{"id":"CVE-2026-45036","aliases":["EUVD-2026-30567","GHSA-qr3x-j8g9-xhf6"],"status":"published","title":"Tabby auto-confirms ZMODEM detection on terminal output, leading to shell command execution from displayed file content under fish, bash, and zsh","description":"Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\\x18B0100000023be50\\r\\n\\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0013,"percentile":0.02727,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-78"],"published":"2026-05-15T16:47:17Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53Z","products":[{"vendor":"eugeny","product":"tabby"},{"vendor":"tabby","product":"tabby"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Eugeny/tabby/security/advisories/GHSA-qr3x-j8g9-xhf6","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45036.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45036","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45036","title":"Tabby auto-confirms ZMODEM detection on terminal output, leading to shell command execution from displayed file content under fish, bash, and zsh","description":"Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\\x18B0100000023be50\\r\\n\\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T16:47:17.974Z","modified":"2026-05-20T15:42:57.726Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:32.755125Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30567","description":"Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\\x18B0100000023be50\\r\\n\\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T16:47:17Z","modified":"2026-05-20T15:42:57Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:21:14.344818Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45036","description":"Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\\x18B0100000023be50\\r\\n\\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T17:16:48.487Z","modified":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.13Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.39893Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45036","title":"Tabby auto-confirms ZMODEM detection on terminal output, leading to shell command execution from displayed file content under fish, bash, and zsh","description":"Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\\x18B0100000023be50\\r\\n\\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T16:47:17.974Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53.865069976Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:05.172514Z"}]}}