{"id":"CVE-2026-42863","aliases":["EUVD-2026-35106","GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m"],"status":"published","title":"Flowise: Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment","description":"Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00316,"percentile":0.24737,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"published":"2026-05-14T14:54:28Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"flowise","fixed_in":["3.1.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"flowise","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.1.1"},{"fixed":"3.1.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"flowise","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.2"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"flowiseai","product":"flowise"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Product","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42863","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/42xxx/CVE-2026-42863.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42863","title":"Flowise: Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment","description":"Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-08T15:29:24.966Z","modified":"2026-06-08T16:22:46.285Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:35.004553Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-35106","description":"Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-08T15:29:24Z","modified":"2026-06-08T16:22:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:48.834104Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m","title":"FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment","description":"### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating chatflows:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/chatflows/{chatflowId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing the chatflow configuration (flowData) along with other metadata fields.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nExamples of server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. deployed\n2. isPublic\n3. workspaceId\n4. createdDate\n5. updatedDate\n6. category\n7. type\n\nThese fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity when processing the update request, suggesting that the server performs a direct merge of the request body into the chatflow model without applying a strict DTO whitelist or authorization checks.\n\nFor example, modifying the request body with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"createdDate\": \"1999-03-06T10:59:32.000Z\",\n  \"updatedDate\": \"1999-03-06T13:21:34.000Z\",\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nresults in the server accepting and persisting these values.\n\nIn testing, a second workspace was created in the database and the workspaceId field was successfully modified through the API request. The chatflow was reassigned to the attacker-controlled workspace, confirming that the application does not enforce workspace ownership validation.\n\n\n### PoC\nAuthenticate to the Flowise interface.\n\nCapture the request used to update a chatflow:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/chatflows/\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting additional fields:\n\n{\n  \"name\": \"test-flow\",\n  \"flowData\": \"{...}\",\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nSend the request.\n\nObserve that the response returns the manipulated values:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nVerify in the database that the chatflow has been reassigned:\n\n```sql\nSELECT id, workspaceId FROM chat_flow WHERE id='\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e';\n```\n\nThe workspaceId value reflects the attacker-supplied workspace.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate server-controlled attributes of chatflows.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Unauthorized modification of chatflow visibility (isPublic)\n- Unauthorized deployment state changes (deployed)\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of chatflows (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant environments, this allows an attacker to move chatflows between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.\n\nThis may enable:\n\n- Cross-workspace workflow takeover\n- Unauthorized exposure of private workflows\n- Manipulation of deployed agent workflows\n\nThe issue stems from missing authorization checks and improper handling of client-controlled input in the chatflow update endpoint.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T14:54:28Z","modified":"2026-06-09T13:10:04Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:24.856614Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42863","description":"Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-08T16:16:39.82Z","modified":"2026-07-23T07:10:00.113Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:22.73178Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-42863","title":"Flowise: Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment","description":"Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-08T15:29:24.966Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02.246663804Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.117819Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5wxp-qjgq-fx6m","title":"FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Chatflow Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace AgentFlow Reassignment","description":"### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the chatflow update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows clients to modify server-controlled properties such as deployed, isPublic, workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a chatflow object.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an authenticated user can manipulate internal attributes of a chatflow and reassign it to another workspace. This allows cross-workspace resource reassignment and unauthorized modification of deployment and visibility settings.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating chatflows:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/chatflows/{chatflowId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing the chatflow configuration (flowData) along with other metadata fields.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nExamples of server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. deployed\n2. isPublic\n3. workspaceId\n4. createdDate\n5. updatedDate\n6. category\n7. type\n\nThese fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity when processing the update request, suggesting that the server performs a direct merge of the request body into the chatflow model without applying a strict DTO whitelist or authorization checks.\n\nFor example, modifying the request body with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"createdDate\": \"1999-03-06T10:59:32.000Z\",\n  \"updatedDate\": \"1999-03-06T13:21:34.000Z\",\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nresults in the server accepting and persisting these values.\n\nIn testing, a second workspace was created in the database and the workspaceId field was successfully modified through the API request. The chatflow was reassigned to the attacker-controlled workspace, confirming that the application does not enforce workspace ownership validation.\n\n\n### PoC\nAuthenticate to the Flowise interface.\n\nCapture the request used to update a chatflow:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/chatflows/\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting additional fields:\n\n{\n  \"name\": \"test-flow\",\n  \"flowData\": \"{...}\",\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nSend the request.\n\nObserve that the response returns the manipulated values:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"deployed\": true,\n  \"isPublic\": true,\n  \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nVerify in the database that the chatflow has been reassigned:\n\n```sql\nSELECT id, workspaceId FROM chat_flow WHERE id='\u003cCHATFLOW_ID\u003e';\n```\n\nThe workspaceId value reflects the attacker-supplied workspace.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate server-controlled attributes of chatflows.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Unauthorized modification of chatflow visibility (isPublic)\n- Unauthorized deployment state changes (deployed)\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of chatflows (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant environments, this allows an attacker to move chatflows between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.\n\nThis may enable:\n\n- Cross-workspace workflow takeover\n- Unauthorized exposure of private workflows\n- Manipulation of deployed agent workflows\n\nThe issue stems from missing authorization checks and improper handling of client-controlled input in the chatflow update endpoint.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T14:54:28Z","modified":"2026-06-09T13:15:14.318403069Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-284","CWE-639","CWE-915"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:38.911014Z"}]}}