{"id":"CVE-2026-45550","aliases":["EUVD-2026-36037","GHSA-856h-mvm2-2h2x"],"status":"published","title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00196,"percentile":0.09438,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-06-10T14:00:06Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:31Z","products":[{"vendor":"roxy-wi","product":"roxy-wi"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-856h-mvm2-2h2x","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45550.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45550","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45550","title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T14:00:06.978Z","modified":"2026-06-10T16:31:33.373Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:43.922571Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-36037","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T14:00:06Z","modified":"2026-06-10T16:31:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:44.937217Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45550","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T15:16:36.16Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:52:11.41Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:23.485267Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-45550","title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T14:00:06.978Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:31.713407396Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:05.525666Z"}]}}