{"id":"CVE-2026-42804","aliases":["EUVD-2026-75329","GHSA-6jqh-27cv-xqr6"],"status":"published","title":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C...","description":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). \r\n\r\nThe parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.\r\n\r\nA locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.\r\n\r\nThis corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00254,"percentile":0.17044,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-121"],"published":"2026-09-10T08:56:14Z","modified":"2026-09-10T16:17:12Z","products":[{"vendor":"bosch sensortec","product":"bhi360_sensorapi (c-library)"}],"references":[{"url":"https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-223618.html","tags":["vendor-advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42804"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jqh-27cv-xqr6"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42804","description":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). \r\n\r\nThe parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.\r\n\r\nA locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.\r\n\r\nThis corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).","status":"published","published":"2026-09-10T08:56:14.315Z","modified":"2026-09-10T15:01:55.301Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-121"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:23.731501Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-75329","description":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). \r\n\r\nThe parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.\r\n\r\nA locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.\r\n\r\nThis corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).","status":"published","published":"2026-09-10T08:56:14Z","modified":"2026-09-10T15:01:55Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:24.501469Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-6jqh-27cv-xqr6","title":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C...","description":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.\n\nThe vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). \n\nThe parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.\n\nA locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.\n\nThis corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.\n\nFurthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).","status":"published","published":"2026-09-10T09:31:33Z","modified":"2026-09-10T09:31:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-121"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:11:41.43854Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42804","description":"A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Bosch Sensortec BHI360 SensorAPI(C-Library) in versions up to and including commit d6b200416a.\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability is located within the FIFO parsing and debug logging subsystem inside the function bhi360_parse_debug_message() in bhi360_parse.c (lines 1852-1875). \r\n\r\nThe parser trusts the first payload byte of a debug frame as the message length (msg_length) and copies that many bytes into a fixed-size 17-byte stack buffer (debug_msg) via memcpy without performing any bounds checking.\r\n\r\nA locally or physically positioned attacker (e.g., via a malicious sensor, counterfeit hardware module, or a Man-in-the-Middle on the communication bus) can exploit this vulnerability by injecting a crafted debug frame with a length byte exceeding 16.\r\n\r\nThis corrupts adjacent stack data, including the saved return address.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, because the overflowed buffer is subsequently passed to a printf-style logging sink, the attacker can supply format string specifiers (e.g., %n) to execute arbitrary code on the host microcontroller/SoC or cause a reliable system crash (Denial of Service).","status":"published","published":"2026-09-10T09:17:01.88Z","modified":"2026-09-10T16:17:12.07Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-121"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:45.93749Z"}]}}