CWE-269"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.123867Z"}]}}