{"id":"CVE-2026-41481","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1779670108","EUVD-2026-25634","GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr","PYSEC-2026-77","ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-41481","ROOT-APP-PYPI-GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr"],"status":"published","title":"LangChain: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0026,"percentile":0.17902,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-04-16T22:53:32Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:14Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","fixed_in":["1.1.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"TuxCare:PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","fixed_in":["0.3.11.post1+tuxcare"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"rootio-langchain-text-splitters","fixed_in":["1.1.1+root.io.2","1.1.0+root.io.2","1.1.0+root.io.3","1.1.1+root.io.3","0.3.11+root.io.3","1.1.1+root.io.1","0.3.11+root.io.1","1.1.0+root.io.1","0.3.11+root.io.2"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","fixed_in":["1.1.1+aikido.2","1.1.0+aikido.2","1.1.0+aikido.3","1.1.1+aikido.3","0.3.11+aikido.3","0.3.11+aikido.2"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.3.11"},{"fixed":"0.3.11.post1+tuxcare"}]}],"versions":["0.3.11"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.2"}]}],"versions":["0.0.1","0.0.2","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.4","0.3.0","0.3.0.dev0","0.3.0.dev1","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.11","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.6rc1","0.3.6rc2","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","1.0.0","1.0.0a1","1.1.0","1.1.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.2"}]}],"versions":["0.0.1","0.0.2","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.4","0.3.0","0.3.0.dev0","0.3.0.dev1","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.11","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.6rc1","0.3.6rc2","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","1.0.0","1.0.0a1","1.1.0","1.1.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"rootio-langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+root.io.3"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+root.io.3"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+root.io.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+aikido.3"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+aikido.3"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+aikido.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"rootio-langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+root.io.1"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+root.io.1"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+root.io.1"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+root.io.3"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+root.io.3"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+root.io.2"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+root.io.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"langchain-text-splitters","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.1.0+aikido.3"},{"fixed":"1.1.1+aikido.3"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+aikido.2"},{"fixed":"0.3.11+aikido.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"langchain","product":"langchain-text-splitters"},{"vendor":"langchain-ai","product":"langchain-text-splitters"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"migration toolkit for applications 8"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"openshift lightspeed"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat ansible automation platform 2"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat openshift ai (rhoai)"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/security/advisories/GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41481","tags":["vdb-entry","x_refsource_REDHAT","advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2461733","tags":["issue-tracking","x_refsource_REDHAT","report"]},{"url":"https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-41481.json","tags":["x_sadp-csaf-vex","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41481","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langchain-text-splitters/PYSEC-2026-77.yaml","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41481.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41481","title":"LangChain: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T20:54:27.713Z","modified":"2026-07-15T00:59:28.46Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-918","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:08.498858Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-25634","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T20:54:27Z","modified":"2026-07-15T00:59:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:56.47701Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr","title":"LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass","description":"## Summary\n\n`HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url()` validated the initial URL using `validate_safe_url()` but then performed the fetch with `requests.get()` with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections.\n\nThe response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `langchain-text-splitters` \u003c 1.1.2\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- `langchain-text-splitters` \u003e= 1.1.2 (requires `langchain-core` \u003e= 1.2.31)\n\n## Affected code\n\n**File:** `libs/text-splitters/langchain_text_splitters/html.py` — `split_text_from_url()`\n\nThe vulnerable pattern validated the URL once then fetched with redirects enabled:\n\n```python\nvalidate_safe_url(url, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)\nresponse = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)\n```\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. A developer passes external URLs to `split_text_from_url()`, relying on its\n   built-in `validate_safe_url()` check to block requests to internal networks.\n2. An attacker supplies a URL pointing to a public host they control. The URL\n   passes `validate_safe_url()` (public hostname, public IP).\n3. The attacker's server responds with a `302` redirect to an internal endpoint\n   (e.g., an unauthenticated internal admin API, or a cloud instance metadata\n   service that does not require request headers — such as AWS IMDSv1).\n4. `requests.get()` follows the redirect automatically. The redirect target is\n   **not** revalidated.