{"id":"CVE-2026-47708","aliases":["EUVD-2026-46426","GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","PYSEC-2026-544"],"status":"published","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00384,"percentile":0.32803,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-77"],"published":"2026-06-04T21:00:42Z","modified":"2026-11-11T02:49:02Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stata-mcp","fixed_in":["1.17.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stata-mcp","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stata-mcp","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","1.10.0","1.10.1","1.10.2","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.12.0","1.12.1","1.13.0","1.13.1","1.13.10","1.13.11","1.13.12","1.13.13","1.13.14","1.13.15","1.13.16","1.13.17","1.13.18","1.13.19","1.13.2","1.13.20","1.13.21","1.13.22","1.13.23","1.13.24","1.13.25","1.13.26","1.13.27","1.13.28","1.13.29","1.13.3","1.13.30","1.13.31","1.13.32","1.13.33","1.13.34","1.13.35","1.13.36","1.13.37","1.13.38","1.13.39","1.13.4","1.13.40","1.13.41","1.13.42","1.13.5","1.13.6","1.13.7","1.13.8","1.13.9","1.14.0","1.14.1","1.14.2","1.14.3","1.15.0","1.15.1","1.16.0","1.16.1","1.16.2","1.16.3","1.17.0","1.17.1","1.17.2","1.3.10","1.3.2","1.3.3","1.3.4","1.3.5","1.3.6","1.3.7","1.3.8","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.5.3","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.6.2","1.6.3","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.2","1.9.0","1.9.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stata-mcp","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.17.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","1.10.0","1.10.1","1.10.2","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.12.0","1.12.1","1.13.0","1.13.1","1.13.10","1.13.11","1.13.12","1.13.13","1.13.14","1.13.15","1.13.16","1.13.17","1.13.18","1.13.19","1.13.2","1.13.20","1.13.21","1.13.22","1.13.23","1.13.24","1.13.25","1.13.26","1.13.27","1.13.28","1.13.29","1.13.3","1.13.30","1.13.31","1.13.32","1.13.33","1.13.34","1.13.35","1.13.36","1.13.37","1.13.38","1.13.39","1.13.4","1.13.40","1.13.41","1.13.42","1.13.5","1.13.6","1.13.7","1.13.8","1.13.9","1.14.0","1.14.1","1.14.2","1.14.3","1.15.0","1.15.1","1.16.0","1.16.1","1.16.2","1.16.3","1.17.0","1.17.1","1.17.2","1.3.10","1.3.2","1.3.3","1.3.4","1.3.5","1.3.6","1.3.7","1.3.8","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.5.3","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.6.2","1.6.3","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.2","1.9.0","1.9.1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"sepinetam","product":"stata-mcp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/security/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/issues/74","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","report","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47708.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47708","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/stata-mcp","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47708","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T20:55:15.048Z","modified":"2026-07-22T15:10:36.426Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:40.478484Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-46426","description":"MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T20:55:15Z","modified":"2026-07-22T15:10:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:45.882146Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"### Summary\nThe `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:\n\n```python\ncommands = f\"\"\"\ncapture log close\n{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}\n...\ndo \"{dofile_path}\"\n...\n\"\"\"\n```\n\nThe `generate_log_command` method returns:\n\n```python\nlog_cmd = f'log using \"{log_file.as_posix()}\", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)'\n```\n\nWhere `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:\n\n```python\ndef generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'):\n    return self.log_file_path / f\"{log_name}.{extension}\"\n```\n\nThe `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.\n\nAdditionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWhen calling `stata_do` via MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dofile_path\": \"test.do\",\n  \"log_file_name\": \"'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '\"\n}\n```\n\nThe generated Stata commands become:\n\n```stata\nlog using \"\u003clog_dir\u003e/'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '.log\", replace text name(text_log)\n```\n\nStata interprets this as multiple commands, with `shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt;` executed as an arbitrary shell command.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** via `shell` command injection\n- **Arbitrary file write/overwrite** via path traversal in `log_name`\n- Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters\n\n### Remediation / Fix\n\n1. Apply strict allowlist validation to `log_name` (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)\n2. Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory\n3. Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction\n4. Apply similar sanitization to `dofile_path` before embedding it into Stata command strings\n\n### References\n\n- Issue: #74\n- Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T21:00:42Z","modified":"2026-06-04T21:00:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:16.698699Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47708","description":"MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T21:16:51.477Z","modified":"2026-10-24T19:10:00.127Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:31.394335Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-47708","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-21T20:55:15.048Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:21.37417043Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:21:28.618498Z"},{"id":"GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"### Summary\nThe `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:\n\n```python\ncommands = f\"\"\"\ncapture log close\n{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}\n...\ndo \"{dofile_path}\"\n...\n\"\"\"\n```\n\nThe `generate_log_command` method returns:\n\n```python\nlog_cmd = f'log using \"{log_file.as_posix()}\", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)'\n```\n\nWhere `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:\n\n```python\ndef generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'):\n    return self.log_file_path / f\"{log_name}.{extension}\"\n```\n\nThe `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.\n\nAdditionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWhen calling `stata_do` via MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dofile_path\": \"test.do\",\n  \"log_file_name\": \"'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '\"\n}\n```\n\nThe generated Stata commands become:\n\n```stata\nlog using \"\u003clog_dir\u003e/'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '.log\", replace text name(text_log)\n```\n\nStata interprets this as multiple commands, with `shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt;` executed as an arbitrary shell command.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** via `shell` command injection\n- **Arbitrary file write/overwrite** via path traversal in `log_name`\n- Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters\n\n### Remediation / Fix\n\n1. Apply strict allowlist validation to `log_name` (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)\n2. Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory\n3. Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction\n4. Apply similar sanitization to `dofile_path` before embedding it into Stata command strings\n\n### References\n\n- Issue: #74\n- Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f","status":"published","published":"2026-06-04T21:00:42Z","modified":"2026-06-29T12:26:16.888662747Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:37.148947Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-544","title":"MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper","description":"### Summary\nThe `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:\n\n```python\ncommands = f\"\"\"\ncapture log close\n{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}\n...\ndo \"{dofile_path}\"\n...\n\"\"\"\n```\n\nThe `generate_log_command` method returns:\n\n```python\nlog_cmd = f'log using \"{log_file.as_posix()}\", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)'\n```\n\nWhere `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:\n\n```python\ndef generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'):\n    return self.log_file_path / f\"{log_name}.{extension}\"\n```\n\nThe `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.\n\nAdditionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.\n \n### Proof of Concept\n\nWhen calling `stata_do` via MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dofile_path\": \"test.do\",\n  \"log_file_name\": \"'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '\"\n}\n```\n\nThe generated Stata commands become:\n\n```stata\n log using \"\u003clog_dir\u003e/'; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; '.log\", replace text name(text_log)\n```\n\nStata interprets this as multiple commands, with `shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt;` executed as an arbitrary shell command.\n\n### Impact\n \n- **Remote Code Execution** via `shell` command injection\n- **Arbitrary file write/overwrite** via path traversal in `log_name`\n- Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters\n\n### Remediation / Fix\n\n1. Apply strict allowlist validation to `log_name` (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)\n2. Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory\n3. Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction\n4. Apply similar sanitization to `dofile_path` before embedding it into Stata command strings\n\n### References\n\n- Issue: #74\n- Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f","status":"published","published":"2026-06-29T11:50:52.497266Z","modified":"2026-07-01T20:23:05.367908Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:57.671918Z"}]}}