{"id":"CVE-2026-40313","aliases":["EUVD-2026-22214","GHSA-3959-6v5q-45q2"],"status":"published","title":"PraisonAI: ArtiPACKED Vulnerability via GitHub Actions Credential Persistence","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00305,"percentile":0.23444,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-829"],"published":"2026-04-14T03:10:23Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:33Z","products":[{"vendor":"mervinpraison","product":"praisonai"},{"vendor":"praison","product":"praisonai"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3959-6v5q-45q2","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/github-vulnerability-artipacked-exposes.html","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Press/Media Coverage","web"]},{"url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-repo-artifacts-leak-tokens","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Mitigation","Third Party Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40313.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40313","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40313","title":"PraisonAI: ArtiPACKED Vulnerability via GitHub Actions Credential Persistence","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-14T03:10:23.697Z","modified":"2026-04-14T16:27:49.836Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:11.445168Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-22214","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-14T03:10:23Z","modified":"2026-04-14T16:27:49Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:25.999353Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40313","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-14T04:17:13.89Z","modified":"2026-10-26T21:10:00.17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:14.37744Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-40313","title":"PraisonAI: ArtiPACKED Vulnerability via GitHub Actions Credential Persistence","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-14T03:10:23.697Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:33.008516808Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.424067Z"}]}}