{"id":"CVE-2026-46549","aliases":["EUVD-2026-38586","GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p"],"status":"published","title":"NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00241,"percentile":0.15339,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-863"],"published":"2026-05-21T20:34:51Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:47:46Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"nocodb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.301.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"nocodb","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.301.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nocodb","product":"nocodb"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46549","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46549.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46549","title":"NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:40:24.037Z","modified":"2026-06-24T13:17:16.868Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:47:06.353366Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-38586","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:40:24Z","modified":"2026-06-24T13:17:16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:31.123469Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p","title":"NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation","description":"### Summary\n\nThe OAuth token strategy attached `oauth_scope` and `oauth_granted_resources` to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the `granted_resources.base_id` restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate `req.context.base_id`.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts`, the strategy set `is_oauth_token`, `oauth_client_id`, `oauth_granted_resources`, and `oauth_scope` on the user object, then mapped through to the user's existing `roles` / `base_roles`. The ACL middleware in `extract-ids.middleware.ts` honoured `is_api_token` via `blockApiTokenAccess` but had no equivalent gate for `is_oauth_token` or scope-string enforcement.\n\nThe base/workspace restriction logic short-circuited when `req.context.base_id` was unset (org-level routes), so an OAuth token scoped to one base could still call org-level endpoints as the underlying user.\n\nThe fix adds a path-prefix allowlist (`['/mcp', '/api/v3/', '/auth/user/me']`) enforced inside the strategy and a `blockOAuthTokenAccess` ACL flag for endpoints that should never accept OAuth tokens.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Scope escalation: tokens issued with a narrow scope received the underlying user's full role.\n- Resource boundary bypass: per-base restrictions did not apply to org-level routes.\n- Violates least-privilege expectation for third-party OAuth integrations.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T20:34:51Z","modified":"2026-07-20T21:16:10Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:47.245721Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46549","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T21:16:58.197Z","modified":"2026-06-25T14:21:00.26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:25.288279Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46549","title":"NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the OAuth token strategy attached oauth_scope and oauth_granted_resources to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the granted_resources.base_id restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate req.context.base_id. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:40:24.037Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:47:46.828980041Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:00.786919Z"},{"id":"GHSA-m5qg-rvjq-727p","title":"NocoDB: OAuth Token Scope Not Enforced at ACL Layer Allows Scope Escalation","description":"### Summary\n\nThe OAuth token strategy attached `oauth_scope` and `oauth_granted_resources` to the request user, but the ACL middleware never consulted either. An OAuth token issued with a restricted scope (e.g. MCP-only) therefore inherited the full permissions of the underlying user across all routes; the `granted_resources.base_id` restriction was bypassed on org-level endpoints that don't populate `req.context.base_id`.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/oauth-token.strategy.ts`, the strategy set `is_oauth_token`, `oauth_client_id`, `oauth_granted_resources`, and `oauth_scope` on the user object, then mapped through to the user's existing `roles` / `base_roles`. The ACL middleware in `extract-ids.middleware.ts` honoured `is_api_token` via `blockApiTokenAccess` but had no equivalent gate for `is_oauth_token` or scope-string enforcement.\n\nThe base/workspace restriction logic short-circuited when `req.context.base_id` was unset (org-level routes), so an OAuth token scoped to one base could still call org-level endpoints as the underlying user.\n\nThe fix adds a path-prefix allowlist (`['/mcp', '/api/v3/', '/auth/user/me']`) enforced inside the strategy and a `blockOAuthTokenAccess` ACL flag for endpoints that should never accept OAuth tokens.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Scope escalation: tokens issued with a narrow scope received the underlying user's full role.\n- Resource boundary bypass: per-base restrictions did not apply to org-level routes.\n- Violates least-privilege expectation for third-party OAuth integrations.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T20:34:51Z","modified":"2026-07-20T21:30:39.522929877Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:51.463834Z"}]}}