{"id":"CVE-2026-41249","aliases":["EUVD-2026-34318","GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h"],"status":"published","title":"CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration","description":"CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00549,"percentile":0.46241,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-05-14T13:18:16Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-5bce203f66","title":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-5bce203f66","date":"2026-09-06","url":"https://github.com/pvharmo2/gha-lab-5bce203f66"}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"coreshop/core-shop","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0"},{"last_affected":"5.0.0"}]}],"versions":["5.0.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"coreshop/core-shop","versions":["5.0.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"coreshop","product":"coreshop"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/security/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/commit/cc1e3f547228ec5ebfc1dc0472f9a3cc5f4137a4","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop/blob/5.1.0-beta.1/.github/workflows/static.yml#L14","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41249","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41249.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/coreshop/CoreShop","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41249","title":"CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration","description":"CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T19:26:46.043Z","modified":"2026-06-08T19:15:02.639Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:19.694734Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-34318","description":"CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T19:26:46Z","modified":"2026-06-08T19:15:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:48.375828Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h","title":"CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration","description":"### Summary\n\nThe GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout.\nThis allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability.\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n1. Fork the target repository.\n2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow.\n3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== PWNED ===\"\necho \"whoami:\"\nwhoami\n```\n4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository.\n5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`).\n6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"490\" height=\"87\" alt=\"スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Impact:**\nBecause `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.\n\n**Recommended Mitigation:**\nDo not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed.\nConsider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event:\n1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts.\n2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T13:18:16Z","modified":"2026-06-09T11:55:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:23.739691Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41249","description":"CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T20:16:57.797Z","modified":"2026-10-06T22:10:00.247Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:22.022466Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41249","title":"CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration","description":"CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T19:26:46.043Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53.898373857Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.764807Z"},{"id":"GHSA-q58j-g3f4-h26h","title":"CoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration","description":"### Summary\n\nThe GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout.\nThis allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a \"Pwn Request\" vulnerability.\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n1. Fork the target repository.\n2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow.\n3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload:\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== PWNED ===\"\necho \"whoami:\"\nwhoami\n```\n4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository.\n5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`).\n6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"490\" height=\"87\" alt=\"スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Impact:**\nBecause `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources.\n\n**Recommended Mitigation:**\nDo not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed.\nConsider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event:\n1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts.\n2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T13:18:16Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:06.807111227Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:54.055966Z"}]}}