{"id":"CVE-2026-41673","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1778114662","CLSA-2026-1790755546","CLSA-2026-1791028067","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-41673","EUVD-2026-28288","GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41673"],"status":"published","title":"xmldom: Denial of service via uncontrolled recursion in XML serialization","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00643,"percentile":0.51154,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-674","CWE-776"],"published":"2026-04-22T20:23:57Z","modified":"2026-11-05T13:28:26Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","fixed_in":["0.8.13","0.9.10"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"node-xmldom","fixed_in":["0.9.10-1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.8.13"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.9.0"},{"fixed":"0.9.10"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.6.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"0.6.0-tuxcare.2"}]}],"versions":["0.6.0","0.6.0-tuxcare.1"],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.7.13-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"0.7.13-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["0.7.13"],"bundled":14},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.9.8-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"0.9.8-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["0.9.8"],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.8.6-1","0.9.10-1","0.9.10-2","0.9.11-1","0.9.12-1","0.9.5-1","0.9.6-1","0.9.8-1","0.9.8-2","0.9.9-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.9.10-1","0.9.10-2","0.9.11-1","0.9.12-1","0.9.6-1","0.9.8-1","0.9.8-2","0.9.9-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.10-1"}]}],"versions":["0.9.6-1","0.9.8-1","0.9.8-2","0.9.9-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.8.13"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@xmldom/xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.9.0"},{"fixed":"0.9.10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.27+ds-1","0.1.27+ds-1+deb10u2build0.20.04.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0-1","0.7.3-1","0.7.5-1","0.7.5-1ubuntu0.22.04.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.8.6-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:25.10","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.9.6-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.9.8-2","0.9.10-2","0.9.11-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"node-xmldom","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.9.6-1","0.9.8-1","0.9.8-2"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat build of podman desktop"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat developer hub 1.9"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat enterprise linux 8"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat fuse 7"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat openshift ai (rhoai)"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat openshift ai 3.4"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"red hat openshift container platform 4"},{"vendor":"red hat","product":"self-service automation portal 2"},{"vendor":"xmldom","product":"xmldom"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/17678a2a73ecbd1a2da90f3d47dc23da9cef81aa","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/291257493cb0eb6980eda83b162a9c4e6d7d2597","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/2d6d6916ed8a4c223db1f6d7560ab4544c465b0f","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/430357c7b6333108856e917bf2367afe5ceb6f8a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/4845ef109221df0890825de2822fbe77afba3afe","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/8834218c85ac2a4d757b9587c9028e67c2f7b6c3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/8b7cfd1491314abdc347261921d7334ff15f7112","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/b0620383abc1df067f3ce1014c43ae1bc1161eeb","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/e6edcab6bef5bcdba0b220bb35442aa72f452b84","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.13","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.10","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41673","tags":["vdb-entry","x_refsource_REDHAT","advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2467630","tags":["issue-tracking","x_refsource_REDHAT","report"]},{"url":"https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-41673.json","tags":["x_sadp-csaf-vex","web"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26234","tags":["vendor-advisory","x_refsource_REDHAT","advisory"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520","tags":["vendor-advisory","x_refsource_REDHAT","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41673","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41673.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-41673","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-41673","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41673","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/5cdb515630fa8ca25f840b3ff1420c045545af1b","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41673","title":"xmldom: Denial of service via uncontrolled recursion in XML serialization","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T03:40:28.378Z","modified":"2026-08-28T12:04:19.816Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-674","CWE-776"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:57.334596Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-28288","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T03:40:28Z","modified":"2026-08-28T12:04:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:23.608347Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw","title":"xmldom: Uncontrolled recursion in XML serialization leads to DoS","description":"## Summary\n\nSeven recursive traversals in `lib/dom.js` operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply\nnested DOM tree causes a `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`, crashing the application.