{"id":"CVE-2026-40076","aliases":["EUVD-2026-28151","GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw"],"status":"published","title":"OpenMRS Core arbitrary file write and code execution via Zip Slip in module upload","description":"OpenMRS Core is an open source electronic medical record system platform. In versions 2.7.8 and earlier and versions 2.8.0 through 2.8.5, the module upload endpoint at POST `/openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a Zip Slip path traversal attack. During automatic extraction of uploaded .omod archives in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, ZIP entries under web/module/ are checked only to see whether the full entry path starts with `..,` and the remaining path is then concatenated into the destination path without normalization or a boundary check. A crafted archive can therefore include entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` and cause files to be written outside the intended module directory.\n\nAn authenticated attacker with module upload access can write arbitrary files to locations such as the web application root and achieve remote code execution by uploading a JSP file and then requesting it. The issue is compounded by the fact that the module.allow_web_admin runtime property is enforced in the legacy UI controller but not in the REST API upload path, so deployments relying on that property to block web-based module administration remain exposed through the REST endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions after 2.7.8 in the 2.7.x line and in version 2.8.6 and later.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00853,"percentile":0.58528,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-05-04T17:39:31Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.openmrs.web:openmrs-web","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.7.8"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.openmrs.web:openmrs-web","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.8.0"},{"last_affected":"2.8.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.openmrs.web:openmrs-web","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.7.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.openmrs.web:openmrs-web","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.8.0"},{"last_affected":"2.8.5"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"openmrs","product":"openmrs"},{"vendor":"openmrs","product":"openmrs-core"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core/security/advisories/GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40076","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40076.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40076","title":"OpenMRS Core arbitrary file write and code execution via Zip Slip in module upload","description":"OpenMRS Core is an open source electronic medical record system platform. In versions 2.7.8 and earlier and versions 2.8.0 through 2.8.5, the module upload endpoint at POST `/openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a Zip Slip path traversal attack. During automatic extraction of uploaded .omod archives in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, ZIP entries under web/module/ are checked only to see whether the full entry path starts with `..,` and the remaining path is then concatenated into the destination path without normalization or a boundary check. A crafted archive can therefore include entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` and cause files to be written outside the intended module directory.\n\nAn authenticated attacker with module upload access can write arbitrary files to locations such as the web application root and achieve remote code execution by uploading a JSP file and then requesting it. The issue is compounded by the fact that the module.allow_web_admin runtime property is enforced in the legacy UI controller but not in the REST API upload path, so deployments relying on that property to block web-based module administration remain exposed through the REST endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions after 2.7.8 in the 2.7.x line and in version 2.8.6 and later.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T19:32:13.851Z","modified":"2026-05-07T13:49:31.84Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:11.445168Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-28151","description":"OpenMRS Core is an open source electronic medical record system platform. In versions 2.7.8 and earlier and versions 2.8.0 through 2.8.5, the module upload endpoint at POST `/openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a Zip Slip path traversal attack. During automatic extraction of uploaded .omod archives in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, ZIP entries under web/module/ are checked only to see whether the full entry path starts with `..,` and the remaining path is then concatenated into the destination path without normalization or a boundary check. A crafted archive can therefore include entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` and cause files to be written outside the intended module directory.\n\nAn authenticated attacker with module upload access can write arbitrary files to locations such as the web application root and achieve remote code execution by uploading a JSP file and then requesting it. The issue is compounded by the fact that the module.allow_web_admin runtime property is enforced in the legacy UI controller but not in the REST API upload path, so deployments relying on that property to block web-based module administration remain exposed through the REST endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions after 2.7.8 in the 2.7.x line and in version 2.8.6 and later.