{"id":"CVE-2026-43910","aliases":["EUVD-2026-49879","GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w"],"status":"published","title":"Appium java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor","description":"Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0043,"percentile":0.37619,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"published":"2026-07-28T14:26:53Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:13:35Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"io.appium:java-client","fixed_in":["10.1.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"io.appium:java-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"8.2.1"},{"last_affected":"10.1.0"},{"fixed":"10.1.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"io.appium:java-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"8.2.1"},{"fixed":"10.1.1"}]}],"versions":["10.0.0","10.1.0","8.2.1","8.3.0","8.4.0","8.5.0","8.5.1","8.6.0","9.0.0","9.1.0","9.2.0","9.2.1","9.2.2","9.2.3","9.3.0","9.4.0","9.5.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"appium","product":"java-client"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/appium/java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/appium/java-client/pull/2408","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/appium/java-client/commit/2b9cd442b9dbf56ccc6f1e83aeeb411c0ec230c9","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/appium/java-client/releases/tag/v10.1.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/43xxx/CVE-2026-43910.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43910","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/appium/java-client","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-43910","title":"Appium java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor","description":"Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T15:38:24.102Z","modified":"2026-07-28T17:07:24.613Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:37:25.103021Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-49879","description":"Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T15:38:24Z","modified":"2026-07-28T17:07:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:30.949894Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w","title":"java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor","description":"## Summary\n\nWhen `directConnect(true)` is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally\naccepts `directConnectHost`, `directConnectPort`, and `directConnectPath`\nfrom the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent\nsession traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist,\nno host validation, and no user notification.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n- `AppiumCommandExecutor.java` (line 196–219): `setDirectConnect()` builds\n  a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls `overrideServerUrl(newUrl)`\n  without validating host/IP.\n- `DirectConnect.java`: `getUrl()` constructs `protocol://host:port/path`\n  with no allowlist.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nOnly the protocol is validated (must equal \"https\"). The destination host\nand port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist.\n\n## PoC (confirmed)\n\nA rogue server injecting `directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443` causes the\nclient to silently redirect all post-session commands:\n\n[bootstrap]       POST /wd/hub/session\n[bootstrap]       Injecting directConnect -\u003e https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub\n[redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source\n[redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001\n\nOriginal source code unmodified — confirmed via `git diff HEAD` (empty).\n\n## Evidence Screenshots\n\n**Screenshot 1 — Rogue server capturing redirected traffic:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"887\" height=\"146\" alt=\"1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc28002c-ea20-4ac8-8336-cec632e3c842\" /\u003e\n\n**Screenshot 2 — Java client processing response from attacker host:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"788\" height=\"130\" alt=\"2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/222cbab0-0d53-45b2-847d-6aa4e3b79370\" /\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\n- Full interception of session traffic\n- Network pivot to internal hosts (RFC-1918, 169.254.169.254)\n- Cloud credential theft via IMDS endpoint\n- Escalates to ~8.1 High in CI/CD environments where directConnect(true)\n  is set in shared base configuration\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd allowlist validation before `overrideServerUrl()` is called, and/or\nblock RFC-1918/loopback/link-local destinations by default.\n\n[poc_appium_directconnect.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26472525/poc_appium_directconnect.zip)","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T14:26:53Z","modified":"2026-07-28T14:26:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:53.707378Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-43910","description":"Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T16:18:12.44Z","modified":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:33.249634Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-43910","title":"Appium java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor","description":"Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T15:38:24.102Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:13:35.663135855Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.820169Z"},{"id":"GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w","title":"java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor","description":"## Summary\n\nWhen `directConnect(true)` is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally\naccepts `directConnectHost`, `directConnectPort`, and `directConnectPath`\nfrom the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent\nsession traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist,\nno host validation, and no user notification.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n- `AppiumCommandExecutor.java` (line 196–219): `setDirectConnect()` builds\n  a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls `overrideServerUrl(newUrl)`\n  without validating host/IP.\n- `DirectConnect.java`: `getUrl()` constructs `protocol://host:port/path`\n  with no allowlist.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nOnly the protocol is validated (must equal \"https\"). The destination host\nand port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist.\n\n## PoC (confirmed)\n\nA rogue server injecting `directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443` causes the\nclient to silently redirect all post-session commands:\n\n[bootstrap]       POST /wd/hub/session\n[bootstrap]       Injecting directConnect -\u003e https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub\n[redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source\n[redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001\n\nOriginal source code unmodified — confirmed via `git diff HEAD` (empty).\n\n## Evidence Screenshots\n\n**Screenshot 1 — Rogue server capturing redirected traffic:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"887\" height=\"146\" alt=\"1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc28002c-ea20-4ac8-8336-cec632e3c842\" /\u003e\n\n**Screenshot 2 — Java client processing response from attacker host:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"788\" height=\"130\" alt=\"2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/222cbab0-0d53-45b2-847d-6aa4e3b79370\" /\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\n- Full interception of session traffic\n- Network pivot to internal hosts (RFC-1918, 169.254.169.254)\n- Cloud credential theft via IMDS endpoint\n- Escalates to ~8.1 High in CI/CD environments where directConnect(true)\n  is set in shared base configuration\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd allowlist validation before `overrideServerUrl()` is called, and/or\nblock RFC-1918/loopback/link-local destinations by default.\n\n[poc_appium_directconnect.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26472525/poc_appium_directconnect.zip)","status":"published","published":"2026-07-28T14:26:53Z","modified":"2026-07-28T14:41:49.871148Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-441","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.956911Z"}]}}