\n\n**Reported operations:**\n- `Node.prototype.normalize()` — reported by @praveen-kv (email 2026-04-05) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-fwmp-8wwc-qhv6, via `DOMParser.parseFromString()`)\n- `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` — reported by @Jvr2022 (GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-j2hf-fqwf-rrjf)\n\n**Additionally, discovered in research:**\n- `Element.getElementsByTagName()` / `getElementsByTagNameNS()` / `getElementsByClassName()` / `getElementById()`\n- `Node.cloneNode(true)`\n- `Document.importNode(node, true)`\n- `node.textContent` (getter)\n- `Node.isEqualNode(other)`\n\nAll seven share the same root cause: pure-JavaScript recursive tree traversal with no depth guard.\nA single deeply nested document (parsed successfully) triggers any or all of these operations.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`lib/dom.js` implements DOM tree traversals as depth-first recursive functions. Each level of\nelement nesting adds one JavaScript call frame. The JS engine's call stack is finite; once\nexhausted, a `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` is thrown. This error may not be\ncaught reliably at stack-exhaustion depths because the catch handler itself requires stack\nframes to execute — especially in async scenarios, where an uncaught `RangeError` inside a\ncallback or promise chain can crash the entire Node.js process.\n\nParsing a deeply nested document **succeeds** — the SAX parser in `lib/sax.js` is iterative.\nThe crash occurs during subsequent operations on the parsed DOM.\n\n### `Node.prototype.normalize()` — reported by @praveen-kv\n\n[`lib/dom.js:1296–1308`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1296-L1308) (main):\n\n```js\nnormalize: function () {\n    var child = this.firstChild;\n    while (child) {\n        var next = child.nextSibling;\n        if (next \u0026\u0026 next.nodeType == TEXT_NODE \u0026\u0026 child.nodeType == TEXT_NODE) {\n            this.removeChild(next);\n            child.appendData(next.data);\n        } else {\n            child.normalize();   // recursive call — no depth guard\n            child = next;\n        }\n    }\n},\n```\n\nCrash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~10,000 levels.\n\n### `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` — reported by @Jvr2022\n\n[`lib/dom.js:2790–2974`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L2790-L2974) (main):\nThe internal `serializeToString` worker recurses into child nodes at four call sites, each\npassing a `visibleNamespaces.slice()` copy. The per-frame allocation causes earlier stack\nexhaustion than `normalize()`.\n\nCrash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~5,000 levels.\n\n### Additional recursive entry points\n\nAll five crash at ~10,000 levels on Node.js 18.\n\n| Function                    | Definition                                                                                                           | Public API entry point(s)                                                                            | Crash depth (Node.js 18) |\n|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|\n| `_visitNode`                | [`lib/dom.js:1529`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1529) | `getElementsByTagName()`, `getElementsByTagNameNS()`, `getElementsByClassName()`, `getElementById()` | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `cloneNode` (module fn)     | [`lib/dom.js:3037`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L3037) | `Node.prototype.cloneNode(true)`                                                                     | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `importNode` (module fn)    | [`lib/dom.js:2975`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L2975) | `Document.prototype.importNode(node, true)`                                                          | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `getTextContent` (inner fn) | [`lib/dom.js:3130`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L3130) | `node.textContent` (getter)                                                                          | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `isEqualNode`               | [`lib/dom.js:1120`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1120) | `Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other)`                                                                  | ~10,000 levels           |\n\nBoth active branches (`main` and `release-0.8.x`) are identically affected. The unscoped `xmldom`\npackage (≤ 0.6.0) carries the same recursive patterns from its initial commit.\n\n### Browser behavior\n\nTested with Chromium 147 (Playwright headless). Chromium's native C++ implementations of all\nseven DOM methods are **iterative** — they traverse the DOM without consuming JS call stack frames.\nAll seven succeed at depths up to 20,000 without any crash.\n\nWhen `@xmldom/xmldom` is bundled and run in a browser context the same recursive JS code executes\nunder the browser's V8 stack limit (~12,000–13,000 frames). The crash thresholds are similar to\nthose observed on Node.js 18 (~5,000 for `serializeToString`, ~10,000 for the remaining six).