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T19:32:13Z","modified":"2026-05-07T13:49:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:05:15.366699Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw","title":"OpenMRS Module Upload Vulnerable to Path Traversal (Zip Slip)","description":"## Affected Versions\n\nversion ≤ 2.7.8 (latest version at time of disclosure)\n\nhttps://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core\n\n## Impact\n\nThe endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a path traversal (Zip Slip) attack. An authenticated attacker can upload a crafted `.omod` archive containing ZIP entries with directory traversal sequences. Upon automatic extraction by the server, the incomplete path validation in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` fails to prevent entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` from being written outside the intended module directory. If the traversal target falls within the web application root (e.g., `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`), the attacker achieves arbitrary file write and subsequent Remote Code Execution.\n\nNotably, other extraction methods in the same codebase (`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`, `TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`) are properly protected with `normalize().startsWith()` checks — this vulnerability is an oversight where the same fix was not applied.\n\nFurthermore, the `module.allow_web_admin` runtime property, which is intended to restrict administrators from managing modules via the web interface, only gates the Legacy UI controller entry point. The REST API endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` does not check this property, allowing this restriction to be fully bypassed.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Construct a malicious `.omod` file (which is a ZIP/JAR archive) containing a ZIP entry with a path traversal payload in its entry name, such as `web/module/../../../../\u003ctarget_filename\u003e`. Upload this file to `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` with valid admin credentials via Basic Auth.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1986\" height=\"1102\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/647f15de-7e8c-40b9-aba9-d4db5d2e0b52\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2048\" height=\"1078\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/301412a0-e3b0-4afb-91c2-e9739de3080d\" /\u003e\n\n\n2. The server parses and loads the module. During `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, entries under `web/module/` are automatically extracted. The existing check `Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")` only blocks entries beginning with `..`, so an entry starting with `web/module/` passes the check. The `../` sequences in the remaining path cause the file to be written outside the intended `WEB-INF/view/module/` directory — for example, into the web application root at `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1439\" height=\"141\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bda3b1e-a80e-42ed-af2b-a1da53e8db03\" /\u003e\n\n3. The traversed file is now accessible under the web application root. If the written file is a JSP script, accessing it via the browser triggers server-side execution, achieving RCE.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1482\" height=\"300\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61936002-78cd-4203-80f0-f0a8702b216c\" /\u003e\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` (`web/src/main/java/org/openmrs/module/web/WebModuleUtil.java`).\n\n### Vulnerable code:\n\n```java\nEnumeration\u003cJarEntry\u003e entries = jarFile.entries();\nwhile (entries.hasMoreElements()) {\n    JarEntry entry = entries.nextElement();\n    String name = entry.getName();\n\n    // ❌ Incomplete check — only blocks entries starting with \"..\"\n    if (Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")) {\n        throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n    }\n\n    if (name.startsWith(\"web/module/\")) {\n        String filepath = name.substring(11);\n        StringBuilder absPath = new StringBuilder(realPath + \"/WEB-INF\");\n        absPath.append(\"/view/module/\");\n        absPath.append(mod.getModuleIdAsPath()).append(\"/\").append(filepath);\n\n        // ❌ No normalize() or startsWith() boundary check before writing\n        File outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n        outStream = new FileOutputStream(outFile, false);\n        inStream = jarFile.getInputStream(entry);\n        OpenmrsUtil.copyFile(inStream, outStream);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Why the check fails:** For an entry named `web/module/foo/../../../../evil.jsp`, `Paths.get(name)` starts with `web`, not `..`, so the check passes. After `name.substring(11)`, the filepath `foo/../../../../evil.jsp` is concatenated directly into the output path without normalization, resulting in a write outside the intended directory.\n\n### Correctly protected code in the same codebase:\n\n**`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!parent.toPath().normalize().startsWith(docBase)) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n}\n```\n\n**`TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!zipEntryFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(moduleRepository.toPath().normalize())) {\n    throw new IOException(\"Bad zip entry\");\n}\n```\n\nThe fix pattern is already known and applied elsewhere in the codebase. `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` is an oversight.