{"id":"CVE-2026-47174","aliases":["EUVD-2026-36290","GHSA-qj93-7xrg-rvhw"],"status":"published","title":"Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment","description":"In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00387,"percentile":0.33103,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-829"],"published":"2026-06-11T18:46:59Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01Z","products":[{"vendor":"duck-organization","product":"duck-site"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/duck-organization/duck-site/security/advisories/GHSA-qj93-7xrg-rvhw","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47174.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47174","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47174","title":"Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment","description":"In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:46:59.572Z","modified":"2026-06-11T19:47:33.704Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:40.478484Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-36290","description":"In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:46:59Z","modified":"2026-06-11T19:47:33Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:44.061211Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47174","description":"In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T19:16:45.557Z","modified":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:23.485267Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47174","title":"Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment","description":"In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-11T18:46:59.572Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:01.680949845Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.5,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-829"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.231145Z"}]}}