\n\nThe vulnerability is specific to xmldom's pure-JavaScript recursive implementation, not an\ninherent property of the DOM operations.\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### `normalize()` (from @praveen-kv report, 2026-04-05)\n\n```js\nconst { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');\n\nfunction generateNestedXML(depth) {\n    return '\u003croot\u003e' + '\u003ca\u003e'.repeat(depth) + 'text' + '\u003c/a\u003e'.repeat(depth) + '\u003c/root\u003e';\n}\n\nconst doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(generateNestedXML(10000), 'text/xml');\ndoc.documentElement.normalize();\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\n### `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` (from GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw)\n\n```js\nconst { DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');\n\nconst depth = 5000;\nconst xml = '\u003ca\u003e'.repeat(depth) + '\u003c/a\u003e'.repeat(depth);\nconst doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');\nnew XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nThe other methods have been verified using similar pocs.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny service that accepts attacker-controlled XML and subsequently calls any of the seven affected\nDOM operations can be forced into a reliable denial of service with a single crafted payload.\n\nThe immediate result is an uncaught `RangeError` and failed request processing. In deployments\nwhere uncaught exceptions terminate the worker or process, the impact can extend beyond a single\nrequest and disrupt service availability more broadly.\n\nNo authentication, special options, or invalid XML is required. A valid, deeply nested XML\ndocument is enough.\n\n---\n\n## Disclosure\n\nThe `normalize()` vector was publicly disclosed at 2026-04-06T11:25:07Z via\n[xmldom/xmldom#987](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/987) (closed without merge).\n`serializeToString()` and the five additional recursive entry points were not mentioned in that PR.\n\n---\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nAll seven affected traversals have been converted from recursive to iterative implementations, eliminating call-stack consumption on deep trees.\n\n### `walkDOM` utility\n\nA new `walkDOM(node, context, callbacks)` utility is introduced. It traverses the subtree rooted at `node` in depth-first order using an explicit JavaScript array as a stack, consuming heap memory instead of call-stack frames. `context` is an arbitrary value threaded through the walk — each `callbacks.enter(node, context)` call returns the context to pass to that node's children, enabling per-branch state (e.g. namespace snapshots in the serializer). `callbacks.exit(node, context)` (optional) is called in post-order after all children have been visited.\n\nThe following six operations are re-implemented on top of `walkDOM`:\n\n| Operation | Public entry point(s) |\n|---|---|\n| `_visitNode` helper | `getElementsByTagName()`, `getElementsByTagNameNS()`, `getElementsByClassName()`, `getElementById()` |\n| `getTextContent` inner function | `node.textContent` getter |\n| `cloneNode` module function | `Node.prototype.cloneNode(true)` |\n| `importNode` module function | `Document.prototype.importNode(node, true)` |\n| `serializeToString` worker | `XMLSerializer.prototype.serializeToString()`, `Node.prototype.toString()`, `NodeList.prototype.toString()` |\n| `normalize` | `Node.prototype.normalize()` |\n\n`normalize` uses `walkDOM` with a `null` context and an `enter` callback that merges adjacent Text children of the current node before `walkDOM` reads and queues those children — so the surviving post-merge children are what the walker descends into.\n\n### Custom iterative loop for `isEqualNode`\n\nOne function cannot use `walkDOM`:\n\n**`Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other)`** (0.9.x only; absent from 0.8.x) compares two trees in parallel. It maintains an explicit stack of `{node, other}` node pairs — one node from each tree — which cannot be expressed with `walkDOM`'s single-tree visitor.\n\n### After the fix\n\nAll seven entry points succeed on trees of arbitrary depth without throwing `RangeError`. The original PoCs still demonstrate the vulnerability on unpatched versions and confirm the fix on patched versions.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T20:23:57Z","modified":"2026-05-08T20:10:22Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:04.762828Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41673","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:16:33.257Z","modified":"2026-08-28T16:17:57.96Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-674","CWE-776"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:17.842772Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-41673","title":"xmldom: Denial of service via uncontrolled recursion in XML serialization","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T03:40:28.378Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:57.066084256Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:03.764807Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-41673","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:16:33.257Z","modified":"2026-10-01T03:03:22.817568889Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:54.892385Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw","title":"xmldom: Uncontrolled recursion in XML serialization leads to DoS","description":"## Summary\n\nSeven recursive traversals in `lib/dom.js` operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply\nnested DOM tree causes a `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`, crashing the application.