\n\n### Bypass of `module.allow_web_admin`\n\nThe `module.allow_web_admin` property only restricts module operations at the Legacy UI layer (`ModuleListController`). The REST API endpoint does not consult this property:\n\n```\nLegacy UI:  POST /admin/modules/moduleList.form → allowAdmin() check → [BLOCKED]\nREST API:   POST /ws/rest/v1/module             → No allowAdmin() check → [ALLOWED]\n                ↓\n        ModuleFactory.loadModule()\n                ↓\n        WebModuleUtil.startModule()   ← Zip Slip here, no allowAdmin check\n                ↓\n        FileOutputStream.write()      ← Arbitrary file write\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd `normalize().startsWith()` boundary validation before writing, consistent with the existing pattern in `ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:\n\n```java\nFile outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n\n// ✅ Add this check\nif (!outFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(\n        Paths.get(realPath, \"WEB-INF\").normalize())) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\n        \"Zip entry '\" + name + \"' would be written outside the allowed directory.\");\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce the `module.allow_web_admin` restriction consistently across all module upload entry points, including the REST API.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T17:39:31Z","modified":"2026-05-08T19:25:59Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:04.762828Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40076","description":"OpenMRS Core is an open source electronic medical record system platform. In versions 2.7.8 and earlier and versions 2.8.0 through 2.8.5, the module upload endpoint at POST `/openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a Zip Slip path traversal attack. During automatic extraction of uploaded .omod archives in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, ZIP entries under web/module/ are checked only to see whether the full entry path starts with `..,` and the remaining path is then concatenated into the destination path without normalization or a boundary check. A crafted archive can therefore include entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` and cause files to be written outside the intended module directory.\n\nAn authenticated attacker with module upload access can write arbitrary files to locations such as the web application root and achieve remote code execution by uploading a JSP file and then requesting it. The issue is compounded by the fact that the module.allow_web_admin runtime property is enforced in the legacy UI controller but not in the REST API upload path, so deployments relying on that property to block web-based module administration remain exposed through the REST endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions after 2.7.8 in the 2.7.x line and in version 2.8.6 and later.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T20:16:31.727Z","modified":"2026-10-26T19:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:17.418622Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40076","title":"OpenMRS Core arbitrary file write and code execution via Zip Slip in module upload","description":"OpenMRS Core is an open source electronic medical record system platform. In versions 2.7.8 and earlier and versions 2.8.0 through 2.8.5, the module upload endpoint at POST `/openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a Zip Slip path traversal attack. During automatic extraction of uploaded .omod archives in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, ZIP entries under web/module/ are checked only to see whether the full entry path starts with `..,` and the remaining path is then concatenated into the destination path without normalization or a boundary check. A crafted archive can therefore include entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` and cause files to be written outside the intended module directory.\n\nAn authenticated attacker with module upload access can write arbitrary files to locations such as the web application root and achieve remote code execution by uploading a JSP file and then requesting it. The issue is compounded by the fact that the module.allow_web_admin runtime property is enforced in the legacy UI controller but not in the REST API upload path, so deployments relying on that property to block web-based module administration remain exposed through the REST endpoint. This issue has been fixed in versions after 2.7.8 in the 2.7.x line and in version 2.8.6 and later.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T19:32:13.851Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02.804673278Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.040464Z"},{"id":"GHSA-78fc-9688-w8xw","title":"OpenMRS Module Upload Vulnerable to Path Traversal (Zip Slip)","description":"## Affected Versions\n\nversion ≤ 2.7.8 (latest version at time of disclosure)\n\nhttps://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core\n\n## Impact\n\nThe endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` is vulnerable to a path traversal (Zip Slip) attack. An authenticated attacker can upload a crafted `.omod` archive containing ZIP entries with directory traversal sequences. Upon automatic extraction by the server, the incomplete path validation in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` fails to prevent entries such as `web/module/../../../../malicious.jsp` from being written outside the intended module directory. If the traversal target falls within the web application root (e.g., `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`), the attacker achieves arbitrary file write and subsequent Remote Code Execution.\n\nNotably, other extraction methods in the same codebase (`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`, `TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`) are properly protected with `normalize().startsWith()` checks — this vulnerability is an oversight where the same fix was not applied.