\n5. The response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the\n   application.\n\n**Notes:**\n\n- The core issue is a bypass of an explicitly provided SSRF protection.\n  `split_text_from_url()` included `validate_safe_url()` specifically to be\n  safe with untrusted URLs — the redirect loophole defeated that guarantee.\n- Cloud metadata endpoints that require special headers (AWS IMDSv2, GCP, Azure)\n  are not reachable through this bug because the attacker does not control\n  request headers. AWS IMDSv1, which requires no headers, is reachable.\n- Data exfiltration requires the application to return Document contents to the\n  party that supplied the URL. The SSRF itself — forcing the server to issue a\n  request to an internal endpoint — does not require this.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix replaces `requests.get()` with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport` from `langchain-core`) that validates DNS results and pins connections to validated IPs on every request, including redirect targets, eliminating redirect-based bypasses.\n\nAdditionally, `split_text_from_url()` has been deprecated. Users should fetch HTML content themselves and pass it to `split_text()` directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T22:53:32Z","modified":"2026-06-06T00:58:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:18.682012Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41481","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T21:16:19.49Z","modified":"2026-10-26T22:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:16.252509Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41481","title":"LangChain: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T20:54:27.713Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:14.319250269Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.764807Z"},{"id":"GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr","title":"LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass","description":"## Summary\n\n`HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url()` validated the initial URL using `validate_safe_url()` but then performed the fetch with `requests.get()` with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections.\n\nThe response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `langchain-text-splitters` \u003c 1.1.2\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- `langchain-text-splitters` \u003e= 1.1.2 (requires `langchain-core` \u003e= 1.2.31)\n\n## Affected code\n\n**File:** `libs/text-splitters/langchain_text_splitters/html.py` — `split_text_from_url()`\n\nThe vulnerable pattern validated the URL once then fetched with redirects enabled:\n\n```python\nvalidate_safe_url(url, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)\nresponse = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)\n```\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. A developer passes external URLs to `split_text_from_url()`, relying on its\n   built-in `validate_safe_url()` check to block requests to internal networks.\n2. An attacker supplies a URL pointing to a public host they control. The URL\n   passes `validate_safe_url()` (public hostname, public IP).\n3. The attacker's server responds with a `302` redirect to an internal endpoint\n   (e.g., an unauthenticated internal admin API, or a cloud instance metadata\n   service that does not require request headers — such as AWS IMDSv1).\n4. `requests.get()` follows the redirect automatically. The redirect target is\n   **not** revalidated.\n5. The response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the\n   application.\n\n**Notes:**\n\n- The core issue is a bypass of an explicitly provided SSRF protection.\n  `split_text_from_url()` included `validate_safe_url()` specifically to be\n  safe with untrusted URLs — the redirect loophole defeated that guarantee.\n- Cloud metadata endpoints that require special headers (AWS IMDSv2, GCP, Azure)\n  are not reachable through this bug because the attacker does not control\n  request headers. AWS IMDSv1, which requires no headers, is reachable.\n- Data exfiltration requires the application to return Document contents to the\n  party that supplied the URL. The SSRF itself — forcing the server to issue a\n  request to an internal endpoint — does not require this.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix replaces `requests.get()` with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport` from `langchain-core`) that validates DNS results and pins connections to validated IPs on every request, including redirect targets, eliminating redirect-based bypasses.\n\nAdditionally, `split_text_from_url()` has been deprecated. Users should fetch HTML content themselves and pass it to `split_text()` directly.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-16T22:53:32Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:44.294835049Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:46.760785Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-77","description":"LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters\n 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-24T21:16:19.49Z","modified":"2026-05-20T09:19:04.238442Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:58.117212Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1779670108","title":"TuxCare security update for langchain-text-splitters (2 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt langchain-text-splitters to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 0.3.11.post1+tuxcare.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-04T14:52:33Z","modified":"2026-10-20T13:58:32.417519311Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:45.090939Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-41481","title":"CVE-2026-41481 in rootio-langchain-text-splitters - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-41481 in the rootio-langchain-text-splitters package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T11:43:52Z","modified":"2026-06-04T12:30:05.215281556Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:28.259095Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-PYPI-GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr","title":"GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr in rootio-langchain-text-splitters - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr in the rootio-langchain-text-splitters package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T11:43:52Z","modified":"2026-06-04T12:30:04.170527357Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:28.259095Z"}]}}