{"id":"CVE-2026-44520","aliases":["EUVD-2026-30340","GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx","PYSEC-2026-2458"],"status":"published","title":"Docling-Graph: SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00188,"percentile":0.08422,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"published":"2026-05-07T03:15:46Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:04Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"docling-graph","fixed_in":["1.5.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"docling-graph","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"1.5.0"},{"fixed":"1.5.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"docling-graph","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.5.1"}]}],"versions":["0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.4.0","0.4.1","1.0.0","1.1.0","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.3","1.2.4","1.3.0","1.3.1","1.4.0","1.4.3","1.4.4","1.5.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"docling-graph","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.5.1"}]}],"versions":["0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.4.0","0.4.1","1.0.0","1.1.0","1.2.0","1.2.1","1.2.2","1.2.3","1.2.4","1.3.0","1.3.1","1.4.0","1.4.3","1.4.4","1.5.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"docling-project","product":"docling-graph"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling-graph/security/advisories/GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44520","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44520.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/docling-project/docling-graph","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/docling-graph","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44520","title":"Docling-Graph: SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T16:56:58.11Z","modified":"2026-05-14T18:08:05.223Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:42:49.132798Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30340","description":"Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T16:56:58Z","modified":"2026-05-14T18:08:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:04:31.113278Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx","title":"docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `URLInputHandler` class in `docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py` makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The `URLValidator` only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty `netloc`, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, `requests.head()` was called with `allow_redirects=True`, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.\n\nAn attacker who can control the `--source` CLI argument or `PipelineConfig.source` API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) to steal IAM credentials\n- Internal services on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or private network ranges (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)\n\nThis affects deployments where `docling-graph` processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed in **v1.5.1**.\n\nUsers should upgrade immediately:\n```\npip install --upgrade docling-graph\n```\n\nThe fix adds IP validation via `ipaddress` and `socket.gethostbyname()` before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (`allow_redirects=False`) with explicit validation of any `Location` header before following it.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that **all URLs passed to `URLInputHandler` come exclusively from trusted, internal sources**, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)\n- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [AWS Instance Metadata endpoint](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T03:15:46Z","modified":"2026-05-14T20:54:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:10.269075Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44520","description":"Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T18:16:50.01Z","modified":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.13Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.020465Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44520","title":"Docling-Graph: SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T16:56:58.11Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:04.571730388Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:04.820169Z"},{"id":"GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx","title":"docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `URLInputHandler` class in `docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py` makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The `URLValidator` only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty `netloc`, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, `requests.head()` was called with `allow_redirects=True`, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.\n\nAn attacker who can control the `--source` CLI argument or `PipelineConfig.source` API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) to steal IAM credentials\n- Internal services on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or private network ranges (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)\n\nThis affects deployments where `docling-graph` processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed in **v1.5.1**.\n\nUsers should upgrade immediately:\n```\npip install --upgrade docling-graph\n```\n\nThe fix adds IP validation via `ipaddress` and `socket.gethostbyname()` before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (`allow_redirects=False`) with explicit validation of any `Location` header before following it.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that **all URLs passed to `URLInputHandler` come exclusively from trusted, internal sources**, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)\n- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [AWS Instance Metadata endpoint](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-07T03:15:46Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:43:11.508373487Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-601","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:46.760785Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2458","title":"docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler","description":"### Impact\n\nThe `URLInputHandler` class in `docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py` makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The `URLValidator` only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty `netloc`, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, `requests.head()` was called with `allow_redirects=True`, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.\n\nAn attacker who can control the `--source` CLI argument or `PipelineConfig.source` API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) to steal IAM credentials\n- Internal services on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or private network ranges (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)\n\nThis affects deployments where `docling-graph` processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed in **v1.5.1**.\n\nUsers should upgrade immediately:\n```\npip install --upgrade docling-graph\n```\n\nThe fix adds IP validation via `ipaddress` and `socket.gethostbyname()` before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (`allow_redirects=False`) with explicit validation of any `Location` header before following it.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that **all URLs passed to `URLInputHandler` come exclusively from trusted, internal sources**, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)\n- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [AWS Instance Metadata endpoint](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html)","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:15:40.718557Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:31:40.072921364Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.961245Z"}]}}