{"id":"CVE-2026-48035","aliases":["EUVD-2026-48725","GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"],"status":"published","title":"Hulumi: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","description":"Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00451,"percentile":0.39441,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"published":"2026-06-10T13:38:37Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@hulumi/baseline","fixed_in":["1.4.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@hulumi/baseline","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.4.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@hulumi/baseline","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.4.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"kerberosmansour","product":"hulumi"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/releases/tag/v1.4.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48035.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48035","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48035","title":"Hulumi: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","description":"Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T18:43:35.696Z","modified":"2026-07-27T20:23:56.41Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:50:38.739766Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-48725","description":"Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T18:43:35Z","modified":"2026-07-27T20:23:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:33.420584Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73","title":"@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","description":"**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `\u003c 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nThe S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:\n\n1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)\n2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown.\n3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: \"sandbox\"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.\n\n#### Impact\n\nConsumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/baseline@1.4.0`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`):\n\n- refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier;\n- emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);\n- adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nReplicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T13:38:37Z","modified":"2026-06-10T13:38:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:24.856614Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48035","description":"Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T19:16:58.617Z","modified":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:32.830533Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48035","title":"Hulumi: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","description":"Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T18:43:35.696Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:28.390202614Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.701612Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73","title":"@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","description":"**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `\u003c 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nThe S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:\n\n1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)\n2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown.\n3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: \"sandbox\"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.\n\n#### Impact\n\nConsumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/baseline@1.4.0`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`):\n\n- refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier;\n- emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);\n- adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nReplicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-10T13:38:37Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:07.460091887Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1059"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"}]}}