\n\n**Reported operations:**\n- `Node.prototype.normalize()` — reported by @praveen-kv (email 2026-04-05) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-fwmp-8wwc-qhv6, via `DOMParser.parseFromString()`)\n- `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` — reported by @Jvr2022 (GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-j2hf-fqwf-rrjf)\n\n**Additionally, discovered in research:**\n- `Element.getElementsByTagName()` / `getElementsByTagNameNS()` / `getElementsByClassName()` / `getElementById()`\n- `Node.cloneNode(true)`\n- `Document.importNode(node, true)`\n- `node.textContent` (getter)\n- `Node.isEqualNode(other)`\n\nAll seven share the same root cause: pure-JavaScript recursive tree traversal with no depth guard.\nA single deeply nested document (parsed successfully) triggers any or all of these operations.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`lib/dom.js` implements DOM tree traversals as depth-first recursive functions. Each level of\nelement nesting adds one JavaScript call frame. The JS engine's call stack is finite; once\nexhausted, a `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` is thrown. This error may not be\ncaught reliably at stack-exhaustion depths because the catch handler itself requires stack\nframes to execute — especially in async scenarios, where an uncaught `RangeError` inside a\ncallback or promise chain can crash the entire Node.js process.\n\nParsing a deeply nested document **succeeds** — the SAX parser in `lib/sax.js` is iterative.\nThe crash occurs during subsequent operations on the parsed DOM.\n\n### `Node.prototype.normalize()` — reported by @praveen-kv\n\n[`lib/dom.js:1296–1308`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1296-L1308) (main):\n\n```js\nnormalize: function () {\n    var child = this.firstChild;\n    while (child) {\n        var next = child.nextSibling;\n        if (next \u0026\u0026 next.nodeType == TEXT_NODE \u0026\u0026 child.nodeType == TEXT_NODE) {\n            this.removeChild(next);\n            child.appendData(next.data);\n        } else {\n            child.normalize();   // recursive call — no depth guard\n            child = next;\n        }\n    }\n},\n```\n\nCrash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~10,000 levels.\n\n### `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` — reported by @Jvr2022\n\n[`lib/dom.js:2790–2974`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L2790-L2974) (main):\nThe internal `serializeToString` worker recurses into child nodes at four call sites, each\npassing a `visibleNamespaces.slice()` copy. The per-frame allocation causes earlier stack\nexhaustion than `normalize()`.\n\nCrash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~5,000 levels.\n\n### Additional recursive entry points\n\nAll five crash at ~10,000 levels on Node.js 18.\n\n| Function                    | Definition                                                                                                           | Public API entry point(s)                                                                            | Crash depth (Node.js 18) |\n|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|\n| `_visitNode`                | [`lib/dom.js:1529`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1529) | `getElementsByTagName()`, `getElementsByTagNameNS()`, `getElementsByClassName()`, `getElementById()` | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `cloneNode` (module fn)     | [`lib/dom.js:3037`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L3037) | `Node.prototype.cloneNode(true)`                                                                     | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `importNode` (module fn)    | [`lib/dom.js:2975`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L2975) | `Document.prototype.importNode(node, true)`                                                          | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `getTextContent` (inner fn) | [`lib/dom.js:3130`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L3130) | `node.textContent` (getter)                                                                          | ~10,000 levels           |\n| `isEqualNode`               | [`lib/dom.js:1120`](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/9ef2fd297ca527a05ecb11979850317a927cd20c/lib/dom.js#L1120) | `Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other)`                                                                  | ~10,000 levels           |\n\nBoth active branches (`main` and `release-0.8.x`) are identically affected. The unscoped `xmldom`\npackage (≤ 0.6.0) carries the same recursive patterns from its initial commit.\n\n### Browser behavior\n\nTested with Chromium 147 (Playwright headless). Chromium's native C++ implementations of all\nseven DOM methods are **iterative** — they traverse the DOM without consuming JS call stack frames.\nAll seven succeed at depths up to 20,000 without any crash.\n\nWhen `@xmldom/xmldom` is bundled and run in a browser context the same recursive JS code executes\nunder the browser's V8 stack limit (~12,000–13,000 frames). The crash thresholds are similar to\nthose observed on Node.js 18 (~5,000 for `serializeToString`, ~10,000 for the remaining six).\n\nThe vulnerability is specific to xmldom's pure-JavaScript recursive implementation, not an\ninherent property of the DOM operations.