{"id":"CVE-2026-46551","aliases":["EUVD-2026-38623","GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p"],"status":"published","title":"NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.4, the uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.4.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00411,"percentile":0.3581,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-770"],"published":"2026-05-21T20:35:41Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:47:46Z","affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"nocodb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.301.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"nocodb","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.301.3"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nocodb","product":"nocodb"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46551","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46551.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46551","title":"NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.4, the uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:31:55.131Z","modified":"2026-06-24T13:57:19.738Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:47:06.353366Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-38623","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.4, the uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:31:55Z","modified":"2026-06-24T13:57:19Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:30.642628Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p","title":"NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `uploadViaURL` path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against the remote `content-length` or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts`, the HEAD probe read `content-length` but never compared it to `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE`; the subsequent `storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl()` performed the download without `maxContentLength`. The v3 service (`v3/data-attachment-v3.service.ts`) already enforced the limit, but the v1/v2 endpoints (`POST /api/v1/db/storage/upload-by-url`, `POST /api/v2/storage/upload-by-url`) did not.\n\nThis is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 (blind SSRF via HEAD) — same code area, different class.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authenticated DoS via disk exhaustion. Editor role suffices.\n- Cascading failures once disk fills: blocked DB writes, log rotation, application crash.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T20:35:41Z","modified":"2026-07-20T21:16:34Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:47.245721Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46551","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.4, the uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T21:16:58.457Z","modified":"2026-06-25T14:21:00.26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:25.288279Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46551","title":"NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion","description":"NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.4, the uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T20:31:55.131Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:47:46.939015483Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:00.786919Z"},{"id":"GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p","title":"NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `uploadViaURL` path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against the remote `content-length` or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts`, the HEAD probe read `content-length` but never compared it to `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE`; the subsequent `storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl()` performed the download without `maxContentLength`. The v3 service (`v3/data-attachment-v3.service.ts`) already enforced the limit, but the v1/v2 endpoints (`POST /api/v1/db/storage/upload-by-url`, `POST /api/v2/storage/upload-by-url`) did not.\n\nThis is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 (blind SSRF via HEAD) — same code area, different class.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authenticated DoS via disk exhaustion. Editor role suffices.\n- Cascading failures once disk fills: blocked DB writes, log rotation, application crash.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T20:35:41Z","modified":"2026-07-20T21:30:36.234103285Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-770"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:43.524801Z"}]}}