{"id":"CVE-2026-48079","aliases":["EUVD-2026-54150","GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh"],"status":"published","title":"OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00501,"percentile":0.43225,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-613"],"published":"2026-08-06T21:00:44Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:52Z","products":[{"vendor":"open-reception","product":"appointment-booking-software"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/2419f9e87a8abad72f31b1fedeb80c758b30322e","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/f833dbf50059ff7d4ea42ce7bbb3a5cdcf7a6929","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48079.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48079","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48079","title":"OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T21:00:44.615Z","modified":"2026-08-07T17:11:36.655Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-613"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:50:49.872037Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-54150","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T21:00:44Z","modified":"2026-08-07T17:11:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:06.930016Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48079","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T22:17:10.557Z","modified":"2026-10-23T21:10:00.157Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-613"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.386166Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48079","title":"OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry","description":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T21:00:44.615Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:52.14284174Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-613"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.701612Z"}]}}