{"id":"CVE-2026-45297","aliases":["EUVD-2026-32970","GHSA-5m23-rcj4-cgjx"],"status":"published","title":"Cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch","description":"OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == \"projectId\" (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({\"errors\":[\"tenants already registered\"]} on second signup) so there's no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00207,"percentile":0.10911,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-05-28T16:50:38Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:45:45Z","products":[{"vendor":"openreplay","product":"openreplay"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/openreplay/openreplay/security/advisories/GHSA-5m23-rcj4-cgjx","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45297.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45297","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45297","title":"Cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch","description":"OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == \"projectId\" (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({\"errors\":[\"tenants already registered\"]} on second signup) so there's no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T16:50:38.672Z","modified":"2026-05-29T15:31:12.971Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:43.922571Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-32970","description":"OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == \"projectId\" (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({\"errors\":[\"tenants already registered\"]} on second signup) so there's no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T16:50:38Z","modified":"2026-05-29T15:31:12Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:21:00.772434Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45297","description":"OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == \"projectId\" (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({\"errors\":[\"tenants already registered\"]} on second signup) so there's no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T18:16:34.643Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:51:53.093Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:21.244426Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45297","title":"Cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch","description":"OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == \"projectId\" (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({\"errors\":[\"tenants already registered\"]} on second signup) so there's no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T16:50:38.672Z","modified":"2026-11-12T02:48:34.671369313Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-12T03:30:48.739835Z"}]}}