{"id":"CVE-2026-39368","aliases":["EUVD-2026-19881","GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9"],"status":"published","title":"WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00218,"percentile":0.12338,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-04-07T19:23:29Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"WWBN/AVideo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"26.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"WWBN/AVideo","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"26.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"wwbn","product":"avideo"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Third Party Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39368","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/39xxx/CVE-2026-39368.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-39368","title":"WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T19:23:29.79Z","modified":"2026-04-07T20:02:21.185Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:02.662847Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-19881","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T19:23:29Z","modified":"2026-04-07T20:02:21Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:25:12.431163Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9","title":"WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services","description":"## Summary\n\nThe Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled `restreamerURL` and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers.\n\nThe vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain was:\n\n1. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` exposed a fresh `tokenForAction`\n2. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php` exchanged it for a valid `responseToken`\n3. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `restreamerURL`\n4. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` and `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/getAction.json.php` later fetched that stored URL server-side\n\nThe original issue existed because the `responseToken` was accepted, but the callback destination was not tightly constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints.\n\nThe maintainer confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the fix was applied by validating `restreamerURL` at storage time and re-validating the log-entry branch before use. The maintainer also noted that the `m3u8` field follows the same general pattern but is not server-fetched in the current flow.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Log in as a non-admin user with streaming permission.\n2. Create a normal restream destination.\n3. Trigger `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/testRestreamer.json.php` to create a live transmission history row.\n4. Call:\n\n```text\nGET /plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php?live_transmitions_history_id=\u003cid\u003e\u0026restreams_id=\u003cid\u003e\n```\n\n5. Extract `tokenForAction` from the returned URL.\n6. Exchange it for `responseToken` via:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php\n```\n\n7. Store a loopback callback URL:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php\nrestreamerURL=http://127.0.0.1:9999/index.php\n```\n\n8. Trigger `getRestream.json.php` again.\n9. Observe that the returned response now contains the JSON body from the loopback-only service.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated streamer can cause the AVideo server to send HTTP requests to loopback or internal services and return the response through normal application endpoints by storing a malicious `restreamerURL` in the restream log flow. Because the callback destination was not constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints, the application could be used as a proxy to internal-only services that trust network locality. Successful exploitation can expose local admin panels, internal-only APIs, cloud metadata services if reachable, or other sensitive internal responses available from the application host.\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n- Validate `restreamerURL` against explicitly configured restreamer endpoints at storage time\n- Re-validate the stored callback URL before server-side fetch\n- Bind `responseToken` to the expected restream row and callback host\n- Apply SSRF validation to the initial destination of every server-side fetch, not only redirect targets\n- Ignore or reject user-supplied callback hosts that do not match trusted configuration","status":"published","published":"2026-04-08T00:08:42Z","modified":"2026-04-08T00:08:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:51.193071Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-39368","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T20:16:30.877Z","modified":"2026-07-24T21:10:00.143Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:13.535987Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-39368","title":"WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services","description":"WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-07T19:23:29.79Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28.983777379Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.040464Z"},{"id":"GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9","title":"WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services","description":"## Summary\n\nThe Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled `restreamerURL` and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers.\n\nThe vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain was:\n\n1. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` exposed a fresh `tokenForAction`\n2. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php` exchanged it for a valid `responseToken`\n3. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `restreamerURL`\n4. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` and `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/getAction.json.php` later fetched that stored URL server-side\n\nThe original issue existed because the `responseToken` was accepted, but the callback destination was not tightly constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints.\n\nThe maintainer confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the fix was applied by validating `restreamerURL` at storage time and re-validating the log-entry branch before use. The maintainer also noted that the `m3u8` field follows the same general pattern but is not server-fetched in the current flow.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Log in as a non-admin user with streaming permission.\n2. Create a normal restream destination.\n3. Trigger `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/testRestreamer.json.php` to create a live transmission history row.\n4. Call:\n\n```text\nGET /plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php?live_transmitions_history_id=\u003cid\u003e\u0026restreams_id=\u003cid\u003e\n```\n\n5. Extract `tokenForAction` from the returned URL.\n6. Exchange it for `responseToken` via:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php\n```\n\n7. Store a loopback callback URL:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php\nrestreamerURL=http://127.0.0.1:9999/index.php\n```\n\n8. Trigger `getRestream.json.php` again.\n9. Observe that the returned response now contains the JSON body from the loopback-only service.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated streamer can cause the AVideo server to send HTTP requests to loopback or internal services and return the response through normal application endpoints by storing a malicious `restreamerURL` in the restream log flow. Because the callback destination was not constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints, the application could be used as a proxy to internal-only services that trust network locality. Successful exploitation can expose local admin panels, internal-only APIs, cloud metadata services if reachable, or other sensitive internal responses available from the application host.\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n- Validate `restreamerURL` against explicitly configured restreamer endpoints at storage time\n- Re-validate the stored callback URL before server-side fetch\n- Bind `responseToken` to the expected restream row and callback host\n- Apply SSRF validation to the initial destination of every server-side fetch, not only redirect targets\n- Ignore or reject user-supplied callback hosts that do not match trusted configuration","status":"published","published":"2026-04-08T00:08:42Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:02.7267018Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:54.055966Z"}]}}