{"id":"CVE-2026-41081","aliases":["EUVD-2026-25848","GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh"],"status":"published","title":"Apache Storm Client: Anonymous principal assigned on TLS client certificate verification failure","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00286,"percentile":0.21438,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-287"],"published":"2026-04-27T13:10:45Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:42Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.storm:storm-client","fixed_in":["2.8.7"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.storm:storm-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.8.7"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.storm:storm-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.8.7"}]}],"versions":["2.0.0","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.3.0","2.4.0","2.5.0","2.6.0","2.6.1","2.6.2","2.6.3","2.6.4","2.7.0","2.7.1","2.8.0","2.8.1","2.8.2","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.8.6"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"apache","product":"storm"},{"vendor":"apache software foundation","product":"apache storm client"}],"references":[{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/plxx5l29dvplk5rwzdcq53rdfl6v4gs8","tags":["vendor-advisory","Mailing List","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/25/3","tags":["Mailing List","Third Party Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41081","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh"},{"url":"https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41081.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/storm","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41081","title":"Apache Storm Client: Anonymous principal assigned on TLS client certificate verification failure","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T13:10:45.886Z","modified":"2026-04-27T14:43:31.605Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:08.498858Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-25848","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T13:10:45Z","modified":"2026-04-27T14:43:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:17.432529Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh","title":"Apache Storm's Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leads to Anonymous Principal Assignment","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T15:30:52Z","modified":"2026-05-05T22:06:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:01.917039Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41081","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T14:16:48.167Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:16.252509Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41081","title":"Apache Storm Client: Anonymous principal assigned on TLS client certificate verification failure","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T13:10:45.886Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:42.90479272Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.424067Z"},{"id":"GHSA-j2q8-xx3q-8fqh","title":"Apache Storm's Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leads to Anonymous Principal Assignment","description":"Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior","status":"published","published":"2026-04-27T15:30:52Z","modified":"2026-05-05T22:26:26.587422Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-287"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:49.621585Z"}]}}