{"id":"CVE-2026-44964","aliases":["EUVD-2026-54570","GHSA-jcqx-89jm-9vxr"],"status":"published","title":"The OnCallNotificationActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=...","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAn active Datadog session in the Android app.\r\nImpact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00339,"percentile":0.27617,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-441"],"published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:10:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"datadog","product":"android app"},{"vendor":"yoel geva","product":"android app"}],"references":[{"url":"https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/activity-element#exported"},{"url":"https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44964"},{"url":"https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jcqx-89jm-9vxr"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44964","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAn active Datadog session in the Android app.\r\nImpact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35.145Z","modified":"2026-08-08T01:05:53.334Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-441"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:42:49.132798Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-54570","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAn active Datadog session in the Android app.\r\nImpact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35Z","modified":"2026-08-08T01:05:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:06.573967Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-jcqx-89jm-9vxr","title":"The OnCallNotificationActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=...","description":"The OnCallNotificationActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=\"true\" in AndroidManifest.xml with no permission guard. Any co-installed application on the same device can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras: on_call_page_content (rendered as full-screen lock-screen text), page_id (used to enqueue an on-call Acknowledge worker), and on_call_page_intent, a Parcelable Intent that is passed through to startActivity from inside the Datadog process after a single user tap on the Acknowledge button.\nThe activity enables lock-screen display (setShowWhenLocked) and wakes the device (setTurnScreenOn) on launch. After one user tap, three effects follow: (1) a forged Acknowledge request is sent to the Datadog backend for the attacker-chosen page_id using the victim's authenticated session; (2) the attacker-controlled Intent is launched from the Datadog process via startActivity, providing reach into non-exported components of com.datadog.app (confused-deputy pattern); (3) the keyguard is dismissed and the screen turned on, usable as a social-engineering or annoyance vector. Preconditions: a malicious application co-installed on the victim device and an active Datadog session in the Android app.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:31:46Z","modified":"2026-08-07T21:31:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-441"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:12.306859Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44964","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAn active Datadog session in the Android app.\r\nImpact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim's session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:17:14.57Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:10:00.16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-441"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.386166Z"}]}}