{"id":"CVE-2026-44359","aliases":["EUVD-2026-45873","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44359"],"status":"published","title":"Meshtastic GitHub repo vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via pull_request_target Fork Checkout in CI Workflow","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.01799,"percentile":0.78762,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-829","CWE-94"],"published":"2026-07-19T23:06:32Z","modified":"2026-11-10T02:32:23Z","affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"meshtastic","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.7.7-1","2.7.8-1","2.7.9-1","2.7.9-2","2.7.10-1","2.7.10-2","2.7.11-1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"meshtastic","product":"firmware"},{"vendor":"yarbo","product":"firmware"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-mjx5-98jq-q736","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/commit/5716aeba3bc1e1d34fba9567ff88917ede4a78a5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GdHT2s5hMYCiHt4zrWt1q58mvL7WQC0M/view?usp=sharing","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44359.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44359","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-44359","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44359","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44359","title":"Meshtastic GitHub repo vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via pull_request_target Fork Checkout in CI Workflow","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-19T23:06:32.005Z","modified":"2026-07-24T03:56:28.416Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:00.288193Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-45873","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-19T23:06:32Z","modified":"2026-07-24T03:56:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:41.195396Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44359","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-20T00:16:58.21Z","modified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:31.024898Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44359","title":"Meshtastic GitHub repo vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via pull_request_target Fork Checkout in CI Workflow","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-19T23:06:32.005Z","modified":"2026-11-10T02:32:23.108400175Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-829","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-10T02:45:42.584685Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44359","description":"Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-20T00:16:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T12:58:19.434070559Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:22.075798Z"}]}}