\n\nFurthermore, the `module.allow_web_admin` runtime property, which is intended to restrict administrators from managing modules via the web interface, only gates the Legacy UI controller entry point. The REST API endpoint `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` does not check this property, allowing this restriction to be fully bypassed.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Construct a malicious `.omod` file (which is a ZIP/JAR archive) containing a ZIP entry with a path traversal payload in its entry name, such as `web/module/../../../../\u003ctarget_filename\u003e`. Upload this file to `POST /openmrs/ws/rest/v1/module` with valid admin credentials via Basic Auth.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1986\" height=\"1102\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/647f15de-7e8c-40b9-aba9-d4db5d2e0b52\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2048\" height=\"1078\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/301412a0-e3b0-4afb-91c2-e9739de3080d\" /\u003e\n\n\n2. The server parses and loads the module. During `WebModuleUtil.startModule()`, entries under `web/module/` are automatically extracted. The existing check `Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")` only blocks entries beginning with `..`, so an entry starting with `web/module/` passes the check. The `../` sequences in the remaining path cause the file to be written outside the intended `WEB-INF/view/module/` directory — for example, into the web application root at `/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/openmrs/`.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1439\" height=\"141\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bda3b1e-a80e-42ed-af2b-a1da53e8db03\" /\u003e\n\n3. The traversed file is now accessible under the web application root. If the written file is a JSP script, accessing it via the browser triggers server-side execution, achieving RCE.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1482\" height=\"300\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61936002-78cd-4203-80f0-f0a8702b216c\" /\u003e\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` (`web/src/main/java/org/openmrs/module/web/WebModuleUtil.java`).\n\n### Vulnerable code:\n\n```java\nEnumeration\u003cJarEntry\u003e entries = jarFile.entries();\nwhile (entries.hasMoreElements()) {\n    JarEntry entry = entries.nextElement();\n    String name = entry.getName();\n\n    // ❌ Incomplete check — only blocks entries starting with \"..\"\n    if (Paths.get(name).startsWith(\"..\")) {\n        throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n    }\n\n    if (name.startsWith(\"web/module/\")) {\n        String filepath = name.substring(11);\n        StringBuilder absPath = new StringBuilder(realPath + \"/WEB-INF\");\n        absPath.append(\"/view/module/\");\n        absPath.append(mod.getModuleIdAsPath()).append(\"/\").append(filepath);\n\n        // ❌ No normalize() or startsWith() boundary check before writing\n        File outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n        outStream = new FileOutputStream(outFile, false);\n        inStream = jarFile.getInputStream(entry);\n        OpenmrsUtil.copyFile(inStream, outStream);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Why the check fails:** For an entry named `web/module/foo/../../../../evil.jsp`, `Paths.get(name)` starts with `web`, not `..`, so the check passes. After `name.substring(11)`, the filepath `foo/../../../../evil.jsp` is concatenated directly into the output path without normalization, resulting in a write outside the intended directory.\n\n### Correctly protected code in the same codebase:\n\n**`ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!parent.toPath().normalize().startsWith(docBase)) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\"...\");\n}\n```\n\n**`TestInstallUtil.addZippedTestModules()`:**\n\n```java\n// ✅ Correct — uses normalize().startsWith()\nif (!zipEntryFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(moduleRepository.toPath().normalize())) {\n    throw new IOException(\"Bad zip entry\");\n}\n```\n\nThe fix pattern is already known and applied elsewhere in the codebase. `WebModuleUtil.startModule()` is an oversight.\n\n### Bypass of `module.allow_web_admin`\n\nThe `module.allow_web_admin` property only restricts module operations at the Legacy UI layer (`ModuleListController`). The REST API endpoint does not consult this property:\n\n```\nLegacy UI:  POST /admin/modules/moduleList.form → allowAdmin() check → [BLOCKED]\nREST API:   POST /ws/rest/v1/module             → No allowAdmin() check → [ALLOWED]\n                ↓\n        ModuleFactory.loadModule()\n                ↓\n        WebModuleUtil.startModule()   ← Zip Slip here, no allowAdmin check\n                ↓\n        FileOutputStream.write()      ← Arbitrary file write\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd `normalize().startsWith()` boundary validation before writing, consistent with the existing pattern in `ModuleUtil.expandJar()`:\n\n```java\nFile outFile = new File(absPath.toString().replace(\"/\", File.separator));\n\n// ✅ Add this check\nif (!outFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(\n        Paths.get(realPath, \"WEB-INF\").normalize())) {\n    throw new UnsupportedOperationException(\n        \"Zip entry '\" + name + \"' would be written outside the allowed directory.\");\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce the `module.allow_web_admin` restriction consistently across all module upload entry points, including the REST API.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T17:39:31Z","modified":"2026-05-08T19:34:46.952898Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:40.657155Z"}]}}