{"id":"CVE-2026-42810","aliases":["EUVD-2026-27035","GHSA-vxgg-mqx2-3w59"],"status":"published","title":"Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00425,"percentile":0.37047,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-20"],"published":"2026-05-04T16:48:49Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.polaris:polaris-core","fixed_in":["1.4.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.polaris:polaris-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.4.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.apache.polaris:polaris-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.4.1"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0-incubating","1.0.1-incubating","1.1.0-incubating","1.2.0-incubating","1.3.0-incubating","1.4.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"apache","product":"polaris"},{"vendor":"apache software foundation","product":"apache polaris"}],"references":[{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9","tags":["vendor-advisory","Mailing List","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11","tags":["Mailing List","Third Party Advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42810","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/polaris/commit/da54eb15c2c42c59afedefacbe7a528856b07c0a","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vxgg-mqx2-3w59"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/42xxx/CVE-2026-42810.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/polaris","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42810","title":"Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z","modified":"2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:35.004553Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-27035","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T16:48:49Z","modified":"2026-05-04T18:33:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:05:17.549765Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-vxgg-mqx2-3w59","title":"Apache Polaris has an Improper Input Validation Issue","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions.\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table.\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access.\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T18:30:31Z","modified":"2026-05-08T17:57:34Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:04.762828Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42810","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T17:16:26.493Z","modified":"2026-10-26T19:10:00.163Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-116"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:17.022502Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42810","title":"Apache Polaris: could broaden vended S3 credentials through wildcard-bearing namespace or table names","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:12.061454152Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-116","CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.117819Z"},{"id":"GHSA-vxgg-mqx2-3w59","title":"Apache Polaris has an Improper Input Validation Issue","description":"Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions.\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table.\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access.\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-04T18:30:31Z","modified":"2026-05-08T18:26:33.773175Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"},{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:58.04805Z"}]}}