{"id":"CVE-2026-44965","aliases":["EUVD-2026-54571","GHSA-p6pw-xx6v-j4hh"],"status":"published","title":"Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared...","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAt least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.\r\nAn active Datadog session cached locally.\r\nImpact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00161,"percentile":0.05355,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-926"],"published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:10:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"datadog","product":"android app"},{"vendor":"yoel geva","product":"android app"}],"references":[{"url":"https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926.html"},{"url":"https://developer.android.com/develop/ui/views/appwidgets/configuration"},{"url":"https://trust.datadoghq.com/?tcuUid=2e8b8fa5-39ca-43f4-9f6a-aeafafb440ef"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44965"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6pw-xx6v-j4hh"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44965","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAt least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.\r\nAn active Datadog session cached locally.\r\nImpact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35.165Z","modified":"2026-08-08T01:05:53.332Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-926"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:42:49.132798Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-54571","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAt least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.\r\nAn active Datadog session cached locally.\r\nImpact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:02:35Z","modified":"2026-08-08T01:05:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:06.573967Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-p6pw-xx6v-j4hh","title":"Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared...","description":"Six Android App Widget configuration activities in the Datadog Android application are declared android:exported=\"true\" with no permission guard: IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, and DashboardWidgetActivity. All six extend a shared base WidgetActivity that reads AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID from Intent extras and, when no resolved deep-link destination is supplied, uses that caller-controlled widget ID to look up the stored widget definition, fetch the associated user session, and perform an automatic login with source UserSessionSourceLogin.Automatic.\nAndroid App Widget IDs are small sequential integers assigned by AppWidgetManager. A zero-permission co-installed application can brute-force them by launching any of the six configuration activities with EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID set to 1..N until one matches a configured widget on the victim device. When a match occurs, the activity foregrounds with the victim's session already loaded and renders the widget configuration UI, which is backed by live data pickers (SLOs, dashboards, incident severities and types, on-call pages and shifts) fetched through the victim's authenticated HTTP client.\nExfiltration is screen-visible only — programmatic return of data to the caller is not possible from these activities. Disclosure is therefore a visual side-channel: accessibility services, screen recording, or screenshot capture. \nPreconditions: a malicious co-installed application, at least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen, and an active Datadog session cached locally.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:31:46Z","modified":"2026-08-07T21:31:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-926"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:12.306859Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-44965","description":"In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device.\r\nThis requires:\r\nA malicious application co-installed on the victim's device.\r\nAt least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen.\r\nAn active Datadog session cached locally.\r\nImpact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T18:17:14.69Z","modified":"2026-10-23T20:10:00.16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-926"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.386166Z"}]}}