{"id":"CVE-2026-47172","aliases":["EUVD-2026-36300","GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346"],"status":"published","title":"Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.","description":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00409,"percentile":0.3548,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":true,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-829"],"published":"2026-06-11T18:28:53Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:46Z","exploits":[{"source":"pocgithub","id":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-00d54c717d","title":"pvharmo2/gha-lab-00d54c717d","date":"2026-09-07","url":"https://github.com/pvharmo2/gha-lab-00d54c717d"}],"products":[{"vendor":"duck-organization","product":"quest-bot"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/releases/tag/questbot-v1.0.3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47172.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47172","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47172","title":"Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.","description":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:28:53.321Z","modified":"2026-06-11T19:38:00.196Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:40.478484Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-36300","description":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:28:53Z","modified":"2026-06-11T19:38:00Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:44.061211Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47172","description":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T19:16:45.24Z","modified":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:23.485267Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47172","title":"Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.","description":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:28:53.321Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:46.713874666Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.231145Z"}]}}