{"id":"CVE-2026-41318","aliases":["EUVD-2026-25387","GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5"],"status":"published","title":"AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00195,"percentile":0.09236,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-1336","CWE-79"],"published":"2026-04-24T02:57:16Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28Z","products":[{"vendor":"mintplex-labs","product":"anything-llm"},{"vendor":"mintplexlabs","product":"anythingllm"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/security/advisories/GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/commit/f5fa03f4728e483949f6360093bc3ea1ef555535","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41318.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41318","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41318","title":"AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T02:57:16.193Z","modified":"2026-04-24T18:17:42.185Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-79","CWE-116","CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:08.498858Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-25387","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T02:57:16Z","modified":"2026-04-24T18:17:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:24:18.224827Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41318","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T04:16:20.193Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-79","CWE-116","CWE-1336"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:15.867234Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41318","title":"AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T02:57:16.193Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28.767278579Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-1336","CWE-79"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.764807Z"}]}}