\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### `normalize()` (from @praveen-kv report, 2026-04-05)\n\n```js\nconst { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');\n\nfunction generateNestedXML(depth) {\n    return '\u003croot\u003e' + '\u003ca\u003e'.repeat(depth) + 'text' + '\u003c/a\u003e'.repeat(depth) + '\u003c/root\u003e';\n}\n\nconst doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(generateNestedXML(10000), 'text/xml');\ndoc.documentElement.normalize();\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\n### `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` (from GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw)\n\n```js\nconst { DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');\n\nconst depth = 5000;\nconst xml = '\u003ca\u003e'.repeat(depth) + '\u003c/a\u003e'.repeat(depth);\nconst doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');\nnew XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nThe other methods have been verified using similar pocs.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny service that accepts attacker-controlled XML and subsequently calls any of the seven affected\nDOM operations can be forced into a reliable denial of service with a single crafted payload.\n\nThe immediate result is an uncaught `RangeError` and failed request processing. In deployments\nwhere uncaught exceptions terminate the worker or process, the impact can extend beyond a single\nrequest and disrupt service availability more broadly.\n\nNo authentication, special options, or invalid XML is required. A valid, deeply nested XML\ndocument is enough.\n\n---\n\n## Disclosure\n\nThe `normalize()` vector was publicly disclosed at 2026-04-06T11:25:07Z via\n[xmldom/xmldom#987](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/987) (closed without merge).\n`serializeToString()` and the five additional recursive entry points were not mentioned in that PR.\n\n---\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nAll seven affected traversals have been converted from recursive to iterative implementations, eliminating call-stack consumption on deep trees.\n\n### `walkDOM` utility\n\nA new `walkDOM(node, context, callbacks)` utility is introduced. It traverses the subtree rooted at `node` in depth-first order using an explicit JavaScript array as a stack, consuming heap memory instead of call-stack frames. `context` is an arbitrary value threaded through the walk — each `callbacks.enter(node, context)` call returns the context to pass to that node's children, enabling per-branch state (e.g. namespace snapshots in the serializer). `callbacks.exit(node, context)` (optional) is called in post-order after all children have been visited.\n\nThe following six operations are re-implemented on top of `walkDOM`:\n\n| Operation | Public entry point(s) |\n|---|---|\n| `_visitNode` helper | `getElementsByTagName()`, `getElementsByTagNameNS()`, `getElementsByClassName()`, `getElementById()` |\n| `getTextContent` inner function | `node.textContent` getter |\n| `cloneNode` module function | `Node.prototype.cloneNode(true)` |\n| `importNode` module function | `Document.prototype.importNode(node, true)` |\n| `serializeToString` worker | `XMLSerializer.prototype.serializeToString()`, `Node.prototype.toString()`, `NodeList.prototype.toString()` |\n| `normalize` | `Node.prototype.normalize()` |\n\n`normalize` uses `walkDOM` with a `null` context and an `enter` callback that merges adjacent Text children of the current node before `walkDOM` reads and queues those children — so the surviving post-merge children are what the walker descends into.\n\n### Custom iterative loop for `isEqualNode`\n\nOne function cannot use `walkDOM`:\n\n**`Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other)`** (0.9.x only; absent from 0.8.x) compares two trees in parallel. It maintains an explicit stack of `{node, other}` node pairs — one node from each tree — which cannot be expressed with `walkDOM`'s single-tree visitor.\n\n### After the fix\n\nAll seven entry points succeed on trees of arbitrary depth without throwing `RangeError`. The original PoCs still demonstrate the vulnerability on unpatched versions and confirm the fix on patched versions.","status":"published","published":"2026-04-22T20:23:57Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:42.381251494Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41673","description":"xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:16:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T12:58:15.424744688Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:18.393417Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1778114662","title":"TuxCare security update for xmldom (3 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt xmldom to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 0.6.0-tuxcare.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-04T14:52:30Z","modified":"2026-11-05T13:28:26.23619373Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:37:45.64821Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1790755546","title":"TuxCare security update for @xmldom/xmldom (14 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt @xmldom/xmldom to address 14 CVEs. Fixed in 0.7.13-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-30T08:05:46Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:53.549832566Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:48.65893Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1791028067","title":"TuxCare security update for @xmldom/xmldom (3 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt @xmldom/xmldom to address 3 CVEs. Fixed in 0.9.8-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-03T11:47:47Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:38.622375059Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:49.016976Z"}]}}